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I. PROLOGUE
Nations competitively use every aspect of seapower to promote
their own security, power, wealth, well-being, and respect.' The
object of international law's decisionmaking process is to resolve
peacefully such competing State claims in a fashion that secures
the widest possible distribution of shared values while simultane-
ously rejecting exclusive claims that threaten to impair the inter-
ests of the international community.2 The likelihood of the claim,
counterclaim, and resolution process producing a decision that
conserves inclusive values (or exclusive values that do not jeop-
ardize community interests) is predicated upon the extent to
which participants in the decisionmaking process adhere to the
relevant legal prescriptions. However, because the participants
are intermittently claimants and decisionmakers, the mutualities
and reciprocities of the network are conducive to compliance with
the doctrinal standards. Stated another way, a nation that sub-
mits claims or renders determinations not authorized by interna-
1. See Rao, Legal Regulation of Maritime Military Uses, 13 INDIAN J. INT'L L.
425, 427-31 (1973).
2. M. McDOUGAL & W. BURKE, THE PuBnUc ORDER OF THE OCEANS (1962). Mc-
Dougal and Burke state at 37-38:
The kind of balancing of common interests long regarded as best serving
the most comprehensive community of mankind both emphasizes the pri-
macy of inclusive interests over exclusive interests, requiring only reason-
ableness in accommodation between conflicting inclusive interests, and
honors and protects assertions of exclusive interests, when in conflict with
inclusive interests, only when, and to the degree that, such honoring and
protection will contribute more to the common good.
tional law is likely to find its own actions used in the future by
others to impair its national interests.
The objective of this study is to examine the international legal
prescriptions regulating peacetime military uses of ocean space
other than passage through straits used for international naviga-
tion. To facilitate this task, the relevant principles will be dis-
cussed in the context of that aspect of peacetime anti-submarine
warfare (ASW) conducted below the navigable water surface.
Therefore, although reference will be made to the general princi-
ples enunciated in the four 1958 Conventions on the Law of the
Sea currently governing uses of ocean space,3 as well as to the
principles embodied in the products of the first six sessions of the
Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea (UN-
CLOS III) designed to govern future uses of ocean space, the arti-
cle will contain no suggestions as to the legality or illegality of
various naval activities other than peacetime ASW. This re-
strictive analysis does not, however, preclude the use of the prin-
ciples adduced or of the reasoning applied as a yardstick for
assessing the permissibility of such other activities. In fact, be-
cause this study examines virtually every existing and prospec-
tive conventional prescription relating to military use of the sea,
it has significance far beyond the narrow concern expressly ad-
dressed. To provide analytical context, the apposite principles are
discussed and evaluated following a brief review of both the role
of the submarine in the fulfillment of basic naval missions and
the tactics, assorted devices, and platforms of ASW.
II. ANTI-SuBmARxNE WARFARE: AN OVERVIEW
A. Naval Missions and ASW Tactics
The modern navy is designed to accomplish four basic mis-
sions: 4 sea control, projection of power ashore, naval presence,
and strategic deterrence.5 Sea control is the capacity to assert
3. Convention on the Continental Shelf, done Apr. 29, 1958, [1964] 15 U.S.T.
471, T.I.A.S. No. 5578, 499 U.N.T.S. 311; Convention on Fishing and Conservation of
the Living Resources of the High Seas, done Apr. 29, 1958, [19661 17 U.S.T. 139,
T.I.A.S. No. 5969, 559 U.N.T.S. 285; Convention on the High Seas, done Apr. 29,
1958, [1962] 13 U.S.T. 2312, T.I.A.S. No. 5200, 450 U.N.T.S. 82; Convention on the Ter-
ritorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone, done Apr. 29, 1958, [1964] 15 U.S.T. 1606,
T.I.A.S. No. 5639, 516 U.N.T.S. 205 [hereinafter cited as Territorial Sea Convention].
4. The United States Navy effectively pursues all four missions. It has been
suggested that the Soviet Navy fails to meet adequately the projection of power
ashore and the assertion aspects of sea control. See Turner, The Naval Balance:
Not Just a Numbers Game, 55 FOREIGN AF7. 339, 343-44 (1977).
5. Turner, Missions of the U.S. Navy, NAVAL WAR C. REV., Mar.-Apr., 1974, at
5. See also M. JANis, SEA POWER AND THE LAW OF THE SEA 1 (1976).
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one's own use of the seas and to deny that use to others. 6 More
specifically, sea control is comprised of both assertion and denial.
Assertion means that the navy of a particular nation can protect
its own ships transporting resources, material, or personnel to or
from one particular spot on the globe to another, or can remain at
a specific location in the face of efforts to displace it. Denial is the
opposite; it is the ability to prevent transiting foreign ships from
effectively using sea lanes, or to force an adversary to choose
between fleeing a specific position or remaining at the risk of suf-
fering substantial damage.7 Sea control is the most traditional na-
val mission and perhaps the most essential tactical function
because without effective sea control, the other non-strategic
functions could not be effectively carried out.
Projection of power ashore includes the ability to threaten and
to strike effectively military targets along the littoral of the enemy
or deep inside his territory.8 Though advent of the inter-continen-
tal ballistic missile has minimized the strategic significance of
this mission, as long as concepts of flexible response 9 and limited
war1 0 remain operational possibilities, circumspection would ad-
6. Turner, The Naval Balance: Not Just a Numbers Game, 55 FOREIGN AFF.
339, 345 (1977).
7. Although this study is not concerned with appraising the existing naval
balance of the major sea powers, it may be of interest to note that unlike compara-
tive analyses of strategic deterrence and projection of power ashore forces, any
survey of the relative strength of sea control forces involves a direct comparison.
That is, while strategic deterrence and projection ashore forces do not meet a cor-
responding force component during conflict, the sea control forces of each comba-
tant do. Thus, in a battle for sea control, the sea control forces of navy X will meet
the sea control forces of navy Y. More specifically, the "assertive" force capabili-
ties of navy X Will conflict with the "denial" capabilities of navy Y. Still two other
factors make direct numerical comparisons fatuous. First, because sea denial es-
sentially involves striking at a time and place most advantageous to the attacking
forces, a numerically inferior denial force has a marked advantage. Second, the
weapons of denial and assertion differ. Denial weapons, i.e., torpedoes and anti-
ship missiles, are designed to attack surprised assertion forces, while assertion
weapons are designed to destroy or to neutralize incoming missiles or torpedoes
or to detect, identify, locate, and preemptively destroy their launch platforms. For
a thorough discussion in the context of the United States versus the Soviet Union,
see id. at 347-51.
8. Turner, Missions of the U.S. Navy, NAVAL WAR C. REV., Mar.-Apr., 1974, at
5,8.
9. Flexible response is a conceptual doctrine that describes international
conflict as a series of graduated levels of intensity of violence. It is the converse of
"massive retaliation." The doctrine is frequently used as justification for procure-
ment of a variety of conventional and nuclear ordnance.
10. Limited war is the physical and operational manifestation of the doctrine
of flexible response. Unlike flexible response, which requires only unilateral ac-
vise continued development and deployment of weapons capable
of accomplishing this mission. At present, tactical aircraft," naval
bombardment, and amphibious landing vessels conjoin to permit
nations that do not maintain sufficient land-based forces in a par-
ticular portion of the globe to pursue effectively such an overseas
function.
The mission most directly related to everyday foreign policy is
naval presence.12 In essence, it is the orchestrated, non-combat
use of seapower to secure an international political objective.13
When the naval forces of two sea powers competitively seek to in-
fluence the outcome of some political event ashore, the relative
quantity, quality, and character of their respective forces can
prove determinative. Moreover, because the navy is a component
of the overall military force structure, the relative weakness or
strength of that component may serve to supplement or to dimin-
ish the credibility of express or tacit threats implicit in any partic-
ular foreign policy decision. It is primarily for these reasons that
a dwindling navy evokes alarm among policy planners sensitive to
the overall balance of military forces.
Of the four naval missions, strategic deterrence contributes
most directly to continued international security and to avoidance
of thermonuclear holocaust. Essentially, its primary objectives
are:
-To deter all-out attack by any nation possessing a nuclear war-
making capability;
-To threaten any nation contemplating less than all-out attack
with a counterforce capability sufficient to create apprehensions
of unacceptable risks of devastating response; and
-To maintain an international political climate conducive to the
actualization of foreign policy objectives.14
During the closing days of World War II, it appeared as though
the future role of sea-based strategic deterrence would be played
by the aircraft carrier. Today, however, this role is largely domi-
nated by invulnerable nuclear submarines armed with Pola-
ceptance to remain extant, limited war is non-existent absent effective adherence
by all parties to a conflict.
11. For two views on the role of the aircraft carrier in providing for projection
of power ashore, see Bagley, The Decline of U.S. Sea Power, 21 ORBis 211 (1977),
Krepon, A Navy to Match National Purposes, 55 FOREIGN AFF. 355 (1977). The de-
bate focuses on the vulnerability of a few large carriers as opposed to the useful-
ness of numerous small vessels capable of launching vertical short take off and
landing (V/STOL) aircraft.
12. The relative balance of parties' naval presence forces, like those of sea
control, can be evaluated by direct comparison.
13. Presence has been termed "suasion" by one commentator. See E.
LutrwAI, THE PoLrICAL USES OF SEA POWER 1-38 (1974).
14. See M. JANIS, SEA POWER AND THE LAW OF THE SEA 1 (1976).
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ris/Poseidon ballistic missiles (SSBNs).15 The invulnerability of
the SSBN is a product of its relatively quiet propulsion system
and of its ability to stay submerged for periods of up to sixty
days.6 These and other features actuated former United States
Secretary of Defense James Schlesinger to describe the SSBN as
the most secure element in the nuclear triad.17
Conventional diesel-powered 8 and modern nuclear-powered
submarines participate in the various naval missions only to the
extent that their invulnerability is assured. Because the subma-
rine's principal utility proceeds from its ability to remain sub-
merged and thereby to avoid detection, missions that require
surface navigation are undesirable. Consequently, the submarine
does not usually support the naval presence or the projection of
power ashore missions,19 but rather operates most effectively
when supporting the strategic deterrence and sea control mis-
sions.
The traditional strategy of ASW, though changing to meet bur-
geoning SSBN force structures, is predominantly tactical and de-
fensive.20 In general, it seeks the cumulative attrition 2 ' of enemy
submarines moving through a series of systems on their way to
and from the safety of their home port. Specifically, it is designed
15. At the present time the United States has 41 SSBNs and the Soviet Union
62. The SALT I accord permits the United States to deploy 45 such vessels. See
Brennan, The Soviet Military Build-Up and its Implications for the Negotiations on
Strategic Arms Limitations, 21 ORBIs 107, 116 (1977).
16. See M. JANIs, SEA POWER AND THE LAW OF THE SEA 2 (1976).
17. REPORT OF SECRETARY OF DEFENSE JAMES R. SCHLESINGER TO THE CON-
GRESS ON THE FY 1976 AND TRANSrION BUDGET, FY 1977 AuTHORIzAION REQUEST
AND FY 1976-1980 DEFENSE PROGRAMS, at 11-30 (1975). See also Krepon, A Navy to
Match National Purposes, 55 FOREIGN AFF. 355, 355 (1977), where the SSBN is de-
scribed as "assured and invulnerable."
18. See O'Connell, International Law and Contemporary Naval Operations,
[1970] 44 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 19 (1971). O'Connell notes that many diesel-powered
submarines must surface frequently to charge their batteries and to circulate air.
This problem has been somewhat ameliorated by the use of surface access snor-
kels. Nevertheless, the constraints faced by the conventional submarine either to
surface or to rely on a snorkel significantly increase the chances of its detection
over that of the nuclear-powered submarine. Id. at 40.
19. Except for the SSBNs, which play a strategic deterrence role, submarines
are not designed to contribute significantly to projection of power ashore.
20. Antisubmarine Warfare, [1974] WORLD ARMAMENTS AND DISARMAMENT 303
(Stockholm Int'l Peace Research Inst.) [hereinafter cited as Y.B. WORD ARMA-
MENTS: 1974].
21. Hearings on First Concurrent Resolution on the Budget Before the Comm.
on the Budget, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 239-45 (1977). See also D. RUMSFELD, ANNUAL
DEFENSE DEPARTMENT REPORT- FY 1977, at 172 (1976).
to provide both area and point defense during conflict. The objec-
tive of area defense is to secure specific vast expanses of ocean
space. The accomplishment of this task is initially sought through
the use of barrier control which, if unsuccessful, is supplemented
with ocean surveillance and submarine trailing.2 2 Point defense,
on the other hand, picks up where area defense leaves off, seeking
to insulate transiting allied vessels from the depredations of en-
emy submarines that have managed to elude the barrier-control
network.23 The following portion of this study will discuss the
various ASW detection devices. Though the purpose is not to pro-
vide the reader with any comprehensive technical evaluation of
the worth of each particular system, hopefully it will engender a
general understanding of the basic accoutrements.
B. Underwater Acoustic Detection
1. The Devices and Platforms: An Introduction
In its most rudimentary form, ASW consists of four integrated
functions: detection, identification, localization, and destruction.
A variety of devices are employed in performing the first three
functions, including visual and radar apprehension, 24 infra-red
line scan,25 magnetic anomaly detection,2 6 sonobuoy,27 and under-
22. "Barrier control" is occupation and utilization of narrow ocean-passage
zones, known as "choke points," for the purpose of interdicting enemy submarines
attempting to transit into the deep ocean. This occupation and utilization is usu-
ally achieved with fixed detection systems, mines, and anti-submarine subma-
rines. See S. HIIDmAN, PROSPECTS FOR ARms CONTROL IN THE OCEAN 11 (1972).
Once beyond the barrier and in deep ocean, area defense becomes a game of
ocean surveillance and of submarine trailing. Considering the extreme diffilculty
of locating an enemy submarine once in the deep ocean, the strategy usually
switches, at that time, to point defense.
23. Once an enemy submarine has escaped allied barrier-control systems, or
manages to transit to the deep ocean before the commencement of conflict, ASW
switches to "point defense." Here, allied ASW forces, exercising ASW sea asser-
tion capabilities, attempt to frustrate enemy sea denial forces by creating a cordon
sanitaire around transiting allied vessels.
24. Visual and radar apprehension are effective only when some portion of the
submarine obtrudes above the water surface.
25. I.R.L.S. is a submarine detection system that may be operated from a sat-
ellite and is designed to discriminate various heat levels emanating from earth.
26. M.A.D. is a close-range detection device that functions on the changes in-
ducted in the earth's magnetic field created by a submarine at a particular loca-
tion. Its primary platform is the airplane.
27. Sonobuoy, as used here, includes all water column detection devices other
than towed acoustic arrays. It includes low-frequency analyzation and recording
(LO.F.A.R), as well as C.O.D.A.R., its comparable close-range localization unit.
The difference between L.O.F.A.R. and C.O.DA.R. is that the former uses a high-
frequency spectrum with better directional but shorter-range abilities while the
latter uses a low-frequency spectrum that increases range but reduces directional
abilities.
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water acoustic array systems.28 These devices utilize a myriad of
platforms including surface ships and submarines, fixed-wing air-
craft2 9 and helicopters30 free-floating and moored buoys, satel-
lites, and seabed. Because this study focuses on peacetime ASW
activities conducted below the navigable water surface, attention
will be confined to an examination of underwater acoustic detec-
tion devices, or more specifically, sonobuoys and fixed acoustic
array systems.
2. Passive and Active Detection Devices
All submarines have two characteristics that make them detect-
able. First, they generate and diffuse a spectrum of acoustic en-
ergy as a result of the cavitation and turbulence of their motion
while proceeding through ocean space. Second, sound-wave emis-
sions that strike the interface of a submarine, like that of any
tangible object, reflect and become susceptible to detection and
analysis.3 ' Acoustic energy emission and acoustic energy reflec-
tion of underwater acoustic submarine detection devices, provide
operational foundations for the two generic types of underwater
acoustic submarine detection devices, the passive device and the
active device.
Relative to the passive acoustic detection device, the active de-
vice is a newcomer to ASW.32 Basically, the passive device con-
sists of hyper-sensitive hydrophones or listening instruments that
detect sound emissions generated by transiting vessels and then
relay the detected emissions to an awaiting computer analysis
28. Acoustic array systems are usually fixed to the sea floor or are towed by
ship.
29. The most popular aircraft used by the United States for submarine surveil-
lance include the land-based Orion P-3C and the carrier-based Viking S-3A. For
others, see Robinson, Sea Control Ship Tests Advance ASW, Av. WEEK & SPACE
TECH., Feb. 11, 1974, at 43. The Orion has a crew of 12 and a patrol endurance of 11
hours with a maximum speed of 475 knots and a patrol speed of 200 knots. It em-
ploys various sonobuoys including the DI.F.A.R. (directional low-frequency ana-
lyzer and ranging) with an effective range of 10 kilometers. As of 1973 the United
States possessed 100 Orions and planned to purchase 140 more. See Y.B. WORLD
ARMAMENTS: 1974, supra note 20, at 311.
30. A helicopter can effectively "sanitize" an area around a task force at the
rate of about 40 square kilometers per hour. See Y.B. WORLD ARMAMESrS: 1974,
supra note 20, at 312.
31. Id. at 306-07.
32. Knauss, The Military Role in the Ocean and its Relation to the Law of the
Sea, in THE LAW OF THE SEA: A NEW GENEVA CONFERENCE, PROCEEDINGS OF THE
SIXTH ANNiAL CONFERENCE OF THE LAW OF THE SEA INSTITUTE 77, 79 (L. Alexander
ed. 1972).
unit which processes out the ambient ocean noise and attempts to
identify the nature of the transiting object.3 3 Though the passive
acoustic detection device provides no direct measure of subma-
rine range,34 it is said to be capable of picking up sounds gener-
ated more than 100 miles from the hydrophone's location. 35 The
active acoustic detection device, in comparison, employs large
electromechanical generators, called transducers, in addition to
the familiar hydrophones used by the passive detection device.
These transducers are designed to convert electrical energy into
acoustic energy and to propagate the resultant sound waves
through ocean space.36 The hydrophones then listen to detect any
reflection of the sound waves, processing the information feed-
back in a manner similar to that used by the passive system.
Though the active detection system lacks the long-range abilities
of the passive system, 37 it is nevertheless capable of computing
object range.38
Passive as well as active underwater acoustic detection devices
face certain inveterate operational impediments incident to the
very nature of ocean space.39 Before proceeding to a discussion of
the various water column and fixed array detection devices pres-
ently in use by the United States Navy, some of these inherent
oceanic obstacles will be briefly discussed.
a. Ocean Characteristics Affecting Passive and Active
Detection Devices
The nature of the ocean limits the selection of effective devices.
For instance, electromagnetic radiation cannot be used for sub-
marine detection because it is too readily attenuated by sea
water. As a result, devices utilizing acoustic energy have been
33. Y.B. WORLD ARMAMENTS: 1974, supra note 20, at 306-07.
34. S. HIRDMAN, PROSPECTS FOR ARMS CONTROL IN THE OCEAN 12 (1972).
35. Brown, Military Uses of the Ocean Floor, in PACEM IN MARmus 285, 288 (E.
Borgese ed. 1972). Some authorities, however, set the range at 100 kilometers. See
Y.B. WORLD ARMAMENTS: 1974, supra note 20, at 307. Brown notes in comparison
that the average distance for detection devices mounted on surface ship or subma-
rine remains only five to 10 miles. Brown also notes that one of the major draw-
backs of passive detection devices is that their dependence on broad-frequency
sound reception makes them "more susceptible to being either misled or deafened
by spurious emissions" and jamming. Brown, supra at 287.
36. Y.B. WORLD ARMAMENTS: 1974, supra note 20, at 308-09.
37. Some commentators set the range at 50 miles, see Brown, supra note 35, at
287, others at substantially less, see Y.B. WORLD ARMAMENTS: 1974, supra note 20,
at 307 (mentions 20 kilometers).
38. Processing units accomplish this by measuring the time it takes for sound
pulses to return to the hydrophones.
39. For a detailed account of the scientific aspects of underwater detection,
see Tsipis, Underwater Acoustic Detection, in THE FUTURE OF THE SEA-BASED DE-
TERRENT 169 (1973) [hereinafter cited as SEA-BASED DETERRENT].
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turned to almost exclusively. Nevertheless, the character of
ocean space limits the effectiveness even of these devices.
Specifically, the velocity of acoustic sound waves is directly re-
lated to ocean temperature, ocean salinity, water pressure (which
is a function of depth), and water turbulence. These factors nec-
essarily mean that there are variations in both sound wave veloc-
ity and consequential acoustic energy refraction4O from one ocean
to another, or even from one spot to another within the same
ocean. A further complication is that geological and hydrological
discontinuities and sea floor sinuosities reflect acoustic energy
that otherwise might travel in a straight line. Both active and pas-
sive acoustic detection devices suffer as a consequence. In fact,
the combination of reflection and refraction creates shadow
zones 41 where sound waves, regardless of intensity, are unable to
penetrate. A submarine located in such a zone may easily escape
detection.
In addition to the foregoing, the level of ambient ocean noise
and a phenomenon known as the Doppler shift also hinder de-
tection. Essentially, ambient ocean noise is the product of acous-
tic energy emitted by anything from man-made vessels, to
natatorial creatures, to geological disturbances, or to meteorologi-
cal changes. It necessarily results in a detection threshold below
which the origin of one sound becomes indistinguishable from
that of another. The problems caused by the Doppler shift, in
comparison, are not a consequence of the presence of other mov-
ing objects in ocean space, but rather of the motion of the de-
tected object itself. Specifically, the frequency of all acoustic
waves reflected by the hull of a moving submarine is in direct pro-
portion to the submarine's radial speed.42 Therefore, differing
speeds produce differing sound frequencies. When acoustic wave
reflection and refraction, ambient ocean noise, and the Doppler
shift are all taken together, the reason for the uncertain nature of
submarine detection is quite apparent.43
40. This phenomenon is known as Snell's Law. Essentially, it holds that
sound waves, otherwise traveling in a straight line, will be refracted into arcs of
circles with variations in the velocity of the waves. Such variations are caused by
a host of features characteristic to the ocean including temperature, depth, salin-
ity, and discontinuities.
41. Y.B. WORLD A~mAmENTs: 1974, supra note 20, at 305.
42. Id. at 307. See also Tsipis, supra note 39, at 169.
43. Most commentators agree that submarine detection is a rather inexact sci-
ence. See generally Tsipis, note 39 supra.
3. Water Column Acoustic Detection Devices: The
Sonobuoy
The objective of this portion of the study is to discuss briefly
the widely used acoustic submarine detection device known as
the sonobuoy. No attempt is made here to examine the various
other types of submarine detection devices mentioned earlier,44
including devices platformed on surface ships or submersible ves-
sels. A detailed accounting of fixed acoustic detection array sys-
tems will be presented in a later section.
The sonobuoy may be either a passive device, composed exclu-
sively of hydrophonic detection instruments, or an active device,
consisting of both hydrophonic detectors and electromechanical
transducers. Whether passive or active, the sonobuoy is designed
to be dropped onto the ocean surface and lower detection instru-
ments a few hundred meters into the water column4 5 to ascertain
the presence of acoustic energy. Information received is then
transmitted through the buoy to an analysis unit stationed on air-
craft flying or hovering overhead.46 Such free-floating sonobuoys
are subject to being displaced by surface turbulence and by
normal hydrological motion. In an attempt to avert this intrinsic
problem, nations have endeavored to develop and to deploy
moored sonobuoy systems.
a. Sonobuoy Platforms
i. 'Fixed-Wing Aircraft
The sonobuoy may be dropped from either the land-based
Orion P-3C or the carrier-based Viking S-3A fixed-wing aircraft.
Though theoretically two sonobuoys should be capable of pin-
pointing the precise location of a submarine, the typical practice
is to seed a large portion of ocean space with several such
devices. Once the presence of a submarine is ascertained, its
position is usually localized with magnetic anomaly detection
(M.A.D.).47
The Orion land-based, fixed-wing aircraft has a patrol speed of
approximately 200 knots and is capable of deploying eighty-seven
active and passive sonobuoys.48 The active sonobuoys are said to
44. Such devices include vision, radar, infra-red line scan, magnetic anomaly
detection, or underwater acoustic array systems. See notes 24-30 and accompany-
ing text supra.
45. For purposes of analysis, the water column should be distinguished from
the superjacent navigable surface.
46. Y.B. WORLD ARMAMENTS: 1974, supra note 20, at 309.
47. Id.
48. Id. at 310. See also K. Tsn'xs, TACTICAL AND STRATEGIC ANTISUBMARINE
WAFARE 22 (1974) [hereinafter cited as ANTIsunBuNE WARFARE].
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have an effective detection range of about three kilometers; the
passive devices have a reported range of approximately ten kilo-
meters.49 The Viking carrier-based aircraft is a twin-engine jet
with a sea-level loiter speed of 160 knots and a maximum patrol
range of 2,000 to 3,000 nautical miles. Although the Viking, like
the Orion, employs both active and passive sonobuoys, some au-
thorities have suggested that it is not suitable for lengthy ocean
patrol.5 0
ii. Helicopter
In recent years the helicopter has proven an effective ASW plat-
form. The operational union of helicopter and long-range, fixed-
wing aircraft has permitted a large-area "sanitization" compelled
by the advent of submarine-based surface-to-surface cruise mis-
siles with effective ranges of from twenty to 400 kilometers. In an
effort to detect transiting submarines, the United States Navy has
stationed both dipping sonar and sonobuoys aboard land- and car-
rier-based helicopters.
The best known anti-submarine helicopter employing both dip-
ping sonar and sonobuoys is the Sea King SH-3 series.51 The Sea
King is a land- or carrier-based helicopter piloted by a four-man
crew. It carries active acoustic dipping sonar with a range of a
few kilometers, 52 as well as various active and passive sono-
buoys.53 The sonobuoys are dropped on the surface, like those
used by the Orion P-3C and the Viking S-3A. They scan the area
for audible sound emissions and transmit the information to the
hovering helicopter, where it is processed and analyzed. Employ-
ing both sonobuoys and dipping sonar, the Sea King can effec-
tively "sanitize" a large expanse of ocean space in a relatively
49. Y.B. WoR AmiumENTs: 1974, supra note 20, at 310.
50. See ANTisUBMARE .WARFARE, supra note 48, at 24. The Viking carries ac-
tive (AC/SSQ-47/47B code-named "Julie"; AN/SSQ-50) and passive (AN/SSQ-
41/41A code-named "Jezebel"; AN/SSQ-53 D.I.F.A.R.) sonobuoys. It also uses
M.A.D. and forward-looking infra-red sensors. Id.
51. See id. Appendix 1, Table 1, A(3). See id. Appendix 2, Table 6, for a com-
prehensive listing of the other ASW helicopters used by the United States and
other nations.
52. Id. at 25 (British version compared).
53. The various sonobuoys reputed to be carried by the Sea King include the
AN/SSQ-53 D.I.F.A.R. (passive sonobuoy), AN/SSQ-47/47B (active miniature so-
nobuoy used for localization, code-named "Julie"), AN/SSQ-50 (a self-powered ac-
tive localization unit), and "Cass" (command-activated sonobuoy system). See id.
Appendix 1, Table 1, A(4).
short period of time.54
ii. Moored Surveillance System (MSS)
Though this detection platform shares some of the attributes of
a large fixed array system, it also shares many of those character-
izing the free-floating sonobuoy. For precisely this reason, it
seems most appropriate to mention MSS55 in this, the final por-
tion of the subsection dealing with sonobuoy platforms, immedi-
ately preceding the section covering fixed acoustic array systems.
Briefly, MSS consists of command-activated, long-life sono-
buoys which are dropped from the air and which automatically
moor themselves to the ocean floor to prevent displacement.
Each sonobuoy is equipped with an elaborate communications
and detection system having a useful life of about ninety days.
The deployment scenario calls for each sonobuoy to be placed in
a position that facilitates submarine localization through triangu-
lation techniques. The fact that the sonobuoys can be moored in
up to 3,000 fathoms of water creates the likelihood of a deep-ocean
detection capability.5 6
4. Fixed Acoustic Detection Array Systems
In addition to the sonobuoy, which despite its limited range is
well-suited to barrier control and to point defense, the United
States Navy employs a network of large fixed acoustic detection
devices capable of scanning vast expanses of ocean space. The
Sonar Surveillance System (SOSUS), for instance, is a major un-
derwater passive acoustic detection and classification network
comprised of several separate systems employing a series of hy-
drophones. It is linked by electrical cable to shore-based process-
ing units.57 SOSUS has an estimated range of several hundred
kilometers.5 8
The entire SOSUS consists of several individual systems, each
designed to monitor specific areas of ocean space. "Caesar," the
54. It has been reported that a Sea King using a dipping sonar alone can effec-
tively patrol an area 10 kilometers by 100 kilometers in one hour. See id. at 23.
55. See generally Hearings on Military Posture and H.R. 5068 Before the Comm.
on Armed Services, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 374 (1977).
56. See ANnsuBmAmNE WARFARE, supra note 48, at 30; Appendix 1, Table 1,
A(5). See also YB. WoRLD A m mrs: 1974, supra note 20, at 317-18.
57. See generally Hearings on Military Posture and H.R. 5068 Before the Comm.
on Armed Services, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 374 (1977); Teplinsky, America's Naval
Programmes, 15 SuRvivAL 75 (1973).
58. ANTrisuBmARNE WARFARE, supra note 48, at 30. But see Tsipis' estimate,
supra note 39, Appendix 1, Table 1, A(5) (1,000 nautical miles).
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seminal component of SOSUS,59 is emplaced on the continental
shelf along the eastern seaboard.60 A more advanced and refined
version, "Colossus,"61 is located on the Pacific shelf off the west
coast.62 "Barrier" and "Bronco," systems similar to those scan-
ning the two seaboards, are believed to be deployed beyond the
coasts of the various allies of the United States. 63
Additional long-range ocean surveillance is conducted by both
the Azores Fixed Acoustic Range (AFAR) and the Sea Spider net-
works. AFAR consists of several sonars mounted on top of three
or more 130-meter towers, each spaced thirty-five kilometers
apart 64 and submerged off the southern-most islands of the
Azores group in water 300 to 600 meters in depth.65 Its principal
task is to keep a check on submarines entering and leaving the
Mediterranean. Sea Spider is a much more ambitious system.
Basically, it is a passive acoustic submarine detection unit com-
posed of a single hydrophonic listening device three meters in di-
ameter and anchored by three cables at a depth of approximately
5,000 meters. The entire unit is reported to be powered by a nu-
clear battery and stationed a few hundred miles north of Ha-
waii.66
Although these fixed networks tend toward "insonification" of
ocean space, they pale to insignificance in comparison with the
degree of ocean transparency sought with the Suspended Array
System (SAS).67 Conceived in the early 1970's, SAS is said to
consist of a massive tower resting on the ocean floor at a depth of
close to 5,000 meters with each leg of the tripod ten kilometers
apart. An acoustic detection array consisting of both elec-
tromechanical transducers and hydrophonic receivers sits on top
of the structure. Reportedly, one such device stationed in each
59. "Caesar" was deployed in the 1950's. A similar version is being deployed
along the gulf coast.
60. A rmUBmARE WARFARE, supra note 48, Appendix 1, Table 1, A(5).
61. "Colossus" was deployed in the 1960's. It consists of 5-15 devices per linear
mile. See id. at 30.
62. Y.B. WORLD A isuuss: 1974, supra note 20, at 317.
63. See Armsuim v E WARFARE, supra note 4a, Appendix 1, Table 1, A(5).
64. Id. at 30.
65. Id. Appendix 1, Table 1, A(5). AFAR has been in operation since 1972.
66. Id. In 1969 the Navy attempted, unsuccessfully, to instal such a system.
Reports that it later succeeded have not been confirmed.
67. See Cost Escalation in Defense Procurement Contracts and Military Pos-
ture: Hearings on H.R. 6722 Before the House Comm. on Armed Services, 93d Cong.,
1st Sess. 3289-508 (1973) (statement of Hon. Peter Waterman, Acting Assistant
Secretary of the Navy for Research and Development).
ocean will be capable of insonifying all ocean space.68 The de-
ployment of such a device could well lead to a complete erosion of
the submarine's invulnerability, exposing both conventional and
SSBN submarines to constant surveillance.69
C. Anti-Submarine Weapons
Once a submarine's presence has been detected, its nature de-
termined, and its exact location ascertained, various types of na-
val ordnance may be employed to destroy it if it proves menacing.
These include depth charges,7 0 anti-submarine rockets,7 1 anti-sub-
marine torpedoes, 72 and submersible anti-submarine mines. Be-
cause the use of all but the last of these weapons signals either
the initiation or existence of hostilities, the present discussion
will be confined to an examination of submersible anti-submarine
mines. Weapons of this sort may be deployed during peacetime,
perhaps years in advance of actual international conflict, and per-
mitted to await future acquisition of an enemy target. However,
the launching of a depth charge, an anti-submarine rocket, or an
anti-submarine torpedo would be inconsistent with the continua-
tion of peace.
1. Anti-Ship Mines
The anti-ship mines presently utilized by the United States
Navy fall into three categories: physical-contact, depression, and
68. Y.B. WoR-D AmAmENTs: 1974, supra note 20, at 317.
69. The impact of "insonification" on the SSBN will be discussed in pt.
I(B) (4) infra, where the changes in the present system made by UNCLOS III
will be considered at length.
70. The depth charge is a simple device that may be jettisoned from ship or
airplane and set to detonate at a predetermined depth. Since 1965 the United
States Navy has deployed a unique depth charge known as the UUM-44A Subroc.
Essentially, it is a missile fired from a nuclear "hunter-killer" submarine (SSN)
tube. The missile, tipped with a nuclear warhead, breaks the water surface and
proceeds aerially toward target location. At that point the depth bomb separates,
allowing the bomb to return to the water, sink, and explode at a pre-set depth. See
AsNrMuBARm WARFARE, supra note 48, Appendix 1, Table 2, B (5).
71. The most popular anti-submarine rockets utilized by the United States are
code-named "Hedgehog" and "Mousetrap." See id. Appendix 1, Table 2, D(1).
72. The United States Navy uses several anti-submarine torpedoes. The MK-
45 Astor (anti-submarine torpedo ordnance rocket) was first issued in the 1960's.
It is a high-speed, deep-diving torpedo, armed with a nuclear warhead. The Astor
has a range of 16,000 meters. Although it is in the process of being phased out by
the MK-48, the MK-37 torpedo is also used by the Navy. The MK-37 can be
deployed on either submarine or surface ship. The MK-48, first deployed in 1972,
and successor to the MK-37, is an anti-submarine, anti-ship torpedo with a wire-
guided acquisition range of 40,000 meters. It is capable of diving to 1,000 meters
and of traveling at 50 knots. In addition, the Navy uses the MK-44, which can be
launched from either fixed-wing aircraft or helicopter, as well as the MK-46, which
is fitted with a solid fuel or liquid monopropellant motor.
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magnetic/acoustic.73 Generally, physical-contact mines are either
moored or free-floating.74 Depression and magnetic/acoustic
mines, in comparison, always rest on or are secured to the sea
floor. Unlike physical-contact mines, which explode on impact,
both depression and magnetic/acoustic mines are activated by vi-
cissitudes in the immediate ocean space caused by transiting ves-
sels. Specifically, depression mines depend on fluctuations in
hydrostatic pressure, while magnetic/acoustic mines are sensitive
to changes in surrounding magnetic or acoustic energy levels.
Physical-contact, depression, and magnetic/acoustic mines are all
subject to certain range limitations. The very nature of physical-
contact mines reduces their range to situations of actual impact.
Though depression and magnetic/acoustic mines have ranges of
about thirty fathoms7 7 considered against the vastness of ocean
space, they are of limited utility.
The latest known addition to the Navy's ASW arsenal is the
Captor anti-submarine mine. In essence, Captor consists of a
submersible mine moored to the ocean floor. It contains an MK-
46 torpedo with an active and/or passive homing device. The tor-
pedo is released from its mine casing when a magnetic or acoustic
detection device reveals the presence of a submarine. At that
point, the torpedo homing device takes over and guides the tor-
pedo to its target. The sensor acquisition radius of the Captor tor-
pedo has been estimated at one kilometer, which would make it a
relatively effective weapon against all deep-diving submarines. 76
IM INTERNATIONAL LAW OF THE SEA AND M=LIARY USES OF
OcEAN SPACE: PEACETIME ASW
The objective of this portion of the study is to examine the in-
ternational legal principles regulating all military uses of ocean
space other than passage through straits used for international
navigation. Of specific concern, however, is the legality of the use
73. Brown, supra note 35, at 289.
74. The Hague Convention Relating to the Laying of Automatic Submarine
Contact Mines, done Oct. 18, 1907, 36 Stat. 2332, T.S. No. 541, 1 Bevans 669, prohib-
its the use of physical-contact mines unless they either become harmless within
one hour after release or are anchored and become harmless if they break loose.
This prohibition probably does not affect contact mines that are innocuous until
automatically activated. However, even these may be subject to a requirement
that they become harmless within one hour after activation.
75. Brown, supra note 35, at 289.
76. ANTISuBmANE WARFARE, supra note 48, at 33.
of the underwater acoustic detection systems and anti-submarine
mines mentioned above.
Of all the values nations seek to promote through the use of
seapower,7 7 security is without question the most highly prized
and widely shared. This priority is probably the result of the
pragmatic recognition that absent security all other values would
prove ephemeral. Therefore, any international convention that
seeks to place restrictions on the militarization of ocean space
will not secure broad-based support or general adherence unless
it guarantees international stability and State security 78 by main-
taining the existing balance of power.79 A convention that fails to
77. Seapower in general and ASW in particular play a role in promoting secur-
ity, power, respect, wealth, and well-being. As mentioned earlier, see notes 4-23
and accompanying text supra, the modern navy has four basic missions, and the
submarine plays a significant role in two of them: strategic deterrence and sea
control. ASW provides a State with the ability to detect, identify, localize, and de-
stroy enemy submarines that may either threaten the State with nuclear attack or
jeopardize the ability of the State's sea denial forces to protect its littoral from
projection of power ashore. This ability promotes the State's security. ASW pro-
vides a State with the capacity to destroy enemy submarines that may otherwise
prevent its sea assertion or strategic deterrence forces from accomplishing their
basic objectives. This capacity promotes the State's power. The maintenance of a
naval force that can both insulate and threaten is essential to maintaining a
State's image and enhancing its respect. ASW promotes both wealth and well-be-
ing because it facilitates continued use of vital sea lanes by eliminating enemy
submarines that might otherwise destroy vessels shipping raw material and
finished products to and from the home port.
78. See THE LAw OF THE SEA: A NEW GENEVA CONFERENCE, PROCEEDINGS OF
THE SIXTH ANNUAL CONFERENCE OF THE LAW OF THE SEA INSTITUrE 96-97 (L. Alex-
ander ed. 1972). Myers McDougal stated in relation to security and restrictions on
the militarization of ocean space:
In terms of the inclusive interests of all States, I think we can see that se-
curity is indivisible today. It is indivisible around the globe. This indivisi-
bility includes the land masses as well as the oceans. I think also we must
keep in mind that security in the world today is maintained by a very deli-
cate balance of power between the United States and the Soviet Union,
with Communist China gradually coming into the picture.
The United Nations expresses the high aspiration to which we all sub-
scribe that violence, intense coercion, is not to be used for change, for dis-
ruption of the peaceful processes of producing values; but I think as
realists we all know that on a fundamental, effective power level today se-
curity is maintained by a certain balancing of power. We are not likely to
have much opportunity for the production and distribution of other values
if this balancing of power is disturbed. This balancing of power extends
not only to activities on the oceans but to activities on the land masses.
... I would... urge... all of us, to very carefully appraise every par-
ticular proposal about the law of the oceans in terms of its effect upon the
necessary balancing of power in the world, and upon interrelations of ac-
tivities on the land masses and activities on the oceans.
Id. (emphasis added). See also Zedalis & Wade, Anti-Satellite Weapons and the
Outer Space Treaty of 1967, 8 CAL W. INT'L L.J. 454 (1978), in which the authors
discuss the threat that deployment of anti-satellite weapons presents to the ability
of the superpowers to verify observance of the arms-control measures such as
SALT.
79. Even those who subscribe to the "functionalist" theory of international re-
lations do not advocate destabilizing military undertakings.
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proscribe uses of ocean space that augur disruption of the strate-
gic balance is not only unlikely to elicit general support but is
generally undesirable. The same can be said with equal force of
any convention if it is difficult or impossible to verify the extent to
which the various State-Parties are observing their obligations.
Nations that typically comply with multilateral obligations realize
the potential for destabilizing perfidy. Consequently, any interna-
tional agreement to limit militarization of ocean space must be
designed to ensure international stability and State security and
to provide easy verification of the extent of State-Party obser-
vance.8 0
At present several international conventions limit peacetime
military activity in ocean space. Included among these are:
- The Limited Test Ban Treaty of 1963:81 prohibits nuclear test
explosions in territorial waters or in the high seas;82
- The Treaty of Tlateloco: 83 prohibits, inter alia, testing and de-
80. See Young, Arms Control and Disarmament in the Ocean, in PACEM IN
MARIBus 266, 274-76 (E. Borgese ed. 1972).
81. Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space
and Under Water, done Aug. 5, 1963, [19631 14 U.S.T. 1313, T.I.A.S. No. 5433, 480
U.N.T.S. 43.
82. Article 1 states:
1. Each of the Parties to this Treaty undertakes to prohibit, to prevent,
and not to carry out any nuclear weapon test explosion, or any other nu-
clear explosion, at any place under its jurisdiction or control:
(a) in the atmosphere; beyond its limits, including outer space; or un-
derwater, including territorial waters or high seas; or
(b) in any other environment if such explosion causes radioactive de-
bris to be present outside the territorial limits of the State under whose
jurisdiction or control such explosion is conducted.
Id. It appears that nuclear test explosions conducted beneath internal seas are
merely regulated by Article 1(1) (b) rather than proscribed by Article 1(1) (a). See
generally X. [sic], Nuclear Test Ban Treaty, [1963] 39 BRrr. Y.B. INT'L L. 449
(1965); Schwelb, The Nuclear Test Ban Treaty and International Law, 58 Am. J.
INT'L L. 642 (1964).
83. Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America, done Feb.
14, 1967, 634 U.N.T.S. 281 (English text id. at 326). See also Additional Protocol II,
entered into force for the United States May 11, 1971, [1971] 22 U.S.T. 754, T.I.A.S.
No. 7137, 634 U.N.T.S. 364. Article 1 of the treaty reads:
1. The Contracting Parties hereby undertake to use exclusively for
peaceful purposes the nuclear material and facilities which are under
their jurisdiction, and to prohibit and prevent in their respective territo-
ries:
(a) The testing, use, manufacture, production or acquisition by any
means whatsoever of any nuclear weapons, by Parties themselves, di-
rectly or indirectly, on behalf of anyone else or in any other way, and
(b) The receipt, storage, installation, deployment and any form of pos-
session of any nuclear weapons, directly or indirectly, by the Parties
themselves, by anyone on their behalf or in any other way.
ployment of nuclear weapons by Latin American States within
their territorial waters or any other area over which they exer-
cise sovereignty;84
The Antarctic Treaty of 1959:85 establishes a non-military re-
gime,86 subject to the continuation of traditional military uses
of the high seas, 87 over the entire area south of sixty degrees
south latitude; prohibits nuclear test explosions anywhere in
that area;88 and
The Seabed Arms Control Treaty (SACT):89 prohibits the in-
stallation of nuclear weapons on the sea floor 90 at any point
2. The Contracting Parties also undertake to refrain from engaging in,
encouraging or authorizing, directly or indirectly, or in any way participat-
ing in the testing, use, manufacture, production, possession or control of
any nuclear weapon.
Territory is defined in Article 3 to include "territorial sea, air space, and any other
space over which the State exercises sovereignty in accordance with its own
legislation." Id. (emphasis added).
84. Though this term is ambiguous, it is generally accepted to mean a claim to
exclusive jurisdiction over foreign nationals within a specific area, or active exclu-
sion of such nationals from some area.
85. The Antarctic Treaty, done Dec. 1, 1959, [1961J 12 U.S.T. 794, T.I.A.S. No.
4780, 402 U.N.T.S. 71. On Antarctica generally, see Daniel, Conflict of Sovereignties
in the Antarctic, [1949] 3 Y.B. WoRLD AFF. 241; Jessup, Sovereignty in Antarctica,
41 AM. J. INr'L L. 117 (1947); Sullivan, Antarctica in a Two-Power World, 36 FoR-
EIGN Apr. 154 (1957).
86. Article 1 reads:
1. Antarctica shall be used for peaceful purposes only. There shall be
prohibited, inter alia, any measures of a military nature, such as the es-
tablishment of military bases and fortifications, the carrying out of mili-
tary maneuvers, as well as the testing of any type of weapons.
2. The present Treaty shall not prevent the use of military personnel or
equipment for scientific research or for any other peaceful purposes.
The Antarctic Treaty, done Dec. 1, 1959, [1961] 12 U.S.T. 794, T.I.A.S. No. 4780, 402
U.N.T.S. 71.
87. Article 6 reads:
The provisions of the present Treaty shall apply to the area south of 600
South Latitude, including all ice shelves, but nothing in the present Treaty
shall prejudice or in any way affect the rights, or the exercise of the rights,
of any State under international law with regard to the high seas within
that area.
Id.
88. Article 5(1) reads "Any nuclear explosions in Antarctica and the disposal
there of radioactive waste material shall be prohibited." Id.
89. Treaty on the Prohibition of the Emplacement of Nuclear Weapons and
Other Weapons of Mass Destruction on the Seabed and the Ocean Floor and in
the Subsoil Thereof, done Feb. 11, 1971, [1972] 23 U.S.T. 701, T.I.A.S. No. 7337. See
generally Krieger, The United Nations Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapons and
Other Weapons of Mass Destruction on the Ocean Floor, 3 J. MAR. L. & CoM. 107
(1971); Rao, The Seabed Arms Control Treaty: A Study in the Contemporary Law of
the Military Uses of the Seas, 4 J. MAR. L. & Com. 67 (1972).
90. Treaty on the Prohibition of the Emplacement of Nuclear Weapons and
Other Weapons of Mass Destruction on the Seabed and the Ocean Floor and in
the Subsoil Thereof, done Feb. 11, 1971, art. 1(1), [19721 23 U.S.T. 701, T.I.A.S. No.
7337:
The States Parties to this Treaty undertake not to emplant or emplace
on the seabed and the ocean floor and in the subsoil thereof beyond the
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beyond twelve miles from the coast.91
Although these agreements have proved useful in "denucleariz-
ing" the sea, the most significant single contribution to the devel-
opment of a comprehensive legal regime designed to regulate
every use of ocean space has been made by the continuing United
Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea. Demilitarization and
disarmament of the oceans have not been its raison d'etre. Never-
theless, the nature of the legal regime established by the 1958
Conventions 92 issuing from the First Conference, and that
portended by the various negotiating texts9 3 produced at the first
six sessions of UNCLOS III, exert an influence on the kinds of ac-
tivity perceived as authorized by international law.
What follows is a discussion of the international legal principles
regulating military uses of ocean space enunciated in the four
1958 Conventions and the Informal Single and Informal Compos-
ite Negotiating Texts (ISNT, ICNT) produced at UNCLOS I1.94
Specifically, the legality of peacetime deployment of underwater
acoustic detection devices and anti-submarine mines will be ex-
amined in light of the general principles governing, or that may
soon govern, the internal waters, the territorial waters, the high
seas, the contiguous zone, the continental shelf, the exclusive eco-
nomic zone, and the deep seabed.
In perusing part III, the reader should bear in mind that ocean
space is comprised of several vertical and horizontal zones. For
instance, ocean space can be divided vertically into the navigable
surface, the water column, the sea floor, and the subsoil. The wa-
ters can similarly be divided horizontally, from the coast seaward,
outer limit of a seabed zone... any nuclear weapons or any other types
of weapons of mass destruction as well as structures, launching installa-
tions or any other facilities specifically designed for storing, testing or us-
ing such weapons.
(emphasis added).
91. Id. Article 2 reads: "For the purpose of this Treaty, the outer limit of the
seabed zone referred to in article I shall be coterminous with the twelve-mile
outer limit of the zone referred to in part II of the Convention on the Territorial
Sea and the Contiguous Zone. .. " (emphasis added).
92. Cited in note 3 supra.
93. Informal Composite Negotiating Text (ICNT), U.N. Doc. A/Conf. 62/WP.
10, reprinted in 8 UNCLOS III OR 1, and in 16 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS 1108 (1977);
Revised Single Negotiating Text (RSNT), U.N. Doc. A/Conf. 62/WP.8/Rev. 1, re-
printed in 5 UNCLOS III OR 125 (1976); Informal Single Negotiating Text (ISNT),
U.N. Doc. A/Conf. 62/WP. 8, reprinted in 4 UNCLOS III OR 137, and in 14 INT'L
LEGAL MATERIALS 689 (1975).
94. Cited in note 93 supra.
into internal waters, territorial waters, and high seas. The seabed
immediately below the various water zones can also be divided
horizontally into the internal and territorial seabed, the continen-
tal shelf, and the deep seabed.95 Keeping these delineations in
mind provides a certain clarity of analysis when applying pres-
ently existing or prospective conventional Law of the Sea to any
particular set of factual circumstances. This is specifically be-
cause the rules regulating the waters of ocean space are not nec-
essarily the same as those regulating the seabed zones subjacent
to those waters.
A. Legal Regime Governing the Waters of Ocean Space
This section examines only those rules affecting military uses of
the waters of ocean space. The regime governing military uses of
the subjacent sea floor will be discussed below in section B.
1. The Internal Waters and the Territorial Sea
The starting point of any discussion concerning the rules affect-
ing military uses of the internal waters and of the territorial sea is
the location of the baseline. Essentially, the baseline is a demar-
cation that separates the internal waters96 from the territorial sea.
Waters landward of the baseline are internal.97 Those paralleling
the coast and extending seaward from the baseline form the terri-
torial sea. Generally, the baseline itself is drawn along the coast
of a particular State at a low-water mark.98 However, it may be
95. See H. KNIGHT, THE LAW OF THE SEA: CASES, DOCUMENTS AND READINGS
xxx-xxxv (1976).
96. Apparently, internal waters first received formal definition in the 1958
Territorial Sea Convention, note 3 supra. The Report of the International Law
Commission to the General Assembly, 11 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 9) 12, U.N. Doc.
A/3159 (1956), reprinted in [1956] 2 Y.B. INT'L L. COMM'N 253, 265, U.N. Doc.
A/CN.4/SERA/1956/Add. 1 (1957), though not defining internal waters, neverthe-
less recognized their existence. See id. art. 1 commentary. The definition found in
Article 5(1) of the 1958 Convention initially appeared in a report on the work of
the First Committee (territorial sea and contiguous zone), Report by the Secreta-
riat on the work of the Drafting Committee of the First Committee, U.N. Doc.
A/Conf. 13/C.1/L.167, reprinted in 3 UNCLOS I OR, C.1 Annexes 254, 255, U.N. Doc.
A/Conf. 13/39 (1958), and was most likely the result of a proposal offered by Yugo-
slavia, U.N. Doc. A/Conf. 13/C.1/L.58, reprinted in 3 UNCLOS I OR, C.1 Annexes
227, U.N. Doc. A/Conf. 13/39 (1958).
97. The Territorial Sea Convention, supra note 3, art. 5(1), states: "Waters on
the landward side of the baseline of the territorial sea form part of the internal
waters of the State." Both the ISNT, supra note 93, pt. II, art. 7(1), and the ICNT,
supra note 93, art. 8(1), define internal waters in the same fashion.
98. The Territorial Sea Convention, supra note 3, art. 3, reads: "Except where
otherwise provided in these articles, the normal baseline for measuring the
breadth of the territorial sea is the low-water line along the coast as marked on
large-scale charts officially recognized by the coastal State." Both the ISNT, supra
note 93, pt. II, art. 4, and ICNT, supra note 93, art. 5, establish a similar rule. Is-
[VOL. 16: 575, 1979] Peacetime ASW
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW
located seaward of this point if permanent harbor works forming
an integral part of the harbor system99 or low-tide elevations' 00
are situated off the coast.
In addition to delineating the internal waters from the territo-
rial sea, the baseline also serves as the point from which the
breadth of the territorial sea is measured. Originally that breadth
was no greater than the range of a cannon.101 Today, although
most States recognize a breadth of twelve or fewer miles, 0 2 there
is no controlling conventional international legal principle. This
absence is specifically the result of the failure of the delegates at
both the 1958 and 1960 Geneva Conferences on the Law of the Sea
to reach agreement on the issue.10 3 Because the extent of coastal
lands also have points for the location of baselines. See Territorial Sea Conven-
tion, supra art. 10(2); ISNT, supra art. 132(2); ICNT, supra art. 121(2).
99. The Territorial Sea Convention, supra note 3, art. 8, reads: "For the pur-
pose of delimiting the territorial sea, the outermost permanent harbour works
which form an integral part of the harbour system shall be regarded as forming
part of the coast." See also ICNT, supra note 93, art. 11; ISNT, supra note 93, pt. II,
art. 10.
100. Low-tide elevation is defined by the Territorial Sea Convention, supra note
3, art. 11(1), to mean "a naturally formed area of land which is surrounded by and
above water at low-tide but submerged at high tide." (emphasis added). For low-
tide elevations to be used as points along the baseline, they must be located
within the breadth of the territorial sea. In other words, if the breadth of the terri-
torial sea of State X is three miles, in order for a low-tide elevation off the coast of
State X to be used as a point along the baseline it must be situated no more than
three miles from the coast of State X. See also ICNT, supra note 93, art. 13; ISNT,
supra note 93, pt. II, art. 12. Both texts use language identical to the 1958 treaty.
101. The rule of terrae dominiumfinitur ubifinitur armorum vis seems to have
been first recorded in 1702 by Cornelius van Bynkershoek in his treatise, De
Dominio Maris Dissertatio. See generally Walker, Territorial Waters: The Cannon
Shot Rule, [1945] 22 BRrr. Y.B. INT'L L. 210, 230-31 (1962). Several earlier juris-
prudes suggested various other distances. See T. FULTON, THE SOVE.REIGNrY OF
THE SEA 538-39 (1911) (Bartolus of Saxo-Ferrato suggested 100 miles; Baldus
Ubaldus suggested 60-100 miles). In 1782, Galiani, sensitive to the disparities in
range of various cannon, suggested a uniform belt of three miles. See Walker,
supra at 230-31. But see Baty, The Three-Mile Limit, 22 Am. J. INT'L L. 503, 503-06
(1928).
102. See H. KNIGHT, THE LAW OF THE SEA CASES, DOCUMENTS AND READINGS 329
(1976), stating that 56 States claim a 12-mile territorial sea and that 48 claim one of
less than 12 miles.
103. For some time consensus as to the breadth of the territorial sea has
proven intractable. The earliest attempt to codify the international Law of the Sea
was the 1930 Hague Conference on Codification. Although it reported in Basis of
Discussion No. 3 that the breadth of the territorial sea was three nautical miles,
League of Nations Doc. C.74.M.39.1929.V, reprinted in 24 Am. J. INr'L L. (Supp.) 25,
28 (1930), it was frankly admitted that no real unanimity existed. See id. Point III,
at 27. The draft convention prepared by the ILC in 1956 clearly recognized the di-
vergence of opinion on this issue but nevertheless set a 12-mile limit. See Report
of the International Law Commission to the General Assembly, 11 U.N. GAOR,
State control varies from the internal waters to the territorial sea,
both the differentiation between the zones as well as the actual
breadth of the territorial sea are important in determining the in-
ternational legality of any particular foreign State use.
a. The 1958 Convention
To determine whether international law entitles any foreign
State to deploy ASW devices in the internal waters or the territo-
rial sea of another State, the conventional rules governing the
general uses of these zones must be examined. To the extent that
the coastal State possesses sufficient internationally acknowl-
edged legal control over the waters contained in these areas, it
may be authorized to exclude any such foreign State devices. Ab-
sent such legal control, any attempted exclusion will not be sanc-
tioned by international law and, if it is to be successful, must be
based in large part on the ability of the coastal State to muster
force adequate to effectuate removal.
The fundamental provision enunciating the degree of coastal
State control over both the internal waters and the territorial sea
adjacent to its littoral is Article 1 of the Convention on the Terri-
torial Sea and the Contiguous Zone. 104 Article 1 states:
1. The sovereignty of a State extends, beyond its land territory and its in-
ternal waters, to a belt of sea adjacent to its coast, described as the ter-
ritorial sea.
2. This sovereignty is exercised subject to the provisions of these articles
and to other rules of international law.
An examination of the provision indicates that both the internal
waters' 05 and the territorial sea fall within the purview of coastal
Supp. (No. 9) 4, art. 3, U.N. Doc. A/3159 (1956), reprinted in [1956] 2 Y.B. INT'L L.
COMM'N 253, 256, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/1956/Add. 1 (1957), which stated:
1. The Commission recognizes that international practice is not uni-
form as regards the delimitation of the territorial sea.
2. The Commission considers that international law does not permit an
extension of the territorial sea beyond twelve miles.
3. The Commission, without taking any decision as to the breadth of
the territorial sea up to that limit, notes, on the one hand, that many
States have fixed a breadth greater than three miles and, on the other
hand, that many States do not recognize such a breadth when that of their
own territorial sea is less.
4. The Commission considers that the breadth of the territorial sea
should be fixed by an international conference.
(emphasis added).
For an analysis of the dispute over the breadth of the territorial sea at the 1958
and 1960 Conferences, see Dean, The Geneva Conference on the Law of the Sea:
What Was Accomplished, 52 Am. J. INT'L L. 607 (1958); Dean, The Second Geneva
Conference on the Law of the Sea: The Fight for Freedom of the Seas, 54 Ari. J.
INT'L L. 751 (1960).
104. Note 3 supra.
105. The Report of the International Law Commission to the General Assem-
bly, 1"1 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 9) 4, art. 1(1), U.N. Doc. A/3159 (1956), reprinted in
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State sovereignty;106 yet, the complete essence of that sovereignty
is not articulated. Does it mean that the State possesses merely
the right to employ the internal waters and the territorial sea for
its own purposes but lacks the legal authority to proscribe similar
use of these areas by other States? Doubtless, two States may
have concurrent rights of use. Or does it mean that the coastal
State possesses rights of an exclusive nature so that it may effec-
tively proscribe the use of these areas by other States even
though it may not be actively engaged in use itself?.
Admittedly the word "sovereignty" is normatively ambiguous
but, when employed, it is designed to signify control of an exclu-
sive nature 0 7 and appears to have been used throughout the Con-
ventions in just this sense.108 This conclusion seems particularly
compelling when one notices that the second paragraph of Article
1 explicitly subjects coastal State sovereignty to the other provi-
sions of the Convention. One of the provisions thus invoked is
the right of innocent passage through the territorial sea. Had
coastal State sovereignty been viewed as less than plenary-in
[1956] 2 Y.B. INT'L L. COM'N 253, 256, U.N. Doe. A/CN.4/SER.A/1956/Add. 1
(1957), discloses that the ILC in 1956 did not include the internal waters as a zone
to which coastal State sovereignty expressly extended. It reads: 'The sovereignty
of a State extends to a belt of sea adjacent to its coast, described as the territorial
sea." However, that the delegates intended this omission to indicate that sover-
eignty did not extend to the internal waters is highly unlikely. They probably felt
it too obvious to require mention. Nevertheless, this deficiency was corrected at
the 1958 Conference when a proposal submitted by the United Kingdom was
adopted. See United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland: revised pro-
posal, U.N. Doc. A/Conf. 13/C.1/L.134, reprinted in 3 UNCLOS I OR, C.1 Annexes
247, U.N. Doc. A/Conf. 13/39 (1958). Both Denmark, U.N. Doe. A/Conf. 13/C.1/L.81,
reprinted in 3 UNCLOS I OR, C.1 Annexes 233, U.N. Doc. A/Conf. 13/39 (1958), and
Yugoslavia, U.N. Doc. A/Conf. 13/C.1/L.57, reprinted in 3 UNCLOS I OR, C.1 An-
nexes 227, U.N. Doe. A/Conf. 13/39 (1958), submitted and then withdrew proposals
designed to achieve the same effect. The United Kingdom's proposal was adopted
by 61 votes to 1, with 8 abstentions.
106. Sovereignty is a concept first devised by Jan Bodin in the eighteenth cen-
tury. Although it has some use when speaking of the relationship between one
person or group of persons and the State, because all States are equal (par in
parem non habet imperium) in the eyes of international law, except in the most
empirical sense, the term sovereignty has little use and is normatively ambiguous.
See J. BRiERLY, THE LAW OF NATIONS 36 (1936).
107. See Island of Palmas Case (Netherlands v. United States), Hague Ct. Rep.
2d (Scott) 83, 92, 22 ATA. J. INT'L L. 867, 875 (Perm. Ct. Arb. 1928), stating that the
word generally signifies "[i] ndependence in regard to a portion of the globe is the
right to exercise therein, to the exclusion of any other state, the functions of a
state." (emphasis added). See also 2 G. HAC wORTH, DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL
LAW 1-6 (1941); 1 L. OPPENHEm, INTERNATIONAL LAW §§ 123-124 (8th ed. Lauter-
pacht 1955).
108. See pt. III (A) (2) and notes 137 & 143 infra.
fact, had it been perceived as merely a right of use-there would
have been no need for such a provision. However, because sover-
eignty conjures exclusivity, the need for such a provision is mani-
fest.
As briefly alluded to, the second paragraph of Article 1109 dero-
gates the absolutistic, plenary nature of coastal State sovereignty
by subjecting the territorial sea to the foreign State right of inno-
cent passage.110 Although the internal sea remains the preserve
of the exclusive incidents of State sovereignty, the Convention ex-
pressly permits foreign nations to transit the territorial sea of the
coastal State in order to enter or exit its internal waters or simply
to traverse them without entering internal waters. Passage is in-
nocent so long as it does not interfere with the peace, good order,
or security of the coastal State."' If the passage appears omi-
nous, the coastal State is entitled to take all necessary steps to
prevent it.112 Though the coastal State cannot suspend the right
of innocent passage through straits used for international naviga-
tion, even through territorial waters,113 it may, if essential for the
protection of its own national security, hold the right in tempo-
rary abeyance throughout the balance of the territorial sea.1 "
109. The Territorial Sea Convention, supra note 3, art. 1(2), uses the invocative
language "subject to the provisions of these articles." The Report of the Interna-
tional Law Commission to the General Assembly, 11 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 9) 4,
art. 1(2), U.N. Doc. A/3159 (1956), reprinted in [1956] 2 Y.B. INT'L L. CoMM'N 253,
256, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/1956/Add. 1 (1957), reads: "This sovereignty is ex-
ercised subject to the conditions prescribed in these articles ... ." (emphasis ad-
ded). The ILC's commentary does not indicate why this specific language was
employed. The language was changed at the 1958 Conference when Yugoslavia,
U.N. Doc. A/Conf. 13/C.1/L.58, reprinted in 3 UNCLOS I OR, C.1 Annexes 227, U.N.
Doc. A/Conf. 13/39 (1958), Greece, U.N. Doc. A/Conf. 13/C.1/L.58, reprinted in 3
UNCLOS I OR, C.1 Annexes 229, U.N. Doc. A/Conf. 13/39 (1958), and Denmark,
U.N. Doc. A/Conf. 13/C.1/L.81, reprinted in 3 UNCLOS I OR, C.1 Annexes 233, U.N.
Doec. A/Conf. 13/39 (1958), all withdrew their proposals in favor of amending the
United Kingdom proposal, U.N. Doc. A/Conf. 13/C.1/L.134, reprinted in 3 UNCLOS
I OR, C.1 Annexes 247, U.N. Doc. A/Conf. 13/39 (1958) (substitute "provisions of
this convention" for "conditions prescribed in these articles"), which was adopted
61 to 1, with 8 abstentions. The United Kingdom draft was then slightly modified
by the Drafting Committee of the First Committee, Report by the Secretariat on
the work of the Drafting Committee of the First Committee, U.N. Doc. A/Conf,
13/C.1/L.67, reprinted in 3 UNCLOS I OR, C.1 Annexes 254, U.N. Doc. A/Conf.
13/39 (1958).
110. The Territorial Sea Convention, supra note 3, art. 14, reads: "I. Subject to
the provisions of these articles, ships of.all States, . . . shall enjoy the right of in-
nocent passage through the territorial sea." Article 14(l) is essentially the same
as Article 15(1) of the 1956 ILC draft. See Report of the International Law Com-
mission to the General Assembly, 11 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 9) 5, art. 15(1), U.N.
Doc. A/3159 (1956), reprinted in [1956] 2 Y.B. IN'r'L L. COMM'N 253, 258, U.N. Dc.
A/CN.4/SER.A/1956/Add. 1 (1957).
111. Territorial Sea Convention, supra note 3, art. 14(4).
112. Id. art. 16(1).
113. Id. art. 16(4).
114. Id. art. 16(3).
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The application of the right of innocent passage to warships has
been disputed.115 It appears, however, that the better-reasoned
argument permits warships to invoke the right as freely as other
foreign State vessels. This conclusion seems ineluctable when
one considers that the provision governing the right of innocent
passage is found in section I (A), entitled Rules Applicable to
All Ships. Subsections (B), (C) and (D) of section III then estab-
lish specific rules applicable to Merchant Ships, Government
Ships Other Than Warships, and Warships, respectively. These
specific rules are designed to supplement the general rules of
subsection (A). Article 23 of Subsection (D) states that any war-
ship not complying with the regulations of the coastal State con-
cerning passage through the territorial sea may be required to
leave." 6 The latter provision implicitly assumes that warships" 7
have the right of innocent passage, and it merely prescribes the
coastal State remedy whenever a foreign State warship in its ter-
ritorial sea fails to comply with regulations concerning passage.
Clearly, then, the 1958 Convention provides for coastal State
sovereignty over both internal waters and the territorial sea. The
exclusive nature of this sovereignty diminishes in the waters of
the territorial sea only in so far as the coastal State is obligated to
afford all foreign State vessels the right to exercise innocent pas-
sage. Though innocent passage may not be suspended in straits
used for international navigation, it may be suspended in the bal-
115. The Report of the International Law Commission to the General Assem-
bly, 11 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 9) 22, art. 24, U.N. Doc. A/3159 (1956), reprinted in
[1956] 2 Y.B. INT'L L. COMM'N 253, 276, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/1956/Add. 1 (1957),
required warships to secure previous authorization to pass. The ILC rejected this
draft provision 43 to 24, with 12 abstentions. Nevertheless, even the commentary
to that draft indicated that the rules of innocent passage apply to warships, id.
commentary. Years ago, however, the United States argued against such an appli-
cation. See Oral Argument of Elihu Root in North Atlantic Coast Fisheries Arbi-
tration, in 11 PROCEEDINGS IN THE NORTH ATLANTIC COAST FISHERIES ARBITRATION
2007 (1912). See also Shyan, International Straits and Ocean Law, 15 INDIAN J.
INT'L L. 17 (1975), in which the author maintains that the law on the question is
ambiguous.
116. Territorial Sea Convention, supra note 3, art. 23.
117. The right of innocent passage also covers submarines. The Territorial Sea
Convention merely prescribes the requisites that must be fulfilled in order to ex-
ercise the right: "Submarines are required to navigate on the surface and to show
their flag." Id. art. 14(6). The clandestine nature of the submarine necessitates
such a rule in order to facilitate coastal State determination of the "innocent" na-
ture of the vessel. For an earlier pronouncement, see The Report of the Second
Comm'n (Territorial Sea), Article 12, League of Nations Doc. C.230.M.117.V., at 10
(1930).
ance of the territorial sea if essential for the protection of the
coastal State's national security.
b. UNCLOS III
The draft conventions produced at UNCLOS III have left the
regime established by the 1958 Convention essentially intact.
Specifically, both the ISNT118 and the ICNT"19 continue to ac-
knowledge coastal State sovereignty over the internal waters and
the territorial sea. Similarly, the territorial sea is subject to the
foreign State right of innocent passage, 20 which continues to in-
ure to military as well as to non-military vessels. Although the
coastal State is obliged not to hamper innocent passage,121 it may
temporarily suspend such passage in all areas of the territorial
sea,122 except straits used for international navigation,123 if the
passage threatens its national security. Non-innocent passage, in
comparison, may clearly be prevented. 24
Both the ISNT and the ICNT differ substantially from the 1958
Convention in the provision of indicia that assist the coastal State
in assaying the innocent character of foreign State passage. More
precisely, though the products of UNCLOS Ill continue to permit
passage that does not prejudice the peace, good order, or security
of the coastal State, both the ISNT125 and the ICNT126 list specific
activities which, if engaged in by a foreign state vessel while in
118. The ISNT, supra note 93, pt. 11, art. 1(1), states: 'The sovereignty of a
coastal State extends beyond its land territory and internal waters, and in the case
of an archipelagic State, its archipelagic waters, over an adjacent belt of sea de-
scribed as the territorial sea."
119. The ICNT, supra note 93, art. 2(1), is essentially the same as Article 1(1) of
the ISNT, note 93 supra. See note 118 upra.
120. The ISNT, supra note 93, pt. H1, art. 1(3), invokes its Article 14. Article 14
states: "Subject to the provisions of these articles, ships of all States, whether
coastal or not, shall enjoy the right of innocent passage through the territorial
sea." The ICNT, supra note 93, art. 2(3), invokes its Article 17. Article 17 of the
ICNT is substantially the same as Article 14 of the ISNT.
121. ICNT, supra note 93, art. 24(1); ISNT, supra note 93, pt. II, art. 21(1).
122. ICNT, supra note 93, art. 25; ISNT, supra note 93, pt. II, art. 22.
123. ICNT, supra note 93, art. 45; ISNT, supra note 93, pt. II, art. 44.
124. The ISNT, supra note 93, pt. H, art. 22(1) reads: 'The coastal State may
take the necessary steps in its territorial sea to prevent passage which is not inno-
cent." The ICNT, supra note 93, art. 25(1), uses identical language. Both the ISNT
and the ICNT permit temporary coastal State suspension of the right of innocent
passage. See ISNT, supra art. 22(3): "The coastal State may, without discrimina-
tion amongst foreign ships, suspend temporarily in specified areas of its territorial
sea the innocent passage of foreign ships if such suspension is essential for the
protection of its security. Such suspension shall take effect only after having been
duly published." The ICNT, supra art. 25(3), is identical. The suspension, how-
ever, cannot apply to straits used for international navigation, see ICNT, supra art,
45; ISNT, supra art. 44.
125. ISNT, supra note 93, pt. II, art. 16(2).
126. ICNT, supra note 93, art. 19(2).
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the territorial sea of another State, are per se prejudicial. Among
the enumerated activities are weapons practice,12 7 the collection
of information prejudicial to the defense or the security of the
coastal State,128 and the launching or landing of any military de-
vice.129 If a foreign vessel pursues any such activity, the coastal
State is entitled to undertake all steps necessary to prevent or to
abate the passage.13 0
Though it is unlikely that the mere addition of such a provision
to the 1958 regime actually increases the extent of coastal State
sovereignty over the internal waters and the territorial sea, it un-
doubtedly clarifies the nature of the activities a foreign State may
claim as being within the ambit of innocent passage. Any activity
comparable to one of those articulated is per se prejudicial and
subject to coastal State proscription. Activities which foreign
vessels may have pursued in the past under the guise of freedom
of navigation and of innocent passage are now clearly non-inno-
cent.131
c. Assessment
Coastal State control over the internal waters is absolute and
exclusive. In fact, the coastal State may put the area to whatever
use it sees fit132 while simultaneously excluding all foreign States.
The control that the coastal State exercises over the territorial
sea, a zone extending seaward perhaps to twelve miles, is equally
extensive, except for the right of innocent passage which may it-
self be temporarily suspended under certain conditions. 33 The
1958 Convention permits the coastal State to prevent any foreign
vessel from transiting its territorial sea if the vessel prejudices
the peace, good order, or security of the coastal State. The draft
conventions produced at UNCLOS HI go further and enumerate
specific activities that are per se prejudicial. For present pur-
127. Id. art. 19(2) (b); ISNT, supra note 93, pt. II, art. 16(2) (b).
128. ICNT, supra note 93, art. 19(2)(c); ISNT, supra note 93, pt. II, art. 16(2)(c).
129. ICNT, supra note 93, art. 19(2) (f); ISNT, supra note 93, pt. II, art. 16(2) (f).
130. ICNT, supra note 93, art. 25(1); ISNT, supra note 93, pt. II, art. 22(1).
131. On innocent passage, see Gehring, Legal Rules Affecting Military Uses of
the Seabed, 54 MI. L. REV. 168, 181-84 (1971).
132. Purver, Canada and the Control of Arms on the Seabed, [19751 13 CAN.
Y.B. INT'L L. 195, 199 (1976). See Brown, The Legal Regime of Inner Space: Military
Aspects, 22 CURRENT LEGAL PROB. 181 (1969) [hereinafter cited as Legal Regime of
Inner Space].
133. Legal Regime of Inner Space, supra note 132, at 185. See also Gehring, Le-
gal Rules Affecting Military Uses of the Seabed, 54 MlL. L. REV. 168, 181 (1971).
poses the most significant appear to be the collection of informa-
tion prejudicial to the defense or the security of the coastal State
and the launching or landing of military devices.
Although it is conceivable that anti-submarine mines and
underwater acoustic detection devices (sonobuoys) might be
deployed in the waters landward of the baseline as well as the
territorial sea of a foreign State during wartime, such deployment
seems an unlikely event during peacetime. The relatively small
area encompassed, the regularity with which the waters are tra-
versed by indigenous civilian as well as military vessels, and the
conspicuous nature of any effort undertaken to accomplish de-
ployment conjoin to militate against such an event. Moreover, it
would be particularly difficult for one sea power to seek to main-
tain amicable relations with another while pursuing such a para-
doxical course. Nations value security and territorial sovereignty
above all else. The discovery of any foreign State plan to deploy
ASW devices during peacetime would surely appear as nothing
less than the most egregious form of violation of territorial sover-
eignty. Opposition to continued detente would undoubtedly reso-
nate. In addition, because there is little need for knowledge of
vessel movement within such waters, and because deployment of
destructive anti-submarine and anti-ship mines can be under-
taken on very short notice once conflict has commenced, the risks
involved in pursuing such a peacetime operation seem greatly dis-
proportionate to any benefits that may accrue.
Nevertheless, actual foreign State deployment of such devices
during peacetime violates international law. In fact, coastal State
sovereignty over both internal waters and territorial sea entitles
the coastal State to remove such devices once deployed. Though
there may be some dispute, it appears that the language of the
1958 Convention providing the coastal State with the right to pre-
vent passage that prejudices its peace, good order, or security
authorizes the coastal State to prohibit all naval vessels of a de-
ploying State from passing through its territorial sea. The prod-
ucts of UNCLOS III remove any uncertainty in this respect by
clearly enunciating the coastal State right to prevent foreign State
vessels from passing through the territorial sea if such vessels are
engaged in either the collection of information prejudicial to the
coastal State's defense or security or the launching or landing of
military devices. In addition, the 1958 Convention as well as the
ISNT and the ICNT entitle the coastal State to suspend tempora-
rily innocent passage through the territorial sea if essential for
the protection of its national security. As a result, vessels from all
foreign States may be temporarily excluded without discrimina-
tion if, for instance, the coastal State knows of a plan to deploy
[VOL. 16: 575, 1979] Peacetime ASW
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW
ASW devices, yet lacks precise knowledge of the carrier's iden-
tity.
In terms of ASW, the consequence of such a proscriptive legal
regime is highly desirable. The target States for any major ASW
peacetime deployment effort undoubtedly would be the sea pow-
ers-the United States, the Soviet Union, Great Britain, and
France. The principal objective would be to provide both readily
available information on the precise location of submarines, par-
ticularly SSBNs, and potential for destroying, immediately before
or simultaneous with the commencement of hostilities, all subma-
rines located in the internal waters and the territoral sea. SSBNs
constitute the least vulnerable component of the strategic triad
and perhaps the most dependable counterforce deterrent. Thus,
if any sea power can expose another's SSBNs to the possibility of
immediate attrition, a strategic asymmetry will exist which could
very well jeopardize both international stability and State secur-
ity.
International law is designed to provide for the preservation
and extension of widely shared values such as security. Absent
security and international stability, all values would be
§ jeopardized, and the process for resolving competing interna-
tional claims would no longer be peaceful. In this sense, the legal
regime of exclusive coastal State control over the waters land-
ward of the baseline, as well as those within the territorial sea,
seems preferable to any regime that permits peacetime foreign
State deployment of ASW devices in such areas.
2. The High Seas
The internal waters of a coastal State are located landward of
the baseline. The territorial sea extends from the baseline sea-
ward perhaps as much as twelve miles. Pursuant to the 1958
Convention on the High Seas, 134 all waters beyond the outer pe-
rimeter of the territorial sea are known as the high seas.135
14. The ISNT and ICNT locate the waters of the high seas beyond a point 200
miles from the coast. Filling the interstice between the territorial sea and the high
seas is a zone known as the exclusive economic zone. It will be discussed in depth
at pt. HI (A) (4) infra.
135. The Convention on the High Seas, done Apr. 29, 1958, art. 1, [19621 13 U.S.T.
2312, T.I.A.S. No. 5200, 450 U.N.T.S. 82, reads: '"he term 'high seas' means all parts
of the sea that are not included in the territorial sea or in the internal waters of a
State." The ILC draft initially considered by Committee I (High Seas) of the 1958
Conference read, Report of the International Law Commission to the General As-
a. The 1958 Convention
The nature of the international legal regime governing the wa-
ters beyond the territorial sea is explicitly articulated in Article 2
of the 1958 Convention on the High Seas.136 In general, it denies
the validity of any attempt by any nation to subject a portion of
the high seas to its sovereignty137 and proclaims the entire area
sembly, 11 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 9) 7, art. 26, U.N. Doc. A/3159 (1956), reprinted
in [1956] 2 Y.B. INT'L L. COMM'N 253, 259, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/1956/Add. 1
(1957): "1. The term 'high seas' means all parts of the sea that are not included in
the territorial sea, as contemplated by Part I, or in the internal waters of a State.
2. Waters within the baseline of the territorial sea are considered 'internal wa-
ters'." Several proposals were made when Committee II of the 1958 Conference
considered the ILC draft Article 26. Included were those of France, U.N. Doc.
A/Conf. 13/C.2/L.6, reprinted in 4 UNCLOS I OR, C.2 Annexes 116, U.N. Doc.
A/Conf. 13/40 (1958), Romania and the Ukranian Soviet Socialist Republic, U.N.
Doc. A/Conf. 13/C.2/L.26, reprinted in 4 UNCLOS I OR, C.2 Annexes 123, U.N. Doc.
A/Conf. 13/40 (1958), the United Kingdom, U.N. Doc. A/Conf. 13/C.2/L.48, re-
printed in 4 UNCLOS I OR, C.2 Annexes 128, U.N. Doc. A/Conf. 13/40 (1958), and
Brazil, U.N. Doc. A/Conf. 13/C.2/L.67, reprinted in 4 UNCLOS I OR, C.2 Annexes
133, U.N. Doc. A/Conf. 13/40 (1958). The Committee adopted the proposal of
France to delete paragraph 2 of the ILC draft, and on proposal of Greece, 4 UN-
CLOS I OR, C.2 (15th mtg.) 37, 37, U.N. Doc. A/Conf. 13/40 (1958), referred para-
graph 2 to Committee 11 (52 to 0, with 2 abstentions). The Plenary meetings of the
Conference amended the Committee H draft to read like Article 1 above.
136. The Convention on the High Seas, done Apr. 29, 1958, art. 2, [1962] 13 U.S.T,
2312, T.I.A.S. No. 5200, 450 U.N.T.S. 82, states:
The high seas being open to all nations, no State may validly purport to
subject any part of them to its sovereignty. Freedom of the high seas is
exercised under the conditions laid down by these articles and by other
rules of international law. It comprises, inter alia,.
(1) Freedom of navigation;
(2) Freedom of fishing;
(3) Freedom to lay submarine cables and pipelines;
(4) Freedom to fly over the high seas.
These freedoms, and others which are recognized by the general princi-
ples of international law, shall be exercised by all States with reasonable
regard to the interests of other States in their exercise of the freedom of
the high seas.
The final draft is identical to that reported out of Committee II. See U.N. Doc.
A/Conf. 13/C.2/L.17/Add. 1, reprinted in 4 UNCLOS I OR, C.2 Annexes 150, U.N.
Doc. A/Conf. 13/40 (1958). The 1956 ILC Report, supra note 96, art. 27, stated sim-
ply:
The high seas being open to all nations, no State may validly purport to
subject any part of them to its sovereignty. Freedom of the high seas com-
prises, inter alia:
(1) Freedom of navigation;
(2) Freedom of fishing;
(3) Freedom to lay submarine cables and pipelines;
(4) Freedom to fly over the high seas.
137. Mr. Colglough (United States) stated that the prohibition against the exer-
cise of sovereignty meant that "the high seas were the property not of one nation,
or of a few nations, but of the community of nations ... [and] that the high seas
were not open to regulation or appropriation by any one nation or group of na-
tions." (emphasis added). See 4 UNCLOS I OR, C.2 (15th mtg.) 37, 37, U.N. Doc.
A/Conf. 13/40 (1958). On the same subject the ILC said, Report of the Interna-
tional Law Commission to the General Assembly, 11 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 9) 24,
art. 27 commentary, U.N. Doc. A/3159 (1956), reprinted in [1956] 2 Y.B. InT'L L.
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open to use by all States. 3 8 More specifically, Article 2 entitles all
States to exercise the freedoms of navigation, 139 overflight, fish-
ing, laying of submarine cables and pipelines, and any other free-
doms recognized by the general principles of international law.140
The exercise of any of these freedoms, however, is subject to the
condition that it be undertaken with reasonable regard to the in-
terests of other States in their exercise of the freedoms similarly
assured them.141
One of the most widely acknowledged unstated uses of the high
seas recognized by the general principles of international law is
the right of States to employ the area for military purposes. Mili-
tary vessels are undoubtedly entitled to traverse the waters of the
high seas pursuant to the freedom of navigation. The permissible
extent of other military uses is not altogether made clear by the
Convention. In order to explicate the general nature of other per-
missible military uses it will prove helpful to examine two propos-
als submitted at the 1958 Conference designed to restrict both
military maneuvers and nuclear weapon tests conducted on the
high seas.142
COMM'N 253, 278, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SERA/1956/Add. 1 (1957): "No State may sub-
ject any part of the high seas to its sovereignty; hence no State may exercise
jurisdiction over any stretch of water." (emphasis added).
138. As initially articulated by Hugo Grotius, the principle of mare liberum was
said to rest on three bases. First, it was said the vast area encompassed made it
impossible for any one nation to occupy it. Second, the resources were said to be
inexhaustable and thus there was no need to permit individual States to reduce
the area to possession to prevent dispute. Finally, it was said that the readily ac-
cessible transportation lanes provided by the sea facilitated important inter-cul-
tural exchanges. See H. GRoTius, MARE LIBERUM 7-10, 22-44 (rev. ed. 1916) (1st ed.
n.p. 1608). It seems that only the latter basis has endured the 350 years since Gro-
tius produced his work.
139. The freedom of navigation historically has been the most important inclu-
sive use. See M. McDouGAL & W. BURKE, supra note 2, at 765-73. For case support,
see Le Louis, 2 Dods. 210, 165 Eng. Rep. 1464 (Adm. 1817); The Marianna Flora, 24
U.S. (11 Wheat.) 1 (1826).
140. Article 27 of the 1956 ILC draft also contained "inter alia" language. The
Report of the International Law Commission to the General Assembly, 11 U.N.
GAOR, Supp. (No. 9) 24, art. 27 commentary (2), U.N. Doc. A/3159 (1956), reprinted
in [1956] 2 Y.B. IN'VL L. CoMM'N 253, 278, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/1956/Add. 1
(1957), states: 'The list of freedoms of the high seas contained in this article is not
restrictive. The Commission has merely specified four of the main freedoms, but
is aware that there are other freedoms ......
141. M. McDOUGAL & W. BURKE, supra note 2, at 773.
142. The commentary on Article 27 of the 1956 draft somewhat prompted both
proposals. Paragraph 1, sentence 3 of the commentary states that in exercising
any high seas freedom a nation must refrain from any activity that might "ad-
versely affect" the use of the high seas by nationals of another State. See Report
of the International Law Commission to the General Assembly, 11 U.N. GAOR,
i. The Three Power Proposal: Military Maneuvers
For some time, major military powers have found it essential to
use specific portions of the high seas for conducting military ma-
neuvers and target practice. Though this use has, of necessity, re-
sulted in the exclusion of simultaneous use by other States,143
the conducting nations have been averse to exercising any exclu-
sive jurisdiction over foreign nationals within the maneuver zones
or to attempting forcibly to prevent such nationals from entering
the area.'4 To do so would constitute a subjection of the area to
sovereignty and thereby run afoul of Article 2 of the Convention.
Nevertheless, the nature of the maneuvers has actually resulted
in the zones being put to extensive long-term exclusive use.145
Several nations expostulated against such use of the high seas
at the 1958 Conference.14 6 Albania, Bulgaria, and the Soviet
Union actually went so far as to sponsor jointly a proposal
designed to prohibit such activities.147 Though the proposal was
Supp. (No. 9) 24, art. 27 commentary, U.N. Doc. A/3159 (1956), reprinted in [1956] 2
Y.B. INT'L L. COMM'N 253, 278, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/1956/Add. 1 (1957).
143. Mr. Colglough (United States) perspicaciously noted, 4 UNCLOS I OR, C.2
(9th mtg.) 14, 15, para. 13, U.N. Doc. A/Conf. 13/40 (1958), that any time State X
exercises a freedom over spot 1, it is impossible for the use not to "adversely af-
fect" the use of the same spot 1 by State Y. He said:
It could not be held that the use of the high seas was invalid solely be-
cause some inconvenience would result for other users. Any use of the
high seas by one state temporarily [denies] to other states some degree of
ability to use the seas, just as the use of a road by a motor-car to some
extent [restricts] its use by others.
144. See Legality of Using the High Seas in Connection with Nuclear Weapons
Tests in the Pacific, U.S. Delegation Paper, U.N. Conference on the Law of the
Sea, 1958, US/CLS/Pos/48(2)-(3), Annex II, Feb. 20, 1958, reproduced in part in 4
M. WHrrEMAN, DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 546 (1965). See also M. McDOUGAL &
W. BuRKE, supra note 2, at 769-70.
145. See Legality of Using the High Seas in Connection with Nuclear Weapons
Tests in the Pacific, U.S. Delegation Paper, U.N. Conference on the Law of the
Sea, 1958, US/CLS/Pos/48(2)-(3), Annex II, Feb. 20, 1958, reproduced in part in 4
M. WITEMAN, DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 546 (1965):
Apparently there has been no essential change in attitude in recent
years even though rather substantial portions of international space [high
seas] are being utilized as military aircraft target and maneuver ranges
for relatively long periods of time. There are today numerous United
States military aircraft practice zones over international waters in the At-
lantic, Gulf and Pacific areas....
The British have similar military aircraft practice zones over portions of
international waters near the British Isles. These are in such regular use
that commercial aircraft must regularly detour them on flights to and from
the continent.
(emphasis original).
146. At the 1958 Conference, the Soviet Union, 4 UNCLOS I OR, C.2 (7th mtg.)
8, 10, para. 12, U.N. Doc. A/Conf. 13/40 (1958), Romania, id. (9th mtg.) 14, 16, para.
23, and Bulgaria, id. (10th mtg.) 19, 19, para. 6, all expressed this view.
147. The Three Power Proposal, U.N. Doc. A/Conf. 13/C.2/L.32, reprinted in 4
UNCLOS I OR, C.2 Annexes 124, U.N. Doc. A/Conf. 13/40 (1958), was to be ap-
pended to Article 27 of the 1956 ILC draft. It read: "No naval or air ranges or other
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not comprehensive, 148 it would have eliminated extensive, long-
term use of the high seas for maneuvers or for target practice. In
decisively rejecting the Three Power Proposal' 49 the Conference
acknowledged that naval maneuvers and target practice, though
exclusive, are not violative of the international Law of the Sea.
ii. The Four Power Proposal: Nuclear Weapon Tests
The defeat of the Three Power Proposal left the Eastern bloc
undaunted. 50 Determined to eliminate nuclear test detonations
on the high seas,151 Czechoslovakia, Poland, Yugoslavia, and the
Soviet Union proposed that all States refrain from testing nuclear
weapons in that area. 5 2 Several delegates insisted that because
the question of banning test explosions was so closely related to
the whole disarmament issue, consideration of such a proposal
was outside the bailiwick of the Conference. 153 Others thought
combat training areas limiting freedom of navigation may be designated on the
high seas near foreign coasts or on international sea routes." The proposal was
rejected 43 to 13, with 9 abstentions, 4 UNCLOS I OR, C.2 (21st mtg.) 54, 54, para. 5,
U.N. Doc. A/Conf. 13/40 (1958).
148. It should be noted that this was not a blanket proposal. It was designed to
proscribe only extensive activities near coasts or international sealanes. See re-
marks by Mr. Raduilsky (Bulgaria), 4 UNCLOS I OR, C.2 (16th mtg.) 40, 41, para. 9,
U.N. Doc. A/Conf. 13/40 (1958), in reference to the Three Power Proposal (Albania,
Bulgaria, and the Soviet Union) to ban military maneuvers. He stated that the
proposal did "not refer to areas of the high seas used for ordinary naval or air ex-
ercises of short duration. It was rather designed to establish international stand-
ards forbidding the designation of naval and air training areas for long periods on
a unilateral basis." (emphasis added).
149. The Three Power Proposal was rejected 43 to 13, with 9 abstentions. See
note 147 supra.
150. Several delegates spoke against the legality of nuclear tests. Mdr.
Bierzanek (Poland) stated that such tests created a "defacto sovereignty," 4 UN-
CLOS I OR, C.2 (6th mtg.) 5, 7, para. 12, U.N. Doc. A/Conf. 13/40 (1958); Mr. Tunkin
(Soviet Union) said that they violated paragraph 1 of the commentary to the ILC's
draft Article 27, id. (7th mtg.) 8, 9, para. 11; Mr. Ohye (Japan) expressed agree-
ment -with Tunkin's position in relation to Article 27, id. (8th mtg.) 11, 11, para. 2;
Mr. Ghilmegeanu (Romania) felt the tests "interfered" with other uses, id. (9th
mtg.) 14, 16, para. 22; Mr. Zourek (Czechoslovakia) concurred with Tunkin's posi-
tion, id. (11th mtg.) 23, 24, para. 11.
151. Such detonations were later eliminated by the Treaty Banning Nuclear
Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and Under Water, done Aug. 5,
1963, [1963] 14 U.S.T. 1313, T.I.A.S. No. 5433, 480 U.N.T.S. 43.
152. The Four Power Proposal was designed to insert the following after Article
27 of the 1956 ILC draft: "States are bound to refrain from testing nuclear weapons
on the high seas." See U.N. Doc. A/Conf. 13/C.2/L.30, reprinted in 4 UNCLOS I
OR, C.2 Annexes 124, U.N. Doc. A/Conf. 13/40 (1958).
153. See remarks of Mr. Weeks (Liberia), 4 UNCLOS I OR, C.2 (10th mtg.) 19,
21, para. 28, U.N. Doc. A/Conf. 13/40 (1958); Mr. Colglough (United States), id. (9th
mtg.) 14, 15, para. 13; Mr. Randall (United Kingdom), id. (8th mtg.) 11, 13, para. 28.
that because nuclear testing constitutes use of the high seas, the
Conference was authorized to consider the problem as part of the
discussion on freedom of the seas.154 Ultimately, the United King-
dom countered the Four Power Proposal with its own proposal,55
later withdrawn after lengthy debate in favor of a compromise so-
lution tabled by India to send the matter to the General Assem-
bly.156 The compromise was adopted, and the proposal to ban
nuclear test detonations was never subjected to a vote.157
iii. Reasonable Regard Standard
Following the rejection of the Three Power Proposal and the ex-
pedient compromise solution on the Four Power Proposal, the
delegates immediately proceeded to adopt the joint proposal of
the United Kingdom and Ireland subjecting each permissible use
of the high seas to the condition, mentioned above, that it be un-
dertaken with reasonable regard to the interests of other States in
the exercise of the freedoms guaranteed them.158 In doing so, the
Conference silenced those nations which maintained that interna-
154. Mr. Sikri (India), id. (8th mtg.) 11, 12, para. 12.
155. U.N. Doc. A/Conf. 13/C.2/L.64, reprinted in 4 UNCLOS I OR, C.2 Annexes
132, U.N. Doc. A/Conf. 13/40 (1958).
156. The United Kingdom proposal was withdrawn at the eighteenth meeting of
Committee II, 4 UNCLOS I OR, C.2 (18th mtg.) 46, 47, para. 19, U.N. Doc. A/Conf.
13/40 (1958). The Indian proposal, U.N. Doc. A/Conf. 13/C.2/L.71/Rev. 1, reprinted
in 4 UNCLOS I OR, C.2 Annexes 134, U.N. Doc. A/Conf. 13/40 (1958), stated:
Recalling that the Conference has been convened by the General As-
sembly of the United Nations in accordance with resolution 1105 (XI) of 21
February 1957, and
Recognizing that there is a serious and genuine apprehension on the
part of many States that nuclear explosions constitute an infringement of
the freedom of the seas, and
Recognizing that the question.., is still under review by the General
Assembly... and by the Disarmament Committee...,
Decides to refer this matter to the General Assembly for appropriate ac-
tion.
(emphasis original).
157. The Indian proposal was adopted 51 to 1, with 14 abstentions, 4 UNCLOS I
OR, C.2 (20th mtg.) 52, 52, para. 5, U.N. Doc. A/Conf. 13/40 (1958). On the general
debate as to the legality of nuclear weapon tests, see Margolis, The Hydrogen
Bomb Experiments and International Law, 64 YALE L.J. 629 (1955); McDougal &
Schlei, The Hydrogen Bomb Tests in Perspective: Lawful Measures for Security, 64
YALE L.J. 648 (1955).
158. The proposal of the United Kingdom, U.N. Doc. A/Conf. 13/C.2/L.68, re-
printed in 4 UNCLOS I OR, C.2 Annexes 134, U.N. Doc. A/Conf. 13/40 (1958), was
Adopted 30 to 18, with 9 abstentions. It appended the following to Article 27 of the
ILC draft (see note 136 supra): 'These freedoms, and others which are recognized
by the general principles of international law, shall be exercised by all States with
reasonable regard to the interests of other States in their exercise of the freedom
of the high seas." Also appended to Article 27 was a proposal submitted by Mex-
ico, U.N. Doc. A/Conf. 13/C.2/L.3, reprinted in 4 UNCLOS I OR, C.2 Annexes 115,
U.N. Doc. A/Conf. 13/40 (1958). Article 27, as amended by the United Kingdom
and Mexican proposals, was adopted by Committee II 50 to 4, with 12 abstentions,
4 UNCLOS I OR, C.2 (22d mtg.) 55, 56, para. 20, U.N. Doc. A/Conf. 13/40 (1958), and
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tional law does not countenance military uses of the high seas
either lengthy in duration, yet spatially circumscribed (maneu-
vers), or short in duration, but encompassing vast geographical
areas (nuclear tests). Any military use of the high seas was per-
missible as long as it was reasonable. In comparison, though
every use inevitably precluded some other State from undertak-
ing a simultaneous use of the same area, such use was not ipso
facto unreasonable or violative of the provision proscribing sub-
jection of the high seas to State sovereignty. If the benefits de-
rived from the particular exclusive military use outweighed the
inconvenience caused to inclusive uses of the seas,15 9 and the
utilizing State refrained from either exercising exclusive jurisdic-
tion over foreign nationals within the area or preventing them
from traversing the area, then the activity comported with the
provisions of the Convention.
b. UNCLOS III
One caveat is necessary before beginning the examination of
the rules relating to uses of the high seas. Article 1 of the 1958
Convention states that all waters beyond the territorial sea con-
stitute high seas. The ISNT160 and the ICNT161 use a different lo-
cational definition. Each draft convention defines the high seas as
that body of water situated beyond a delineation 200 miles from
the baseline. Intervening between the outer boundary of the ter-
ritorial sea and the landward boundary of the high seas is the eco-
approved at the Plenary meetings 51 to 0, with 1 abstention, 2 UNCLOS I OR, PLE-
NARY MEETINGS (10th mtg.) 20, 20, para. 2, U.N. Doc. A/Conf. 13/38 (1958).
159. See M. McDOUGAL & W. BuRKE, supra note 2, at 772:
Fair assessment of the relevant factors would indicate to the impartial ob-
server that the exclusive use attendant upon weapons testing fully com-
ports with the reasonableness criterion.... In contrast to [the] minimal
effects upon inclusive use, the interest at stake for the United States is
easily seen to be of the greatest significance for its security and for that of
a good part of the world.
160. The ISNT, supra note 93, pt. II, art. 73, reads: "The term 'high seas' as used
in the present Convention means all parts of the sea that are not included in the
exclusive economic zone, in the territorial sea or in the internal waters of a
State ......
161. The ICNT, supra note 93, art. 86, reads:
The provisions of this Part [Part VII, High Seas] apply to all parts of the
sea that are not included in the exclusive economic zone, in the territorial
sea or in the internal waters of a State .... This article does not entail
any abridgement of the freedoms enjoyed by all States in the exclusive ec-
onomic zone in accordance with article 58.
nomic zone, an area within which the coastal State has numerous
economic interests.
In general terms, the regime established by the 1958 Conven-
tion and that contained in the draft conventions issuing from UN-
CLOS HI are quite similar. The invalidity of any attempt by any
nation to subject a portion of the high seas to its sovereignty is
declared, while the entire area is proclaimed open to use by all
States.162 Every State is entitled to exercise each of the freedoms
specified in the 1958 Convention and the additional freedoms to
conduct scientific research 163 and to construct installations for
the exploration and exploitation of that portion of its own conti-
nental shelf extending beyond the economic zone.1 64 Further-
more, though neither the ISNT165 nor the ICNT166 contains
language incorporating other unstated freedoms recognized by
general principles of international law, the fact that the litany of
express freedoms is prefaced by the words "inter alia" accom-
plishes the same result. The exercise of any of the freedoms, ex-
press or implied, is irrefutably subject to the condition that it be
undertaken with "due consideration" for the interests of other
States. 67
One of the most conspicuous additions made by UNCLOS III to
the legal regime established by the 1958 Convention is the "peace-
162. The ISNT, supra note 93, pt. II, art. 75(1), reads in part:
1. The high seas being open to all nations, no State may validly purport
to subject any part of them to its sovereignty. Freedom of the high seas is
exercised under the conditions laid down by these articles and by other
rules of international law. It comprises, inter alia, both for coastal and
noncoastal States: . ..
See ICNT, supra note 93, art. 87(1), for similar language.
163. ICNT, supra note 93, art. 87(1)(f); ISNT, supra note 93, pt. II, art. 75(1).
164. ICNT, supra note 93, art. 87(1) (d); ISNT, supra note 93, pt. II, art. 75(1) (d).
165. It should be recalled that the proposal of the United Kingdom at the 1958
Conference to append the language reproduced in note 158 supra to Article 27 of
the 1956 ILC draft indicated that the provision also incorporated other freedoms
recognized by general principles of international law. Neither the ISNT nor the
ICNT contain such language, but both do preface the enumerated freedoms by the
words "inter alia." See Article 75(1) of the ISNT, note 162 supra.
166. See ICNT, supra note 93, art. 87(1).
167. The language used in the 1958 text states "reasonable regard." This spe-
cific language was contained in a proposal submitted by the United Kingdom, see
note 158 supra, adopted in opposition to language used in sentence 3 of comment 1
to Article 27 of the 1956 ILC draft, which sought to prevent any use that might ad-
versely affect use by nationals of another State. Pursuant to the "adversely affect"
test, the Eastern bloc powers objected to many uses that were exclusive in nature
and sought to proscribe both military maneuvers and nuclear weapon tests. "Due
consideration" seems to require any using State to be cognizant of the interests of
others in using the area and to abstain from nonessential exclusive uses which
substantially interfere with valued inclusive uses-a requirement not really differ-
ent from the 1958 Convention.
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ful purposes" clause. Both the ISNT168 and the ICNT169 contain a
provision reserving the use of the high seas for '"peaceful pur-
poses." Though this language is by no means new to interna-
tional conventions,o70 its ambiguity has generated continuing
debate as to the normative prescription it declares. Some suggest
it permits all non-aggressive uses; others insist only non-military
uses are consonant.'17 In the context of the instant draft conven-
tions, if only non-military uses are permitted, then the high seas
may not be employed for any military purpose, including the nav-
igation of warships. On the other hand, if it simply prescribes
non-aggressive utilization, then the high seas may legally be used
for a whole panoply of military purposes as long as none of them
are aggressive.
When the " peaceful purposes" clause of either the ISNT or the
ICNT is construed in the context of the whole draft convention so
as to effectuate the general intention of the architects as evi-
denced by the preceding and subsequent provisions,172 the ines-
capable conclusion is that the clause establishes a non-aggressive
normative standard. One of the enumerated freedoms of the high
168. ISNT, supra note 93, pt. 11, art. 74- "The high seas shall be open to all
States,... and their use shall be reserved for peaceful purposes."
169. ICNT, supra note 93, art. 88: "The high seas shall be reserved for peaceful
purposes."
170. Peaceful purposes is also used in Article 1 of the Antarctic Treaty, done
Dec. 1, 1959, [1961] 12 U.S.T. 794, T.LA.S. No. 4780, 402 U.N.T.S. 71; in Article 4 of the
Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use
of Outer Space, Including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, done Jan. 27, 1967,
[1967] 18 U.S.T. 2410, T.IA.S. No. 6347, 610 U.N.T.S. 205; and in the Statute of the
International Atomic Energy Agency, done Oct. 26, 1956, [1957] 8 U.S.T. 1093,
T.LA.S. No. 3873, 276 U.N.T.S. 3.
171. For a non-military construction in reference to the Outer Space Treaty, see
Markov, Against the So-Called "Broader" Interpretation of the Term "Peaceful" in
International Space Law, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE ELEVENTH COLLOQUIUM ON THE
LAW OF OUTER SPACE 73 (1969). For a non-aggressive interpretation, see Dembling
& Arons, The Evolution of the Outer Space Treaty, 33 J. Am L. & CoM. 419 (1967).
172. There are basically two schools of thought on the construction of treaties:
the "plain meaning" school and the "general purpose" school. The former uses as
its primary premise the notion of univocalism, i.e., that every term has but one
meaning, that the meaning is easily identifiable, and that the meaning controls.
The preferable method of construction is the latter school. It seeks to effectuate
the true intentions of the drafters by construing ambiguous provisions in the con-
text of the total treaty. This approach is supported by Article 31 of the Vienna
Convention on the Law of Treaties, opened for signature May 23, 1969, U.N. Doc.
A/Conf. 39/27, reprinted in 63 Am. J. INT'L L. 875 (1969). For further support, see
Judge Anzilotti's dissenting opinion in Interpretation of the 1919 Convention Con-
cerning Employment of Women During the Night, [1932] P.C.I.J., ser. A/B, No. 50.
On the plain meaning rule, see Gross, Voting in the Security Council: Abstention
from Voting and Absence from Meetings, 60 YALE UZ. 209 (1951).
seas guaranteed all States is that of navigation. This freedom is
not restricted, and in fact both draft conventions contemplate
navigation by military as well as civilian vessels.173 Such use,
however, would be clearly inconsistent with a non-military stan-
dard.174 Military use of the high seas is a well-established cus-
tomary utilization recognized by the general principles of
international law and incorporated in both draft conventions by
virtue of the words "inter alia" prefacing the statement of ex-
press freedoms. To suggest that the "peaceful purposes" clause
of either draft convention establishes a non-military standard is
inconsistent with the language contemplating military navigation
as well as that incorporating more extensive military use. In light
of the minimal interference caused to inclusive uses of ocean
space by highly valued exclusive military uses, this result is de-
sirable. Essentially, then, the negotiating texts issuing from UN-
CLOS III locate the point of origin of the high seas some 200 miles
from the baseline. The international legal regime pronounced by
the 1958 Convention to govern the general character of the high
seas remains intact with the waters being both open to all States
and beyond the efforts of any nation to subject them to sover-
eignty. The freedoms of the sea include those declared by the
173. The ISNT, supra note 93, pt. 11, art. 81, states: "Warships on the high seas
have complete immunity from the jurisdiction of any State other than the flag
State." The ICNT, supra note 93, art. 95, reads identically. Both these provisions
implicitly contemplate the use of the high seas by warships. Moreover, the ISNT,
supra arts. 27-32, and the ICNT, supra arts. 29-32, establish the rules for foreign
warships passing through the coastal State's territorial sea. Because foreign war-
ships most frequently reach the territorial sea of a coastal State by traversing a
portion of the high seas, it seems that these Articles also contemplate some use of
the high seas by military vessels.
174. The opposite position, however, has been argued in relation to the Outer
Space Treaty. See Finch, Outer Space for "Peaceful Purposes," 54 A.B.A. J. 365
(1968). Many commentators feel that the Outer Space Treaty language permitting
the use of military personnel and equipment on the moon and other celestial bod-
ies requires that "peaceful purposes" be defined to prescribe a non-aggressive
standard. In light of the fact that most if not all celestial exploration is undertaken
by military personnel utilizing military equipment, it can be cogently argued that
the drafters included such language to avert suggestions that a non-military defini-
tion of the "peaceful purposes" clause precluded military personnel from explor-
ing outer space. Thus, it is possible to have a non-military normative standard for
outer space, yet in recognition of the realities, permit military personnel to explore
space. After all, military equipment can be used for non-military purposes.
In relation to the ISNT and the ICNT, the same argument seems casuistic be-
cause it is not essential to use military personnel and equipment to navigate the
oceans. Consequently, the existence of a provision permitting military vessels to
use the high seas, accompanied by a provision reserving the high seas for "peace-
ful purposes," cannot mean that the latter prescribes a non-military normative
standard with the former merely permitting the military, out of necessity, to use
the high seas. Clearly, as the "peaceful purposes" clause is used in both the ISNT
and the ICNT, it means non-aggressive. For support, see Oxman, The Third United
Nations' Conference on the Law of the Sea: The 1977 New York Session, 72 AM. J.
INT'L L 57, 73 (1978).
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1958 Convention and a few additional ones endemic to the general
legal cadre constructed by UNCLOS III. In addition, though the
language in the earlier Convention subjecting the exercise of all
freedoms to the condition that the exercise be undertaken with
"reasonable regard" for the interests of others has been changed
to read with "due consideration" for the interests of others, the
change is little more than semantical. The inclusion of a provi-
sion prescribing that the use of the high seas is reserved for
"peaceful purposes" merely obligates all utilizing States to refrain
from aggressive uses.
c. Assessment
Military vessels are clearly entitled to traverse the high seas
pursuant to the freedom of navigation articulated in both the 1958
Convention and the draft agreements produced by UNCLOS I.
Other military uses of the high seas are permitted by virtue of the
non-exhaustive, incorporative language prefacing the enumera-
tion of various other freedoms. The exercise of any freedom,
whether express or implied, including military freedom, is subject
to two basic conditions. First, in light of all the circumstances, the
exercise must be reasonable in nature. More precisely, though
every use of a particular portion of the high seas tends to exclude
the simultaneous use of the same area by another State, the value
of the exclusive use must be sufficiently great to outweigh the in-
terference resulting to inclusive uses. Second, though military
uses extensive in terms of time and geographical area are permit-
ted under this standard, no State may attempt to occlude a por-
tion of the high seas by preventing foreign nationals from
entering it or by asserting jurisdiction over foreign nationals
within it. The high seas are open to all, and any attempt by any
nation to subject them to its sovereignty is invalid. 75
Of the water zones examined thus far, the high seas, without
doubt, is the most likely to feel the impact of any peacetime ASW
deployment effort. A deployment operation undertaken in this
area is less likely to be detected, not only because it is situated
sufficiently distant from the vessel concentration zones located in
proximity to the coast, but also because foreign State activity on
the high seas just appears less intrusive than activity conducted
175. Baxter, The Legal Aspects of Arms Control Measures Concerning the Mis-
sile Carrying Submarines and Anti-Submarine Warfare, in SEA-BASED DETER-
RENT, supra note 39, at 209, 221.
landward of the baseline or in the territorial sea. Coastal State
sensitivity about security increases in direct relation to the pro-
pinquity to the State itself. Foreign State ASW deployment on
the high seas may appear less ominous to coastal security than
deployment within the territorial sea. Similarly, any deployment
effort on the high seas will appear more consistent with professed
friendly relations than an effort undertaken in the waters of the
territorial sea. Though the deployment of ASW devices landward
of the baseline or in the territorial sea will undoubtedly be seen
as aggressive, a stronger case can be made that deployment on
the high seas is merely defensive in character.
Peacetime deployment of underwater acoustic detection de-
vices (sonobuoys) and anti-submarine mines in the waters of the
high seas is consistent with the international legal regime estab-
lished by the 1958 Convention and with that proposed by the draft
conventions issuing from UNCLOS I. Both regimes permit mili-
tary uses of the high seas which are reasonable in nature. This
has included not only geographically extensive uses, such as nu-
clear weapon tests, but also less extensive long-term uses, such as
military maneuvers. Underwater acoustic detection devices and
anti-submarine mines are designed to occupy small portions of
the water column for moderate periods of time. In this sense, the
use of the high seas for ASW activities is somewhat analogous to
use for military maneuvers. While military maneuvers tend to re-
sult in some measurable, albeit minimal, degree of interference
with inclusive uses of ocean space, because ASW activities are by
their very nature subsurface, the amount of interference they
cause inclusive uses is virtually non-existent. Perhaps they inter-
fere most with the exclusive military use of ocean space by other
States.
Although international law does not purport to prohibit the
peacetime deployment of ASW devices on the high seas, the con-
sequence of its refusal to recognize the validity of any effort to
subject a portion of the area to State sovereignty necessarily
means that the deploying State may not seek to impose a security
zone around the area of use. While States are permitted to make
exclusive use of the high seas, even though the use may be of
long duration, they are entitled neither to assert jurisdiction over
f6reign nationals intruding on the exclusive use nor actively to
prevent such nationals from pursuing their own internationally
permitted interests in or near the area. Simply stated, every
State may use the high seas for ASW activities, but no State is
entitled either to prevent another from traversing near deployed
devices or to assert jurisdiction over foreign nationals who do so.
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Any such effort would contravene the provision prohibiting sub-
jection to sovereignty.
It can be stated without reservation that the most desirable in-
ternational legal regime to govern military uses of the waters of
the high seas would unquestionably be- one which eliminated
peacetime deployment of all ASW devices. This would virtually
assure continued invulnerability of the submarine, particularly
the SSBN, resulting in the preservation of international stability
and State security through the maintenance of the balance of
power. Continued invulnerability of the SSBN would guarantee
an adequate counterforce deterrent. However, upon close exami-
nation, it is apparent that international stability would prove
ephemeral if a mere proscriptive regime were adopted. The vast
geographical area encompassed by the high seas and the relative
ease and inconspicuity with which underwater acoustic detection
devices and anti-submarine mines can be deployed conjoin to re-
duce the degree to which observance of such a regime could be
verified. If one superpower voluntarily complied with the prohibi-
tion while another did not, a slight strategic asymmetry might be
created. Although the immediate consequence might not be a
preemptive nuclear strike, particularly in light of the limited na-
ture of the strategic advantage, the violating nation may be less
averse to pursuing a more adventuristic foreign policy, thereby ul-
timately increasing the chances for confrontation. Verifiability is
one of the desiderata of every arms control regime, and a compre-
hensive prohibition of water column acoustic detection devices
and anti-submarine mines would not be verifiable.
The regime established by both the 1958 Convention and the
draft conventions produced by UNCLOS HI seems to be the most
desirable alternative to a complete prohibition. By permitting
peacetime deployment of ASW devices in the waters of the high
seas, the regime recognizes the inherent difficulty of verifying any
total prohibition. Moreover, the location of such deployed devices
creates almost no interference with other inclusive uses of ocean
space. Of added importance is the fact that the limited range of
such underwater acoustic detection devices presents little actual,
as opposed to perceived, threat to the invulnerability of the
SSBN. As discussed in an earlier section, the effective range of a
sonobuoy is significantly circumscribed by its intrinsic character.
Thus, while any nation that actively pursues a peacetime water
column ASW deployment program may feel it is obtaining some
strategic advantage, in reality the advantage is indeed slight. In
practical terms, the legal regime that permits deployment elimi-
nates the chance of a threat to international stability developing
out of some mistaken perception incident to violation of a pro-
scriptive regime.
3. Contiguous Zone
Pursuant to the 1958 Convention on the Territorial Sea and the
Contiguous Zone, the coastal State is entitled to protect certain
interests within an area of the high seas, known as the contiguous
zone, the outer boundary of which is not to exceed twelve miles
from the baseline used to measure the breadth of the territorial
sea.176 The ISNT177 and the ICNT178 retain the concept of the con-
tiguous zone. However, both draft conventions depart substan-
tially from the concept as articulated in the 1958 Convention in
that the zone is expanded to twenty-four miles and is superim-
posed on an exclusive economic zone rather than on the high
seas.
179
a. The 1958 Convention
There are two principal features about the contiguous zone that
preclude any coastal State from attempting to proscribe peremp-
torily all foreign military activity conducted therein.180 First, the
zone is superimposed on the high seas, and as such it continues
to be high seas181 except for the coastal State's right to exercise
176. Territorial Sea Convention, supra note 3, art. 24. This Convention states in
part: '"e contiguous zone may not extend beyond twelve miles from the baseline
from which the breadth of the territorial sea is measured." See generally Fitzmau-
rice, The Case of the I'm Alone, [1936] 17 BRrr. Y.B. INT'L L. 82, 97-98 (1962).
177. ISNT, supra note 93, pt. II, art. 33.
178. ICNT, supra note 93, art. 33.
179. Pursuant to the ISNT and the ICNT, the high seas no longer adjoin the ter-
ritorial sea. The major sea zone contiguous to the territorial sea is now the exclu-
sive economic zone, which stretches some 200 miles seaward from the baseline.
The contiguous zone is now superimposed on this zone rather than on the high
.seas.
180. The mere fact that a specific international legal regime permits foreign mil-
itary activity in a particular area does not mean that the coastal State may not
take measures to protect itself pursuant to the inherent right of self-defense as
enunciated in Article 51 of the United Nations Charter. To this effect, see Report
of the International Law Commission to the General Assembly, 11 U.N. GAOR,
Supp. (No. 9) 39-40, art. 66 commentary (4), U.N. Doc. A/3159 (1956), reprinted in
[19561 2 Y.B. INT'L L COMM'N 253, 295, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/1956/Add. 1 (1957).
This rule antedates the Charter. See Church v. Hubbart, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 187
(1804). See also M. McDouGAL & W. BurKE, supra note 2, at 78-81.
181. The Territorial Sea Convention, supra note 3, art. 24(1), states: "In a zone
of the high seas contiguous to its territorial sea." (emphasis added). See also Re-
port of the International Law Commission to the General Assembly, 11 U.N.
GAOR, Supp. (No. 9) 39, art. 66 commentary (1), U.N. Doc. A/3159 (1956), reprinted
in [1956] 2 Y.B. INT'L L. COMM'N 253, 294, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/1956/Add. 1
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jurisdiction to enforce its customs, fiscal, immigration, and sani-
tary regulations. 8 2 Therefore, logical consistency demands that
all high seas freedoms, including the freedom of foreign and
coastal State warships to navigate and conduct other military ac-
tivities, attach to the contiguous zone. Second, the coastal State
is not entitled to exercise jurisdiction within the contiguous zone
(1957). In relation to the imposition of the contiguous zone on the high seas, it
states: 'These waters are and remain a part of the high seas and are not subject to
the sovereignty of the coastal State. . . ." Essentially, then, the contiguous zone
does not transform the basic character of the water as high seas.
182. The Territorial Sea Convention, supra note 3, art. 24(1), reads:
1. In a zone of the high seas contiguous to its territorial sea, the coastal
State may exercise the control necessary to:
(a) Prevent infringement of its customs, fiscal, immigration or sanitary
regulations within its territory or territorial sea;
(b) Punish infringement of the above regulations committed within its
territory or territorial sea.
The Report of the International Law Commission to the General Assembly, 11
U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 9) 39, art. 66(1), U.N. Doc. A/3159 (1956), reprinted in
[19561 2 Y.B. INT'L L. COMM'N 253, 294, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/1956/Add. 1 (1957),
states:
1. In a zone of the high seas contiguous to its territorial sea, the coastal
State may exercise the control necessary to
(a) Prevent infringement of its customs, fiscal, immigration or sanitary
regulations within its territory or territorial sea;
(b) Punish infringement of the above regulations committed within its
territory or territorial sea.
It is readily apparent that the 1956 ILC draft did not mention immigration. Id. art.
66 commentary (7) stated in this respect:
[Tihe majority of the Commission took the view that the interests of the
coastal State do not require an extension of the right of control to immi-
gration and emigration. It considered that such control could and should
be exercised in the territory of the coastal State and that there was no
need to grant it special rights for this purpose in the contiguous zone.
Although "immigration" did appear in the 1953 ILC draft, see Report of the Inter-
national Law Commission to the General Assembly, 8 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 9)
19, U.N. Doc. A/2456 (1953), reprinted in [19531 2 Y.B. INT'L L. Comm'N 200, 219, U.N.
Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/1953/Add. 1 (1959), some have suggested that it was removed
from the 1956 draft Article 66 for fear it would be used against political emigrants,
4 M. WHrrITAiN, DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 486 (1965). Immigration found its
way back into the provision covering the contiguous zone when a proposal submit-
ted by Poland, U.N. Doc. A/Conf. 13/C.1/L.78, reprinted in 3 UNCLOS I OR, C.1
Annexes 232, U.N. Doc. A/Conf. 13/39 (1958), was adopted 33 to 27, with 15 absten-
tions, then amended by Ceylon, 3 UNCLOS I OR, C.1 (58th mtg.) 180, 182, U.N.
Doc. A/Conf. 13/39 (1958), to include "immigration" in addition to "fiscal, sanitary
and security." (emphasis added). When draft Article 66 went to the Plenary ses-
sion, it initially failed to receive the necessary two-thirds vote (40 to 27, with 9 ab-
stentions, 2 UNCLOS I OR, PLENARY MEETINGS (14th mtg.) 35, 40, U.N. Doc.
A/Conf. 13/38 (1958). When an American proposal, identical except for the ab-
sence of "security," U.N. Doc. A/Conf. 13/L.31, reprinted in 2 UNCLOS I OR, PLE-
NARY MEETINGS Annexes 126, U.N. Doc. A/Conf. 13/38 (1958), was voted on, it
received approval 60 to 0, with 13 abstentions.
to protect "security" interests. In fact, the delegates at the 1958
Conference clearly rejected a proposal that would have included
"security" among the list of protectable coastal State interests.' 83
In doing so they demonstrated not only their desire to approach
any potential encroachment on freedom of the high seas with
great circumspection, but also their confidence that "security"
was adequately protected by the inherent right of self-defense ar-
ticulated in Article 51 of the United Nations Charter.184
183. When Article 66 was reported by Committee I to the Plenary sessions of
the 1958 Conference, it did include "security." The term initially appeared in the
Polish proposal, U.N. Doc. A/Conf. 13/C.1/L.78, reprinted in 3 UNCLOS I OR, C.1
Annexes 232, U.N. Doc. A/Conf. 13/39 (1958), which was adopted by Committee I.
This proposal was then amended at the urging of Ceylon, 3 UNCLOS I OR, C.1
(58th mtg.) 180, 182, U.N. Doc. A/Conf. 13/39 (1958). Security remained as one of
the protectable interests when draft Article 66 was reported to the 1958 Confer-
ence's Plenary sessions. (The Philippines had earlier proposed that the word "de-
fence" rather than "security," as contained in the Polish proposal, be used, id.
(36th mtg.) 105, 107.) At the Plenary meetings, draft Article 66 as reported by
Committee I failed to secure the necessary two-thirds vote (40 to 27, with 9 absten-
tions, 2 UNCLOS I OR, PLENARY MEETINGS (14th mtg.) 35, 40, para. 63, U.N. Doc.
A/Conf. 13/38 (1958). The proposal of the United States, which did not mention
"security" but was otherwise identical to the Committee I draft Article 66, U.N.
Doc. A/Conf. 13/L.31, reprinted in 2 UNCLOS I OR, PLENARY MEETINGS Annexes
126, U.N. Doc. A/Conf. 13/38 (1958), was then adopted 60 to 0, with 13 abstentions.
There was little comment.
It should be noted that the ILC's draft Article 66 issuing from the Eighth Ses-
sion of the Commission did not mention "security" either. See Report of the Inter-
national Law Commission to the General Assembly, 11 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 9)
39-40, art. 66 commentary (4), U.N. Doc. A/3159 (1956), reprinted in [1956] 2 Y.B.
INT'L L, COMm'N 253, 295, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/1956/Add. 1 (1957), stating:
The Commission did not recognize special security rights in the contigu-
ous zone. It considered that the extreme vagueness of the term "security"
would open the way for abuses and that the granting of such rights was
not necessary. The enforcement of customs and sanitary regulations will
be sufficient in most cases to safeguard the security of the State.
Moreover, neither the 1950 nor the 1951 ILC Rapporteur proposals mentioned se-
curity. See Summary Records of the 65th Meeting, [1950] 1 Y.B. INT'L L. COMM'N
197, 204, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/1953 (1958); Regime of the High Seas, U.N. Doc.
A/CN.4/42 (1951), reprinted in [1951] 2 Y.B. INT'L L. COMM'N 75, U.N. Doc.
A/CN.4/SER.A/1951/Add. 1 (1957). See also Report of the Inteimational Law Com-
mission to the General Assembly, 6 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 9) app. 17, 20, U.N.
Doc. A/1858 (1951), reprinted in [1951] 2 Y.B. INT'L L. COMM'N 123 app. 141, 144,
U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SER-A/1951/Add. 1 (1957). However, the 1930 Hague Codifica-
tion Conference did mention "security" as a protectable interest in its Basis of
Discussion No. 5, League of Nations Doc. C.74.M.39.1929.V, reprinted in 24 Ai. J.
INT'L L. (Supp.) 25, 29 (1930). But see Report of the Second Committee, League of
Nations Pub. V. Legal Questions 1930.V.9, reprinted in 24 Ali. J. INT'L L. (Supp.)
234, 236 (1930), where no decision was reached.
184. See note 180 supra. As early as the 1930 Hague Conference, delegates ex-
pressed the opinion that there was no need to mention "security" as a protectable
interest. See Report of the Second Committee, League of Nations Pub. V. Legal
Questions 1930.V.9, reprinted in 24 AM. J. INT'L L (Supp.) 234, 236 (1930), where it
is stated: 'The recognition of a special right in the matter of legitimate defence
against attack would, in the opinion of [some] States, be superfluous, since that
right already existed under the general principles of international law ... ." The
reference is to the inherent right of self-defense, later reflected in Article 51 of the
United Nations Charter.
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While all States are permitted to use the waters of the contigu-
ous zone for military purposes, the use must be reasonable. In
other words, although use of the contiguous zone, just as that of
the high seas, may be exclusive in nature, the value of the exclu-
sive use must be sufficiently great to outweigh the consequent in-
terference with inclusive uses. Though uses as extensive and
exclusive as military maneuvers and nuclear weapon tests have
been viewed as justifiable under this standard, no State may at-
tempt to close an area being used to foreign nationals or to assert
jurisdiction over such nationals found within the area.
b. UNCLOS III
Although the ISNT and the ICNT leave the concept of the con-
tiguous zone intact,185 the outer boundary of the area has been
resituated twenty-four miles from the coast and the zone itself su-
perimposed on the exclusive economic zone rather than on the
high seas.186 For present purposes, it need be stated only that the
change in superimposition has resulted in the elimination of the
right of foreign States to deploy underwater acoustic detection de-
vices and anti-submarine mines within the waters of the contigu-
ous zone during peacetime. Further assessment of the regime of
the contiguous zone under the products of UNCLOS III will be
found below in subsection 4. The following brief assessment will
therefore be limited exclusively to a consideration of the regime
established by the 1958 Convention.
c. Assessment
The contiguous zone stretches seaward from the outer bound-
ary of the territorial sea to a point twelve miles from the baseline.
Within the waters of the contiguous zone the coastal State is enti-
185. The ISNT, supra note 93, pt. 1I, art. 33(1), reads:
1. In a zone contiguous to its territorial sea, described as the contiguous
zone, the coastal State may exercise the control necessary to:
(a) prevent infringement of its customs, fiscal, immigration or
sanitary regulations within its territory or territorial sea;
(b) punish infringement of the above regulations committed within
its territory or territorial sea.
The ICNT, supra note 93, art. 33(1), is identical to Article 33(1) of the ISNT.
186. The ISNT, supra note 93, pt. TI, art. 33(2), states: "The contiguous zone
may not extend beyond 24 nautical miles from the baseline from which the
breadth of the territorial sea is measured." The ICNT, supra note 93, art. 33(2), is
identical. As to the superimposition of the contiguous zone on the exclusive eco-
nomic zone rather than on the high seas, see note 179 supra.
tled to exercise jurisdiction to enforce its custom, fiscal, immigra-
tion, and sanitary regulations. Because the zone is superimposed
on the high seas, it is considered to be high seas for all other pur-
poses. Therefore, the high seas freedoms of navigation, overflight,
fishing, laying of submarine cables and pipelines, and other tradi-
tional uses recognized by the general principles of international
law continue unaffected. One of the traditional uses left unaf-
fected is the right of foreign States to employ the area for reason-
able military activities. In fact, as mentioned, a proposal that
would have permitted the coastal State to exercise jurisdiction in
the contiguous zone for the enforcement of "security" regulations
was rejected at the 1958 Conference.
Although foreign States are clearly entitled to utilize another
State's contiguous zone for reasonable military purposes, it seems
unlikely that any foreign State would actually pursue a peace-
time ASW deployment program within the waters encompassed
by such a zone. The propinquity to the coast and to areas of ves-
sel concentration, the fact that waters are regularly traversed by
indigenous civilian and naval vessels, and the conspicuous nature
of foreign State vessels within the zone all militate against such
an eventuality. Moreover, the limited usefulness of information
obtained dealing with vessel movement in the waters landward of
the outer perimeter of the contiguous zone seems unlikely to in-
duce any foreign State to risk jeopardizing the continuation of
friendly relations. If any nation feels constrained to deploy un-
derwater acoustic detection devices and anti-submarine mines in
the waters of another State's contiguous zone, this task can be ac-
complished simultaneous with or immediately subsequent to the
commencement of hostilities, with no loss of effectiveness.
Should a foreign State decide to undertake such a peacetime
deployment effort, it appears that the program would be conso-
nant with the international legal regime governing the waters of
the contiguous zone. Though a proscriptive regime may seem
much more desirable (particularly in light of the fact that the de-
gree of observance over such a narrow zone of ocean space could
be satisfactorily verified, and that the deployment of such devices
in close proximity to the location of SSBN bases poses a greater
threat than, say, deployment on the high seas), it is palpable that
the coastal State may exercise its inherent right of self-defense,
pursuant to Article 51 of the United Nations Charter, if warranted
by the extent of the intrusion. The coastal State is not at the peril
of a permissive regime. Because the waters remain high seas for
all purposes other than the enforcement of customs, fiscal, immi-
gration, and sanitary regulations, the foreign deploying State may
neither attempt to prevent nationals of other States from pursu-
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ing their own interests in or near areas where the devices are lo-
cated nor assert jurisdiction over such nationals refusing to heed
admonitions to remain away.
4. Exclusive Economic Zone
A perusal of the four 1958 Conventions reveals no mention of
the concept of the exclusive economic zone (EEZ). In fact, it is
readily apparent that the 1958 High Seas Convention establishes
no juridical zone adjacent to the territorial sea other than the
high seas. The contiguous zone is merely superimposed upon the
high seas. The ISNT, produced at the Geneva Session of UN-
CLOS I, is the seminal document in the short history of the
EEZ. Though the precise nature of the EEZ will be discussed in
greater detail, it suffices for now to state that it is a zone of in-
creased coastal State control over economic activities. The zone
itself is located between the outer perimeter of the territorial sea
and the landward boundary of the high seas. Actually, by the ex-
press terms of the ISNT187 and the ICNT,188 the EEZ must not ex-
tend beyond 200 miles from the baseline that is used to measure
the breadth of the territorial sea. All waters located seaward of
the outer boundary of the EEZ are high seas.
a. UNCLOS III
The international legal regime governing use of the waters of
the EEZ is comprised of three basic components: coastal State
economic rights in the EEZ, foreign State rights in the non-eco-
nomic utilization aspects of the EEZ, and residual rights (rights
other than those expressly granted to all States or implicitly de-
nied all States as a result of being expressly granted to the
coastal State). These will be discussed seriatim.
Within the EEZ the coastal State possesses certain specifically
articulated rights designed to facilitate control of its economic in-
terests. For instance, it exercises sovereign rights for the purpose
of exploring and exploiting, conserving and managing all the natu-
ral resources located on the bed or in the subsoil of the EEZ or in
the waters superjacent thereto. 89 In addition, only the coastal
187. ISNT, supra note 93, pt. II, art. 46.
188. ICNT, supra note 93, art. 57.
189. The ISNT, supra note 93, pt. H, art. 45(1) (a), states: "1. In an area beyond
and adjacent to its territorial sea, described as the exclusive economic zone, the
coastal State has: (a) sovereign rights for the purpose of exploring and exploiting,
State is entitled to establish, use, or exercise jurisdiction over ar-
tificial islands, installations, and structures located within 200
miles of the coast.190 When exercising any of these exclusive
rights, the coastal State is obligated to do so with due regard for
the rights of all other States in the EEZ.191
To be sure, the coastal State is not the only entity entitled to
utilize the waters of the EEZ. In fact, many of the freedoms exer-
cised by foreign States within the waters of the EEZ while still
high seas remain intact. More precisely, all States continue to en-
joy the traditional high seas freedoms of navigation, overflight,
and the laying of submarine cables and pipelines.192 The freedom
to fish the waters of the EEZ, however, has been omitted because
the continuation of such a foreign State right would be inconsis-
tent with the exclusive character of coastal State control over eco-
nomic interests.193 In addition to the three enumerated freedoms,
foreign States are entitled to engage in any "other internationally
lawful uses of the sea related to navigation and communica-
tion."194
The product of the reservation to the coastal State of exclusive
control over the economic aspects of EEZ utilization, and the de-
volution to all States of the three enumerated freedoms plus any
other internationally lawful uses related to navigation and com-
munication, does not exhaust all possible uses of the EEZ.195 The
regime does not expressly provide or expressly deny any State
the right to employ the EEZ for some purpose other than eco-
conserving and managing the natural resources,.. . of the bed and subsoil and
superjacent waters." The ICNT, supra note 93, art. 56(1) (a), reads essentially the
same: "1. In the exclusive economic zone, the coastal State has: (a) sovereign
rights for the purpose of exploring and exploiting, conserving and managing the
natural resources, . . .of the sea-bed and subsoil and the superjacent waters
190. ISNT, supra note 93, pt. II, art. 45(1)(b): "1. In an area beyond and adja-
cent to its territorial sea, described as the exclusive economic zone, the coastal
State has: ...(b) exclusive rights and jurisdiction with regard to the establish-
ment and use of artificial islands, installations and structures." The ICNT, supra
note 93, art. 56 (1) (b), does not preface "jurisdiction" with the word "exclusive";
otherwise it remains unchanged.
191. ISNT, supra note 93, pt. II, art. 45(2): "In exercising its rights and perform-
ing its duties under the present Convention in the exclusive economic zone, the
coastal State shall have due regard to the rights and duties of other States." The
ICNT, supra note 93, art. 56(2), is basically the same.
192. ICNT, supra note 93, art. 58(1); ISNT, supra note 93, pt. II, art. 47(1).
193. See notes 189-90 supra.
194. ISNT, supra note 93, pt. 11, art. 47(1). The ICNT, supra note 93, art. 58(1),
states: "and other internationally lawful uses of the sea related to these freedoms
such as those associated with the operation of ships, aircraft and submarine
cables and pipelines, and compatible with the other provisions of the present Con.
vention."
195. See Oxman, The Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea:
The 1976 New York Sessions, 71 Am. J. INr'L L. 247, 264-65 (1977).
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nomic utilization, navigation, overflight, the laying of submarine
cables and pipelines, and uses related to navigation and commu-
nication. Article 2 of the High Seas Convention,196 as well as the
present draft proposals applicable to the high seas,197 do not cre-
ate a similar problem because they purport to touch on all con-
ceivable uses of the high seas. To provide some useful guideline
for determining the international permissibility of employing the
EEZ for some uncovered purpose, both negotiating texts contain
a "residual" provision.198
The residual provision specifically applies to situations in which
the coastal State or a foreign State attempts to utilize the EEZ for
some purpose neither expressly permitted nor expressly or im-
plicitly denied. For instance, 99 though reasonable military activi-
ties on the high seas are permitted by virtue of the broad,
incorporative language of the apposite provisions in both the 1958
Convention and the present negotiating texts, the ISNT and the
ICNT are silent on this point in relation to the EEZ. Military ves-
sels are entitled to traverse the EEZ in a non-aggressive fash-
ion20 0 pursuant to the freedom of navigation, but nothing is
mentioned in either draft convention about the permissibility of
utilizing the EEZ for some more extensive military activity. To
determine the permissibility of any such actual or contemplated
activity, one must consider the respective interests involved and
the impact of the determination on the international community
as a whole.201 Restating the equation, if the benefits that accrue
196. Reproduced in note 136 supra.
197. ICNT, supra note 93, art. 87; ISNT, supra note 93, pt. H, art. 75.
198. ICNT, supra note 93, art. 59; ISNT, supra note 93, pt. H1, art. 47(3).
199. The ISNT, supra note 93, pt. 11, art. 47(1), guarantees the right of "naviga-
tion." Article 47(2) then invokes Articles 76-97 with Article 81 specifically applying
to "warships." The same applies for the ICNT, supra note 93, art. 58(1), which
guarantees "navigation." Article 58(2) then invokes Articles 88-115 with Article 95
specifically applying to warships.
200. The ICNT, supra note 93, art. 58(2), and the ISNT, supra note 93, pt. H, art.
47(2), invoke the "peaceful purposes" clause. The discussion adduced in pt.
MI(A) (2) supra applies here with equal force. See also Oxman, The Third United
Nations' Conference on the Law of the Sea: The 1977 New York Session, 72 Am. J.
INT'L L 57, 73 (1978).
201. The ISNT, supra note 93, pt. 11, art. 47(3), states:
In cases where the present Convention does not attribute rights or juris-
diction to the coastal State or to other States within the exclusive eco-
nomic zone, and a conflict arises between the interests of the coastal State
and any other State or States, the conflict should be resolved on the basis
of equity and in the light of all the relevant circumstances, taking into ac-
count the respective importance of the interests involved to the parties as
well as to the international community as a whole.
as a consequence of permitting a particular exclusive use of the
EEZ do not outweigh the resultant diminution in coastal State
and community values, then the use is impermissible.
b. Assessment
Both the ISNT and the ICNT grant the coastal State exclusive
control over all economic utilizations of the EEZ.202 Other States
continue to enjoy at least three of the four freedoms formerly ap-
plicable to the high seas area now encompassed by the EEZ. In
addition to navigation, overflight, and the laying of submarine
cables and pipelines, all States are entitled to exercise other in-
ternationally lawful uses related to navigation and communica-
tion. Because the rights expressly reserved to the coastal State
and those granted to other States in no way establish a compre-
hensive international legal configuration touching on all possible
uses of the EEZ, a "residual" provision has been inserted to pro-
vide some standard by which the permissibility of other uses may
be determined. The permissibility of employing the waters of the
EEZ for some purpose neither expressly granted nor expressly or
implicitly denied is determined by balancing, in light of all the
relevant circumstances, the exclusive use against the effect that
such a use will have upon the interests of the coastal State and of
the international community. If the diminution to coastal State
and community values incident to permitting the exclusive use is
not outweighed by the benefits that accrue as a result of that use,
then the use is impermissible. All military uses of the waters
within the EEZ must be judged against this standard.
The EEZ covers a vast expanse of ocean space, stretching from
the outer boundary of the territorial sea to the landward-most
boundary of the high seas. Though propinquity to the shore
makes that portion closest to the littoral an unlikely spot for for-
eign State peacetime deployment of ASW devices, the outer
reaches'seem at least as susceptible as the high seas. Situated
distant from the areas of vessel concentration and in a location
where foreign State activity is less conspicuous and at least ap-
pears less threatening to immediate security, any program
designed to deploy underwater acoustic detection devices (sono-
buoys) and anti-submarine mines may go undetected. However,
if the coastal State actually discovers the true nature of the for-
eign State activity, the fact that it has been conducted in such rel-
ative proximity to the coast will undoubtedly generate immediate
(emphasis added). The ICNT, supra note 93, art. 59, is basically the same.
202. Oxman, The Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea: The
1976 New York Sessions, 71 AM. . INT'L L. 247, 265 (1977).
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and pronounced acrimony. Any foreign State contention that the
deployment is motivated by concerns of self-defense will lack
credibility.
In light of the severely circumscribed range of underwater
acoustic detection devices, and of the fact that anti-submarine
mines can be deployed subsequent to or simultaneous with the
commencement of hostilities with no loss of effectiveness, it
seems extremely unlikely, despite the susceptibility of the outer
reaches of the EEZ, that any foreign State will risk the continua-
tion of amicable relations for some advantage which is at best
minimal. The limited range of underwater acoustic detection de-
vices prevents them from posing any substantial, credible threat
to the SSBN.
Nevertheless, if a foreign State decides to pursue a peacetime
ASW deployment program, the permissibility of the program
must be determined in light of the standard articulated in the
"residual" provision of the ISNT and ICNT. Undoubtedly, the first
inclination is to adjudge such an exclusive use of the waters of
the EEZ impermissible. This inclination is quite understandable
because it certainly appears that any foreign State submission
that deployment is essential to preserve foreign State security
lacks veracity. Moreover, it also appears that such a military pro-
gram threatens coastal State security, and as a consequence, in-
ternational stability. International law should not seek to
promote such results. Closer examination reveals that a determi-
nation to proscribe such devices will not advance coastal State
and community interests. Strangely enough, the interests of both
are best preserved by permitting deployment of ASW devices
within the waters of the EEZ and letting the coastal State deal
with threats to its security under Article 51 of the United Nations
Charter. A total proscription might very well jeopardize coastal
State security and international stability by creating a regime
that could be transgressed with little likelihood of detection.
The principal coastal State interests in the waters of the EEZ
are economic exploitation, navigation, and security. Though the
other States of the international community are not entitled to
tap the resources of the EEZ, they too have an interest in naviga-
tion of the waters of that zone as well as in the maintenance of a
climate conducive to international stability. As mentioned earlier,
both underwater acoustic detection devices and anti-submarine
mines are designed to accomplish their primary objective while
occupying a small area below the navigable water surface. The
amount of interference they cause to the coastal State's interests
in economic exploitation, and the coastal State's and the interna-
tional community's interests in navigation, is hardly measurable.
Moreover, neither underwater acoustic detection devices nor anti-
submarine mines designed to occupy the water column pose a se-
rious threat to the invulnerability of the SSBN. Only ASW de-
vices with long-range capabilities possess such potential. The
circumscribed operational radius of ASW devices designed to be
deployed in the waters of the EEZ limits their functional utility.
Because these devices are incapable of substantially eroding the
invulnerability of the SSBN, it will remain perhaps the only as-
sured counterforce component in the strategic triad. As a result,
international stability and State security will remain intact. The
balance of power will be preserved. To be sure, any potential for-
eign State threat to coastal State security incident to the deploy-
ment of ASW devices will fall within the ambit of Article 51 of the
United Nations Charter. The foreign State will not be permitted
to capitalize on the permissive regime at the expense of coastal
State security.
But what of the coastal State's interest in security as guaran-
teed by some other portion of the naval force structure? For in-
stance, does not a regime that permits deployment of ASW
devices, though admittedly incapable of threatening SSBNs, jeop-
ardize other non-strategic submarines and result in a diminution
of coastal State security? In fact, does not a regime designed to
proscribe the deployment of all ASW devices enhance coastal
State security by guaranteeing the continued existence of non-
strategic submarines? To ascertain the answers to questions of
this sort, it is imperative that one measure the likelihood that a
foreign State will attempt a deployment program having such a
limited objective against the threat to international stability and
State security incident to the asymmetry resulting from a pro-
scriptive regime that cannot be verified.
As discussed earlier, it is on the one hand extremely unlikely
that a foreign State would attempt to deploy ASW devices in the
waters of the EEZ. The minimal advantage to be secured is far
outweighed by the potential for serious adverse reaction conse-
quent to the discovery of such devices. On the other hand, the
ease and inconspicuousness with which deployment could be car-
ried out would make it exceedingly difficult to detect violations of
any proscriptive regime. This minute detection risk would pre-
sent an irresistible temptation to the perfidious to violate the
prohibitions. International stability and State security would
prove illusory because the violators would proceed to capitalize
628
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on whatever perceived advantage they obtained over those States
that observed the prohibitions. Though, in light of the limited
range of such ASW devices, the efforts would probably not take
the form of some nuclear threat, the foreign State might well em-
bolden an otherwise circumspect foreign policy. Thus, while
neither a permissive regime nor a proscriptive regime that is sub-
ject to repeated violation actually threatens the SSBN because of
the limited range of ASW devices, it is quite clear that the latter
poses an acute threat to international stability and State security
by increasing the chances for confrontation.
A regime that permits all States, including the coastal State, to
pursue peacetime ASW deployment programs appears to serve
best the interest of the international community. Because each
coastal State is entitled to use its own EEZ for the deployment of
such ASW devices and to invoke Article 51 of the United Nations
Charter in apposite situations, a permissive regime does not sub-
ject it to any inordinate threat. In addition, because all States are
permitted to utilize the waters of the EEZ for the deployment of
ASW devices of limited range, those that might otherwise surrep-
titiously violate a proscriptive regime to seek to capitalize on
whatever advantage they secured see that potential advantage
minimized as a result of a similar advantage accruing to other
States. In short, one of the asymmetries that typically result in
confrontation is eliminated.
i. The Contiguous Zone: Its Relation to the EEZ
The 1958 Convention superimposed the contiguous zone on the
high seas. Pursuant to the ISNT and the ICNT, the zone has been
resituated on top of the EEZ. Within the waters of the contiguous
zone, the coastal State still retains jurisdiction to enforce its cus-
toms, fiscal, immigration, and sanitary regulations.
As mentioned above, the legal regime governing the outer
reaches of the EEZ permits foreign State deployment of underwa-
ter acoustic detection devices and anti-submarine mines. Deploy-
ment that poses a threat to coastal State security falls within the
ambit of Article 51 of the United Nations Charter. To be consis-
tent with strict logic, the international legal rules that apply to
one part of the EEZ should apply throughout. Because the con-
tiguous zone does not convert the status of the waters over which
it is situated, the EEZ rule of permissibility appears to apply with
equal force to that area. Threats to coastal State security are
therefore to be handled under the inherent right of self-defense
enunciated in Article 51.
Notwithstanding the consistency of this suggestion, the
"residual" provision of the ISNT and the ICNT requires that the
permissibility of any activity within the EEZ be determined on
the basis of a balancing of various interests in light of "all the rel-
evant circumstances." Clearly, then, no hard and fast rule of per-
missibility applies throughout the entire EEZ. One of the
relevant circumstances that may substantially impact on the com-
putation of the equation is the proximity to the coast of any ASW
deployment. Although deployment in the outer reaches of the
EEZ poses little real threat to the SSBN, primarily because of the
limited range of ASW devices, the threat increases in direct rela-
tion to the proximity of the deployment to the coast. Conse-
quently, though Article 51 of the United Nations Charter may be
adequate to deal with distant deployment, a less ambivalent stan-
dard of coastal State proscription within the waters of the contig-
uous zone best serves to balance equitably the interests of all
concerned.
Pursuant to the 1958 Convention, coastal States are left with no
choice. Threats to security can be dealt with only on the basis of
the United Nations Charter. The "residual" provisions contained
in the products of UNCLOS m attempt to provide some standard
that satiates the desire for a proscriptive regime in waters beyond
coastal State sovereignty yet close enough to host lurking danger.
Because the contiguous zone is a relatively small body of water
situated close to the coastal State and regularly traversed by in-
digenous vessels, it appears the degree of observance of the pro-
scription can be readily verified. Although the regime established
within the contiguous zone by the 1958 Convention is satisfactory
in that it permits the coastal State to invoke Article 51 if the
threat resulting from deployment is acute, the proscriptive regime
of the ISNT and the ICNT is particularly desirable in that it elimi-
nates potential disagreements over the invocation of Article 51.
B. Legal Regime Governing the Sea Floor of Ocean Space
This section discusses the international legal principles affect-
ing military uses of the seabed. Particular attention is given to
the seabed of the internal waters and the territorial sea, the conti-
nental shelf, the exclusive economic zone, and the deep seabed,
now known as the Area.
1. The Internal Waters and the Territorial Sea
The internal waters are those waters located landward of the
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baseline, which is generally drawn along the coast at the low-
water mark, but which, in particular circumstances, may be lo-
cated seaward of the coast.2 03 The territorial sea, in constrast, is
that belt of water paralleling the coast and extending from the
baseline perhaps as much as twelve miles. 204
a. The 1958 Convention
The coastal State has absolute sovereignty over all waters land-
ward of the baseline and, except for the foreign State right of in-
nocent passage, which may itself be prevented or temporarily
suspended if it portends a threat to coastal State security,
equivalent sovereignty over the waters of the territorial sea. The
objective of this portion of the study is to determine whether the
absolutistic regime governing the water column and navigable
surface of the internal waters and the territorial sea applies to the
seabed subjacent to each of the water zones. If such a regime
does in fact govern these areas then it seems strong arguments
may be adduced by the coastal State in justification of a proscrip-
tion of foreign State ASW devices throughout the entire area.
Article 2 of the 1958 Convention 20 5 expressly extends coastal
State sovereignty to the seabed and subsoil of the territorial sea,
yet says nothing about an extension to the seabed area subjacent
to the internal waters.206 Nevertheless, any suggestion that the
coastal State lacks absolute control over the seabed immediately
below its internal waters is surely erroneous. Coastal State sover-
eignty over the airspace, surface, and subsurface of its land and
territorial sea is explicit. It is similarly acknowledged that the
coastal State possesses absolute sovereignty over waters situated
landward of its baseline. It would be anomalous to suggest that
the mere misfortune of being the inheritor of a geographical mass
spotted with indentations obtruding deep into the interior permits
foreign States to make use of the seabed of those indentations not
only with impunity but with international legal authorization.
203. See pt. 11(A) (1) supra.
204. Id.
205. Territorial Sea Convention, supra note 3, art. 2: "The sovereignty of a
coastal State extends to the air space over the territorial sea as well as its bed and
subsoil."
206. The Report of the International Law Commission to the General Assem-
bly, 11 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 9) 4, art. 2, U.N. Doc. A/3159 (1956), reprinted in
[1956] 2 Y.B. INT'L L. Coiim'N 253, 256, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SEP.A/1956/Add. 1 (1957),
also failed to make mention of coastal State sovereignty over the seabed below in-
ternal waters.
The coastal State's historical interest in security is not in the
least diminished by the presence of numerous bays marking its
littoral. In fact, that interest is substantially intensified.207
In addition, it seems any suggestion that the absence of express
wording in the 1958 Convention extending coastal State sover-
eignty to the sea floor of the internal waters operates to warrant
permitting foreign State military use of the area is violative of the
basic scheme of the agreement. It is clearly palpable that a
greater degree of coastal State control is permitted throughout 208
the internal waters than within the territorial sea.209 In fact, in
commenting on Article 1(2)-which subjects the territorial sea to
the other provisions of the Convention-Mr. Tuncel, the Turkish
delegate, noted that because Article 1(1) states that coastal State
sovereignty extends "beyond" the land area and internal waters,
any danger that this sovereignty is viewed as similarly subject to
the other provisions (regarding innocent passage) is removed.210
Coastal State sovereignty extends over the entire horizontal and
vertical area encompassed by the internal waters. The land terri-
tory and the internal waters are analogous in the sense of abso-
207. Denmark, the Netherlands, Colombia, and France all proposed amend-
ments to the ILC draft. Denmark's proposal, U.N. Doc. A/Conf. 13/C.1/L.81, re-
printed in 3 UNCLOS I OR, C.1 Annexes 233, U.N. Doc. A/Conf. 13/39 (1958),
emphasized extending sovereignty to the airspace above the internal seas. The
Netherlands' proposal, U.N. Doc. A/Conf. 13/C.1/L.83, reprinted in 3 UNCLOS I
OR, C.1 Annexes 234, U.N. Doc. A/Conf. 13/39 (1958), emphasized extending sover-
eignty to the airspace above the territorial sea. Colombia's proposal, U.N. Doc.
A/Conf. 13/C.1/L.82 & Corr. 1, reprinted in 3 UNCLOS I OR, C.1 Annexes 233, U.N.
Doc. A/Conf. 13/39 (1958), was essentially the same as the ILC draft except for as-
serting a 12-mile territorial sea. France's proposal, U.N. Doc. A/Conf. 13/C.1/L.6,
reprinted in 3 UNCLOS I OR, C.1 Annexes 212, U.N. Doc. A/Conf. 13/39 (1958),
merely called for "airspace" to be defined in accordance with international law.
None of these proposals did more than express concern about areas other than the
bed of the internal waters. In fact, all were eventually withdrawn in favor of the
ILC draft, which focused on extending coastal State sovereignty to the bed of the
territorial sea, a zone further from the coastal State than the internal waters and
one in which the coastal State surely has less, or at least no greater, security inter-
est than it has in the internal waters. See M. McDouGAL & W. BURKE, supra note
2, at 64.
208. At the 1930 Hague Codification Conference, the American representative to
the Second Committee, David Miller, noted that for purposes of State sovereignty
there is no division between air and water, or water and seabed. See 3 League of
Nations Hague Codification Conf. Acts of Conf., Minutes of the Second Committee,
Fifth meeting, March 21, 1930, C.351(b).M.145(b).1930.V, at 48. See also RESTATE-
MENT (SECOND) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAw OF THE UNITED STATES § 11 (1965),
where territory of a State is defined to include the internal waters and the subja-
cent seabed.
209. After all, the territorial sea and not the internal waters is subjected to in-
nocent passage.
210. See remarks of the representative of Turkey, 3 UNCLOS I OR, C.1 (44th
mtg.) 134, 136, para. 15, U.N. Doc. A/Conf. 13/39 (1958).
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lute State control.211 This leaves little doubt as to the extent of
coastal State control over the seabed subjacent to its internal wa-
ters. The coastal State may proscribe any foreign State military
use of the seabed while proceeding to employ it for its own mili-
tary purposes.212
Though there seems little dispute about the right of the coastal
State to prevent foreign State military use of the seabed subja-
cent to its territorial sea, particularly in light of the language of
Article 2, which expressly extends coastal State sovereignty to
the seabed and subsoil,2 13 the obverse is not quite so clear. A
conjunctive reading of Articles 1 and 2 raises some doubt as to
whether the coastal State may use the seabed beneath its territo-
rial sea for some military purpose that interferes with the foreign
State right of innocent passage across the navigable surface.214
After all, the first paragraph of Article 1 extends coastal State sov-
ereignty to the waters of the territorial sea with the following
paragraph subjecting "[t] his sovereignty" to the right of innocent
passage. Article 2 then proceeds to extend coastal State sover-
eignty to the airspace, seabed, and subsoil of the territorial sea
but does not contain a second paragraph subjecting sovereignty
over those areas to innocent passage. Although the absence of
such conditional language prompted some delegates at the 1958
Convention to submit amendments designed to assure that
coastal State sovereignty over the seabed would not interfere
with innocent passage215 and others to voice their belief that
211. This view has support among authorities. See Gutteridge, The 1958 Geneva
Convention on the Continental Shelf, [1959] 35 Brarr. Y.B. I'r'L L. 102, 119 (1960).
212. See Legal Regime of Inner Space, supra note 132, at 184.
213. Article 2 is reprinted in note 205 supra. See also Frangois, Regime of the
Territorial Sea, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/53 (1952), reprinted in [1952] 2 Y.B. I'T'L L.
Col i'N 25, 28, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/1952/Add. 1 (1958), where Article 3 reads:
"The territory of a coastal State also includes the bed of the territorial sea and the
subsoil." See also Memorandum prepared by Frank Boas, Attorney-Advisor, Of-
fice of the Legal Advisor, Jan. 1958, US/CLS/LEG/2 at 1-3. Writing of coastal State
control of the bed he said in quoting from 1 P. FAUCHILLE, TRArrE DE DRorr INTER-
NATIONAL PuBLic 152 (1925): "Fauchille also made the point that the practice of
States has always recognized that the riparian State of territorial sea can alone oc-
cupy the subsoil of the territorial sea." See also 1 L. OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL
LAw § 217 (8th ed. Lauterpacht 1955).
214. The navigable surface is specified because even submarines, which may
exercise the right, must surface in order to rely on innocent passage.
215. See the proposal of the Netherlands, U.N. Doc. A/Conf. 13/C.1/L.83, re-
printed in 3 UNCLOS I OR, C.1 Annexes 234, U.N. Doc. A/Conf. 13/39 (1958). It
would have combined Articles 1 and 2 into a single Article reading: "Subject to the
right of innocent passage. . . ,the sovereignty of a State extends to: (a) a belt of
sea adjacent to its coast, described as the territorial sea,. . . (b) the bed and the
coastal State sovereignty over the bed of the territorial sea was
absolute 216 and beyond restriction, it seems widely acknowledged
that the coastal State may employ its territorial sea floor for mili-
tary purposes as long as the use does not interfere with innocent
passage across the navigable surface.2 17
The coastal State's sovereignty over the seabed subjacent to the
internal waters and the territorial sea entitle it to prohibit foreign
State military use of the areas. In addition, the extent of the sov-
ereignty affords the coastal State the opportunity to utilize the
seabed beneath the two water zones for its own military pur-
poses. Though the coastal State's military use of the bed beneath
the internal waters may be so extensive as to interfere with for-
eign surface traffic, because innocent passage does not attach to
that water zone the coastal State is well within its legal authority.
On the other hand, any coastal State use of the bed subjacent to
the territorial sea must not hamper foreign State innocent surface
passage unless the interference would otherwise be authorized
pursuant to the 1958 Convention.
b. UNCLOS III
Neither the ISNT nor the ICNT retreats from the extent of
sovereignty granted the coastal State by the 1958 Convention over
both the waters landward of the baseline and the waters within
subsoil of the territorial sea." This proposal was rejected 49 to 6, with 18 absten-
tions.
216. Mr. Tuncel (Turkey) stated, 3 UNCLOS I OR, C.1 (44th mtg.) 134, 136, para.
16, U.N. Doc. A/Conf. 13/39 (1958), that "he could not support the Netherlands
amendment to article 1. .. , because the coastal State had absolute sovereignty
over the bed and subsoil of its territorial sea." This position receives support from
the fact that the Report of the Second Committee, League of Nations Pub. V. Legal
Questions 1930.V.9, art. 2, reprinted in 24 Am. J. INT'L L. (Supp.) 234, 240 (1930),
states in respect to international legal limitations on the use of the seabed that
"there are but few rules of international law." Moreover, the ILC acknowledged in
1956 that its draft convention was not designed to deal with the seabed and sub-
soil. See Report of the International Law Commission to the General Assembly, 11
U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 9) 12, art. 2 commentary, U.N. Doc. A/3159 (1956), reprinted
in [1956] 2 Y.B. INT' L. COMM'N 253, 265, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/ SER.A/1956/Add. 1
(1957).
217. At the 1958 Conference, Mr. Busmann (Netherlands) stated that although
the 1956 ILC draft did not contain language in Article 2 subjecting coastal State
sovereignty over the seabed beneath the territorial sea to innocent surface pas-
sage, any impression that no such limitation applied "was not correct." See 3 UN-
CLOS I OR, C.1 (58th mtg.) 180, 182, para. 25, U.N. Doc. A/Conf. 13/39 (1958). See
also Legal Regime of Inner Space, supra note 132, at 185, where it is stated in ref-
erence to the territorial sea:
It is clear, however, that whatever right of passage the warship enjoys, it
must be exercised (i) "innocently," (ii) as a right of passage, and (iii) on
the surface. Subject to this limitation, the coastal State is free to use [the
water, seabed and subsoil] for whatever military purposes it pleases and
any measures of demilitarization would once again have to be effected on
a basis of consent.
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the territorial sea. Nonetheless, has either draft convention
sought to diminish coastal State control over the seabed subja-
cent to these water zones? If so, has the effect been to permit for-
eign State military use of either area or simply to reduce coastal
State military use?
Both the ISNT218 and the ICNT29 expressly extend coastal
State sovereignty to the seabed and subsoil beneath the territo-
rial sea, but, like the 1958 Convention, say nothing about an ex-
tension to the area beneath the internal waters. Despite the
absence of such language, it seems that the arguments made in
relation to the 1958 Convention supporting an extension to the sea
floor beneath internal waters apply here with equal force. The
need to protect against foreign State intrusion deep into the litto-
ral of coastal States is as important as ever. To suggest that the
coastal State may prohibit foreign military uses of its land terri-
tory and seabed beneath the territorial sea, yet lacks legal author-
ity to prohibit foreign military uses of the sea floor subjacent to
internal waters, fixes the coastal State with a burdensome incon-
sistency that is the result of a mere geographical patrimony.
As far as the territorial sea is concerned, there is little question
that the ISNT and the ICNT entitle the coastal State to proscribe
foreign State military use of the subjacent seabed and subsoil.220
This entitlement is consistent with the regime established by the
1958 Convention. However, the two negotiating texts go further
and appear explicitly to subject coastal State sovereignty over the
seabed of the territorial sea to the right of innocent passage.22 '
218. ISNT, supra note 93, pt. II, art. 1(1).
219. ICNT, supra note 93, art. 2(1).
220. The ISNT, supra note 93, pt. II, art. 1(2), reads: 'This sovereignty extends
to the air space over the territorial sea as well as to its bed and subsoil." The
ICNT, supra note 93, art. 2(2), is identical.
221. Using the ISNT, supra note 93, pt. II, art. 1, as illustrative, it now appears
that coastal State sovereignty over both the waters and the bed of the territorial
sea is subject to innocent passage. It reads in pertinent part:
1. The sovereignty of a coastal State extends beyond its land territory
and internal waters,. . . over an adjacent belt of sea described as the ter-
ritorial sea.
2. This sovereignty extends to the air space over the territorial sea as
well as to its bed and subsoil.
3. The sovereignty over the territorial sea is exercised subject to the pro-
visions of these articles and to other rules of international law.
The 1958 text located Article 1(1) and 1(3) of the ISNT in Article 1 subjecting
"[t]his sovereignty'--sovereignty over the waters of the territorial sea-to inno-
cent passage. Article 1 was then followed by a separate Article 2, which read as
ISNT Article 1(2) now reads. That particular Article 2 was not expressly subjected
This subjection is the result of a merger of the terms of Articles 1
and 2 of the 1958 Convention. It should eliminate all apprehen-
sions held by delegates at the 1958 Conference that the coastal
State may be entitled to use the seabed subjacent to its territorial
sea for military purposes that impede passage. Any coastal State
use of the seabed beneath the territorial sea must not hamper in-
nocent surface passage unless such passage would otherwise be
permitted by the draft texts.
Doubtless, both the ISNT and the ICNT preserve the regime es-
tablished by the 1958 Convention to govern the seabed beneath
the internal waters. Similarly, the regime designed to regulate
foreign and coastal State use of the bed and subsoil subjacent to
the territorial sea is left intact. The coastal State has the right to
prohibit foreign military use of the seabed beneath both its inter-
nal waters and its territorial sea. In addition, it is entitled to uti-
lize the seabed and subsoil below its internal waters and
territorial sea for its own military purposes. However, just as
with the regime established by the 1958 Convention, coastal State
military use of the seabed subjacent to its territorial sea must not
be such as to interfere with innocent surface passage. Activity
conducted below the internal waters is not limited by any such
condition.
c. Assessment
The legal regimes established by the 1958 Convention and by
the products of UNCLOS HI are identical. The sovereignty of the
coastal State extends beyond the waters landward of the baseline,
and beyond those within the ambit of the territorial sea, to the
subjacent seabed and subsoil. The coastal State is entitled to pre-
vent any foreign military use of the seabed subjacent to either
water zone. Subject to the right of innocent passage across the
territorial sea, the coastal State may employ its own seabed for
to innocent passage. By locating the former Article 1(1) as the first paragraph in
Article 1 of the ISNT and by following it with the former Article 2 as paragraph 2,
it can be strongly argued that the confusion about whether the coastal State sover-
eignty over the bed of the territorial sea is subject to innocent passage has been
eliminated. For a draft that leaves no doubt that the seabed of the territorial sea is
subject to innocent passage, see Informal suggestion by the Chairman for a pos-
sible unified text on the nature and characteristics of the territorial sea, Comm. H
White Paper, Part I, Territorial Sea (Item 2), March 20, 1975, cited in R.
PLATZODER, TmiRD UNITED NATroNs CONFERENCE ON THE LAW OF THE SEA 197
(1975). It reads:
1. The sovereignty of a coastal State extends beyond its coast and its
internal waters to... the territorial sea, the air space over the territorial
sea as well as to its bed and subsoil.
3. This sovereignty is exercised in accordance with the provisions of
the articles and other relevant rules of international law ....
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military purposes. In a general sense, the legal regime of the sea-
bed subjacent to the internal waters and the territorial sea is
quite similar to that governing the navigable surface and water
column encompassed by the same zones.
The probability of foreign State peacetime deployment of ASW
devices on the seabed subjacent to the internal waters and the
territorial sea of another State seems remote. The conspicuous
nature of any effort designed to station fixed acoustic detection
devices or sea floor anti-submarine mines in either area conjoins
with the high risk of adverse consequences incident to coastal
State detection to militate against such a likelihood. Should some
foreign State seek to pursue such a program, the legal regime es-
tablished by the 1958 Convention, as well as that contemplated by
UNCLOS III, entitles the coastal State to prohibit deployment or
to remove the devices once discovered if prohibition itself proves
ineffective. This conclusion follows, of necessit-11, from the princi-
ples discussed above, which extend coastal State sovereignty to
the seabed and subsoil beneath the internal waters and the terri-
torial sea.
The prohibition of foreign State deployment of fixed acoustic
detection devices and sea floor anti-submarine mines is highly de-
sirable. It maintains the balance of power by preserving the in-
vulnerability of the submarine, particularly the SSBN. As a
result, both international stability and the widely shared value of
State security are conserved. In fact, it is not altogether clear that
permitting such deployment would increase foreign State alacrity
to undertake peacetime efforts in either area. After all, mines can
be discharged with the same efficiency simultaneous with or im-
mediately subsequent to the initiation of conflict, and technically
there is little need to deploy massive fixed acoustic detection de-
vices within the territory of another State because their long-
range capacity makes them most desirable for shelf and mid-
ocean, rather than internal water or territorial sea, surveillance.
2. The Continental Shelf
The 1958 Conference adopted a definition of the continental
shelf quite different from geological realities.2 22 Essentially, the
222. The Study Prepared by the Secretariat of the United Nations for the ad
hoc Committee to Study the Peaceful Uses of the Sea-Bed and the Ocean Floor
Beyond the Limits of National Jurisdiction, U.N. Doc. A/AC.135/19, para. 13 (1968),
notes of the ILC's work on the shelf: "From the beginning of its study in 1950, the
continental shelf recognized by international law extends out-
ward from the edge of the territorial sea and is wholly sur-
mounted by waters of the high seas. More precisely, Article 1 of
the 1958 Geneva Convention on the Continental Shelf223 states
that the continental shelf is comprised of the seabed and subsoil
beyond the territorial sea, yet adjacent to the coast, to a point
where the water depth is 200 meters or, even beyond that, to
where the waters admit of exploitation. It is obvious that al-
though the landward boundary of the continental shelf is easily
located, the outer limit remains uncertain. With the advance of
technology the 200-meter limit has fallen virtually into disuse.
Nevertheless, there seems to be general agreement that the "ad-
mits of exploitation" test is circumscribed by the requirement of
"adjacency."224
Both the ISNT225 and the ICNT226 retain the concept of the con-
tinental shelf. Because this area is now also effectively a part of
the EEZ, many of the principles regulating use of the seabed and
subsoil between the territorial sea and the Area are principles of
the EEZ. The international legal regime governing that portion of
the seabed previously viewed as simply the continental shelf will
be considered below in subsection 3, which discusses the seabed
of the EEZ.
a. The 1958 Convention
The high seas are located beyond the outer boundary of the ter-
ritorial sea. Every nation is entitled to exercise the freedoms of
navigation, fishing, overflight, the laying of submarine cables and
pipelines, and any other freedoms recognized by the general prin-
ciples of international law throughout the entire portion of ocean
space comprising the high seas. Traditionally, the right of States
Commission decided not to adhere strictly to the geological concept of the conti-
nental shelf, a decision which it maintained for its final draft produced in 1956."
See generally Knight, The Draft United Nations Conventions on the International
Seabed Area: Background, Description, and Some Preliminary Thoughts, 8 SAN Di-
EGO L. REV. 459, 463-70 (1971).
223. The Convention, done Apr. 29, 1958, art. 1, [1964] 15 U.S.T. 471, T.I.A.S. No.
5578, 499 U.N.T.S. 311, declares that the term "continental shelf" is
used as referring (a) to the seabed and subsoil of the submarine areas
adjacent to the coast but outside the area of the territorial sea, to a depth
of 200 metres or, beyond that limit, to where the depth of the superjacent
waters admits of the exploitation of the natural resources of the said
areas ....
224. For an excellent summary of the various theories of "exploitability" and
"adjacency," see Finlay, The Outer Limit of the Continental Shelf- A Rejoinder to
Professor Louis Henkin, 64 AM. J. INT'L IL 42 (1970); Henkin, A Reply to Mr. Finlay,
64 Am. J. INT'L L 62 (1970).
225. ISNT, supra note 93, pt. II, arts. 62-72.
226. ICNT, supra note 93, arts. 76-85.
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to utilize the high seas for military purposes has been viewed as
implicitly assured by the language recognizing freedoms other
than the four freedoms specifically enumerated. Moreover, as dis-
cussed earlier, whether the deep seabed immediately subjacent to
the waters of the high seas be considered res communis or res
nullius, the right of military use still attaches. Because the conti-
nental shelf is covered by the waters of the high seas, it appears
only logical that, except to the extent modified by the provisions
of the Continental Shelf Convention, the freedoms of the high
seas apply to the continental shelf with equal force.227
Article 2(1) of the 1958 Continental Shelf Convention 228 grants
every coastal State "sovereign rights" to explore its shelf and to
exploit all the natural resources 229 located both on the bed of the
shelf and in the subsoil thereof. The rights of the coastal State do
not require any express proclamation or actual occupation to be
227. In fact, this appears to have been the position of some delegates at the
1958 Conference. See the remarks of Mr. Munch (West Germany), 6 UNCLOS I
OR, C.4 (28th mtg.) 81, 83, para. 28, U.N. Doc. A/Conf. 13/42 (1958), that: "All rights
over the continental shelf other than those set forth in article 68 were open to ev-
eryone; except for the express purpose of the exploration and exploitation of its
natural resources, the continental shelf, including its subsoil, was subject to the
regime of the high seas." (emphasis added). This conception is also apparent in
the comments of Mr. Kanakaratne (Ceylon) at the 1958 Conference, id. (27th mtg.)
78, 80, para. 41, where he said:
Article 27 [now Article 2 of the Convention on the High Seas, done Apr.
29, 1958, [1966] 17 U.S.T. 139, T.I.A.S. No. 5969, 559 U.N.T.S. 285] of the In-
ternational Law Commission's draft referred to four specific freedoms of
the high seas .... [A]rticles 69 to 71 [now Articles 3-5 of the Convention
of the Continental Shelf, done Apr. 29, 1958, [1964] 15 U.S.T. 471, T.I.A.S.
No. 5578, 499 U.N.T.S. 311] of the International Law Commission's draft
had been designed to regulate the question of those freedoms in relation
to the continental shelf.
In this respect it should also be noted that the Report of the International Law
Commission to the General Assembly, 11 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 9) 11-12, U.N.
Doc. A/3159 (1956), reprinted in [1956] 2 Y.B. Ir'L L. COM'N 253, 264, U.N. Doc.
A/CN.4/SER.A/1956/Add. 1 (1957), included the continental shelf principles as the
third and final § of part II of the portion of the draft, entitled the "High Seas."
Moreover, Article 26(1) specifically defined the "high seas" to mean "all parts of
the sea that are not included in the territorial sea, as contemplated by Part I." Be-
cause the continental shelf was in part II rather than part I, a strong argument can
be made that the high seas freedoms apply to the shelf.
228. The Convention on the Continental Shelf, supra note 223, at 473, reads:
"The coastal State exercises over the continental shelf sovereign rights for the
purpose of exploring it and exploiting its natural resources."
229. Id. art. 2(4) defines natural resources as
mineral and other non-living resources of the seabed and subsoil together
with living organisms which, at the harvestable stage, either are immobile
on or under the seabed or are unable to move except in constant physical
contact with the seabed or the subsoil.
effective. 230 The rights are exclusive, and the coastal State need
not engage in actual exploration of the shelf or subsoil thereof to
require that other States secure its consent before lawfully under-
taking either of these specific activities.23'
The grant of "sovereign rights" to the coastal State is clearly
not tantamount to a grant of absolute "sovereignty." Any fair re-
view of the origins of the "sovereign rights" provision indicates
that all efforts were designed to confer rights essential to the ef-
fectuation of exploration and exploitation without bestowing ab-
solute "sovereignty." Though the International Law Commission
(ILC) stated in its 1951 draft that the coastal States should have
"control and jurisdiction"232 for the purposes of exploring and ex-
ploiting the shelf, this was rephrased in 1953, following the rejec-
tion of proposals conferring "sovereignty,"233 to read "sovereign
230. Id. art. 2(3) states: 'The rights of the coastal State over the continental
shelf do not depend on occupation, effective or notional, or on any express procla-
mation."
231. Id. art. 2(2) states that the rights of exploration and exploitation "are ex-
clusive in the sense that if the coastal State does not explore the continental shelf
or exploit its natural resources, no one may undertake these activities, or make a
claim to the continental shelf, without the express consent of the coastal State."
232. See Report of the International Law Commission to the General Assembly,
U.N. Doc. A/1858 app. 17, 18, art. 2 (1951), reprinted in [19511 2 Y.B. Irr'L L.
COMM'N 123 app. 141, 141 (1957) (Draft Articles on the Continental Shelf and Re-
lated Subjects), which states: 'The continental shelf is subject to the exercise by
the coastal State of control and jurisdiction for the purpose of exploring it and ex-
ploiting its natural resources." (emphasis added). In comment 7 to Article 2, the
ILC stated, id. at 142:
Article 2 avoids any reference to "sovereignty" of the coastal State over
the submarine areas of the continental shelf. As control and jurisdiction
by the coastal State would be exclusively for exploration and exploitation
purposes, they cannot be placed on the same footing as the general pow-
ers exercised by a State over its territory and territorial waters.
This comment reveals that the ILC attempted to limit coastal State rights to explo-
ration and exploitation only. Such a severe restriction created apprehension on
the part of the United Kingdom that it might not permit jurisdiction over things
such as crimes committed on the shelf or in a tunnel beneath the shelf. The ILC
dealt with this fear in 1953. See notes 233-34 infra.
233. In 1953 the ILC considered several proposals, including those of Mr. Fran-
gois (Netherlands), Summary Records of the 197th Meeting, [1953] 1 Y.B. INT'L L.
COMM'N 79, 83, para. 58, U.N. Doc. A/CNA/SER.A/1953 (1959) (to place "sovereign
rights" before the words "control and jurisdiction" in the 1951 ILC draft Article 2)
(amended, Summary Records of the 198th Meeting, [1953] 1 Y.B. Ixrr'L L. COMM'N
85, para. 2, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/1953 (1959)), and Mr. Pal (India), Summary
Records of the 198th Meeting, [1953] 1 Y.B. INr'L L. CoMiM'N 87 para. 17, U.N. Doc
A/CN.4/SER.A/1953 (1959) ("The coastal State has the sovereign rights of control
and jurisdiction over the continental shelf in respect only of its mineral resources
and of the exploration and exploitation of the same."). Mr. Yepes (Colombia) pro-
posed complete sovereignty, id. at 79, 83, para. 59 ('The coastal State possesses
the same rights of sovereignty over the continental shelf as it exercises over its
land area.") (amended id. at 86, para. 7). Mr. Lauterpacht (United Kingdom) pro.
posed "sovereignty" also, Summary Records of the 197th meeting, [1953] 1 Y.B.
INT'L L COmM'N 84, para. 67, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/1953 (1959) ('The continen-
tal shelf is subject to the sovereignty of the coastal State."), but distinguished his
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rights."2 34 A proposal at the 1956 session 23 5 to replace this lan-
guage with "exclusive rights" was rejected in favor of retaining
proposal from that of Mr. Yepes, Summary Records of the 198th Meeting, [1953] 1
Y.B. INT'L L COMf'N 86, para. 10, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/1953 (1956), stating that
he conceived "sovereignty" to be subject to the limitations of freedom of the seas.
The proposal of Mr. Lauterpacht proceeded from his concern that the 1951 ILC
draft did not confer sufficient jurisdiction on the coastal State to deal with crimes
on or beneath the shelf. The Fourth Committee initially adopted the Lauterpacht
proposal 6 to 5, with 1 abstention, the thirteenth delegate (Sweden) being absent,
id. at 88, para. 38. Yepes withdrew his proposal because the Committee would ob-
viously have rejected it as too extensive.
A second paragraph, adopted 7 to 5, with 1 abstention, was appended to draft Ar-
ticle 2. It read: "The exclusive rights of the coastal State are limited to the rights
of use, control and jurisdiction for the purposes of exploration and exploitation
234. The Lauterpacht proposal was reconsidered at the 210th meeting when the
Swedish delegate noted that he had been absent when it was initially adopted but
would have voted against it had he been present. Summary Records of the 210th
Meeting, [1953] 1 Y.B. IN'L L COMM'N 163, 169, U.N. Doe. A/CN.4/SER.A/1953
(1959). Actually, though the Lauterpacht language had been adopted, 7 of the 13
delegates spoke against it. See Summary Records of the 198th Meeting, [1953] 1
Y.B. IN''L L. COW'N 85, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/ SERA/1953 (1959); Summary Records
of the 197th Meeting, [1953] 1 Y.B. INT'L L. COMM'N 79, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/
1953 (1959). At the 215th meeting, the Swedish delegate stated that his fear of the
language used in the proposal stemmed from the fact that "sovereignty over a ter-
ritory was bound to result in sovereignty over what lay above that territory." See
Summary Records of the 215th Meeting, [1953] 1 Y.B. IN'L L. COI'N 198, 199,
para. 6, U.N. Doe. A/CN.4/SER.A/1953 (1959). Thus, he proposed that the language,
however limited by Lauterpacht, be replaced with "exclusive rights of control and
jurisdiction." Mr. Alfaro, seeking to assure the delegates that Lauterpacht's propo-
sal, although couched in terms of "sovereignty," was really only designed to guar-
antee coastal States the right to handle activities related to exploration and
exploitation stated, id. at 201, para. 25: "It was.., abundantly clear that the Com-
mission was not recognizing the coastal State's sovereignty over the continental
shelf, but its exclusive.., right of control and jurisdiction for the purposes of ex-
ploring and exploiting.. . ." Many were unsatisfied with the language of draft Ar-
ticle 2. It was finally amended, id. at 202, para. 40, to read: 'The coastal State
exercises over the continental shelf sovereign rights for the purpose of exploring
and exploiting its natural resources." In reference to earlier United Kingdom fears,
the ILC said of draft Article 2, Report of the International Law Commission to the
General Assembly, 8 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 9) 14, para. 69, U.N. Doc. A/2456
(1953), reprinted in [1953] 2 Y.B. INT'L L. COMM'N 200, 214 U.N. Doc.
A/CN.4/SER.A/1953/Add. 1 (1959); "[NJ o doubt.., the rights conferred upon the
coastal State cover all rights necessary for and connected with the exploration and
the exploitation of the ... shelf." (emphasis added).
235. Mr. Hsu (China) proposed, Summary Records of the 359th Meeting, [1956]
1 Y.B. INT'L L. COMM'N 142, 146, paras. 35-37, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SERA/1956 (1973),
that "exclusive rights" be substituted for "sovereign rights." This proposal was re-
jected 9 to 3, with 3 abstentions, id. at 147, para. 48. In retaining "sovereign rights"
the ILC said, Report of the International Law Commission to the General Assem-
bly, 11 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 9) 42, art. 68 commentary (2), U.N. Doc. A/3159
(1956), reprinted in [19561 2 Y.B. INT'L L. COMM'N 253, 297, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/
SER.A/1956/Add. 1 (1957), that it "was unwilling to accept the sovereignty of the
the compromise language adopted in 1953. At the 1958 Confer-
ence, the Fourth Committee initially adopted a proposal similar to
that rejected by the ILC in 1956 but later decided against its inclu-
sion in the final draft, preferring to retain "sovereign rights."236
The fact that the coastal State possesses "sovereign rights" to
explore and exploit the shelf in no way affects the superjacent
waters of the high seas or the airspace above those waters. 237 The
coastal State over the seabed and subsoil of the continental shelf." (emphasis ad-
ded).
236. Several proposals were submitted to the Fourth Committee. They came
from Argentina, U.N. Doe. A/Conf. 13/C.4/L.6, reprinted in 6 UNCLOS I OR, C.4
Annexes 127, U.N. Doc. A/Conf. 13/42 (1958) (proposing "sovereignty" but limiting
its scope); Mexico, U.N. Doc. A/Conf. 13/C.4/L.2, reprinted in 6 UNCLOS I OR, C.4
Annexes 126, U.N. Doc. A/Conf. 13/42 (1958) (granting full "sovereignty"); West
Germany, U.N. Doc. A/Conf. 13/C.4/L.43, reprinted in 6 UNCLOS I OR, C.4 An-
nexes 138, U.N. Doc. A/Conf. 13/42 (1958). The United States noted its objection to
the word "sovereign" contained in the 1956 draft, 6 UNCLOS I OR, C.4 (10th mtg.)
19, 20, para. 12, U.N. Doc. A/Conf. 13/42 (1958), and proposed that it be replaced
with the word "exclusive," U.N. Doc. A/Conf. 13/C.4/L.31, reprinted in 6 UNCLOS
I OR, C.4 Annexes 135, U.N. Doe. A/Conf. 13/42 (1958). The Mexican proposal was
rejected 37 to 24, with 6 abstentions, 6 UNCLOS I OR, C.4 (24th mtg.) 68, 69, para.
21, U.N. Doc. A/Conf. 13/42 (1958), and the United States proposal initially adopted
21 to 20, with 27 abstentions, id. at 69, para. 24. Clearly the delegates wished to
back away from any word that could mistakenly lead to extensive coastal State
control. At the eighth Plenary meeting of the 1958 Conference, Ms. Whiteman
(United States) noted she would support the proposal of Mr. Jhirad (India) to re-
store the language of "sovereign rights," 6 UNCLOS I OR, C.4 (8th mtg.) 11, 11,
para. 4, U.N. Doe. A/Conf. 13/42 (1958), because the balance of Article 68 (prede-
cessor of Article 2) and Article 69 (predecessor of Article 3) circumscribed the ex-
tent of the "sovereign rights." The proposal was adopted 51 to 14, with 6
abstentions, id. at 14, para. 64. "Sovereign rights," though very limited, was re-
stored.
237. The Convention on the Continental Shelf, supra note 3, art. 3, states: "The
rights of the coastal State over the continental shelf do not affect the legal status
of the superjacent waters as high seas, or that of the airspace above those waters."
See comment on Article 3 of the 1958 draft by Ms. Whiteman (United States), 6
UNCLOS I OR, C.4 (26th mtg.) 73, 76, para. 38, U.N. Doe. A/Conf. 13/42 (1958).
Early in the efforts to gain a consensus about the language to be used to illustrate
the extent of coastal State control over the shelf, jurists expressed fear lest the
language selected impair the freedom of the superjacent water and air space. See
draft Article 4 (predecessor of Article 3), Summary Records of the 114th Meeting,
[1951] 1 Y.B. INT'L L Com'N 274, 277, para. 58, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/1951
(1957), where in selecting the language the ILC stated: 'The exercise by a coastal
State of control and jurisdiction over the continental shelf does not affect the legal
status of the superjacent waters as high seas." The commentary to the 1956 draft
Article 69 (predecessor of Article 3), Report of the International Law Commission
to the General Assembly, 11 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 9) 43, U.N. Doc. A/3159 (1956),
reprinted in [19561 2 Y.B. INT'L L. COMM'N 253, 298, U.N. Doe. A/CN.4/
SER.A/1956/Add. 1 (1957), states: 'The articles on the continental shelf are in-
tended as laying down the regime of the continental shelf, only as subject to and
within the orbit of the paramount principle of the freedom of the seas and of the
airspace above them." Clearly, the desire was to avoid impairing the freedoms ex-
tant in the waters of the high seas. See also Report of the International Law Com-
mission to the General Assembly, 8 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 9) 15, para. 76, U.N.
Doc. A/2456 (1953), reprinted in [1953] 2 Y.B. INTr'L L. CoMM'N 200, 215, U.N. Doe.
A/CN.4/SERA/1953/Add. 1 (1959).
[voL. 16: 575, 1979] Peacetime ASW
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW
effect of coastal State rights over the continental shelf is confined
to that area alone. Moreover, the limited nature of the coastal
State's rights over the continental shelf appears to militate
against any suggestion that the Convention has diminished the
applicability of traditional high seas freedoms to the shell. 238 Be-
cause one such freedom is the right of military use, all States are
apparently entitled to employ another's continental shelf for mili-
tary purposes provided the use does not interfere with the coastal
State's rights of exploration and exploitation. Any threat to
coastal State security resulting from foreign military activity falls
within the ambit of Article 51 of the United Nations Charter.
A careful reading of the travaux pr~paratoires produced over
the many years preceding the final adoption of "sovereign rights"
discloses that jurists considering the question desired to avoid
impairing the right of foreign State military use of the shelf.
Before Mr. Lauterpacht's proposal to grant the coastal State "sov-
ereignty" over the shelf was ultimately rejected by the ILC in 1953
in favor of less extensive language, Mr. Hsu of China inquired as
to whether "sovereignty" as defined by Lauterpacht would entitle
coastal States to remove foreign submarines or weapons con-
cealed on the shel.2 39 At that point Mr. Amado, the chairman, re-
minded Mr. Hsu and the other delegates that the United Kingdom
had been the country which had submitted the "sovereignty" pro-
posal and that doubtless she was one of the premier champions of
freedom of the seas.240 Consequently, it was unlikely that the
proposal was intended to impair military use of the shelf. The
238. There seems little question that the impetus for granting the coastal State
"sovereign rights" rather than "sovereignty" was the apprehension that the latter
would adversely affect use of the superjacent waters. M. McDoUGAL & W. BURKE,
supra note 2, at 699-700. However, by failing to grant full "sovereignty," it appears
that the Convention left intact the applicability to the shelf of traditional free-
doms. There were three possible regimes to which the shelf could have been
subjected: full sovereignty, res communis, or res nullius. Full sovereignty was ob-
viously rejected, leaving two remaining regimes. By explicitly prohibiting any for-
eign State "claims" (see Article 2(2)) to the shelf absent coastal State consent, the
res nullius characterization was also rejected. However, because the coastal State
was granted plenary rights over the natural resources of the shelf, it cannot be
maintained that the area is completely res communis. The best characterization of
the shelf is that it is a hybrid of sovereignty and res communis. The coastal State
is given complete control over exploration and exploitation of the shelf. Uses of
the shelf by other States for unrelated purposes continue to be permitted.
239. Summary Records of the 200th Meeting, [1953] 1 Y.B. INT'L L. COMM'N 97,
98, para. 19, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/1953 (1959).
240. Id. at 99, para. 37.
delegates of the United Kingdom expressed no objection to Mr.
Amado's admonition.
During the Eighth Session of the ILC in 1956, one of the princi-
pal topics of discussion was atomic weapon tests on the high seas.
Prior to that session, Mr. Frangois of the Netherlands submitted a
comprehensive report urging not only that the question of atomic
weapon tests be seriously considered, but, that because the high
seas surmounted the shelf, a provision should be adopted requir-
ing foreign States to secure coastal State consent before con-
ducting tests on the shelf with any new weapons. 241 After the ILC
refused explicitly to proscribe atomic weapon tests on the high
seas, because such tests were considered by many to be beyond
the scope of the Commission's concern, Mr. Frangois urged the
delegates to disregard his suggestions in reference to weapon
tests on the shelf.242 They did just that.
At the 1958 Conference, the delegates accepted the notion of
coastal State "sovereign rights" over the shelf and finally embod-
ied the principle in one of the four international agreements pro-
duced by the Conference. In the process they rejected several
proposals that would have impaired the right of foreign States to
utilize the continental shelf of another State for some military
purpose. When Mexico proposed coastal State "sovereignty," Mr.
Kanakaratne of Ceylon cautioned that unless the coastal States
were invested with "sovereignty" rather than with the limited
control of exploration and exploitation, any other State would be
entitled to use the shelf for "some entirely different purpose...
and the coastal State would be unable to protest."243 In apparent
acknowledgement, Mr. Garcia-Amador of Cuba spoke against the
Mexican proposal, emphasizing that he did not wish to see coastal
States invested with legal control sufficient to entitle them to pro-
scribe foreign submarines from coming to "rest" on the continen-
tal shelf.244 Most delegates apparently agreed with Mr. Garcia-
241. Regime of the High Seas and Regime of the Territorial Sea, U.N. Doc.
A/CN.4/97, para. 57 (1956), reprinted in [1956] 2 Y.B. INT'L L. COMM'N 1, 11, U.N.
Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/1956/Add. 1 (1957).
242. Summary Records of the 359th Meeting, [1956] 1 Y.B. INT'L L. COMM'N 142,
147, para. 51, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SERA/1956 (1973).
243. 6 UNCLOS I OR, C.4 (23d mtg.) 63, 67, para. 43, U.N. Doc. A/Conf. 13/42
(1958). Mr. Kanakaratne supported the Mexican proposal because of a desire to
entitle the coastal State to proscribe foreign activities other than exploration and
exploitation.
244. Id. (20th mtg.) 50, 52, para. 25. He said:
It should be remembered also that freedom of navigation included free-
dom of submarine navigation. It might be necessary for a submarine to
come to rest on the seabed, an act which would be fully in accordance
with the principle of freedom of the seas but would become technically a
legal impossibility if the sovereignty of the coastal State extended to the
seabed and subsoil of the high seas.
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Amador. The Mexican proposal was later decisively rejected.245
The delegates also considered a proposal submitted by India,246
designed to prohibit any State from constructing military installa-
tions on its own or on another State's continental shelf.247 Al-
though the proposal was debated at length, it was rejected,248 yet
not before Mr. Munch of West Germany had explicitly stated that
because coastal States possessed "sovereign rights" only for the
purposes of exploring and exploiting the shelf, "[any State could
build installations on [the shelf], provided that they did not inter-
ference [sic] with the exploration and exploitation of natural re-
sources."249 The delegates were apparently reluctant to adopt any
provision designed to enhance the coastal State's control over for-
eign State activities on the continental shelf. The clear implica-
tion is that all States are entitled to utilize the continental shelf
for military purposes as long as the use does not interfere with
the coastal State's rights of exploration and exploitation.250
b. Assessment
Pursuant to the 1958 Convention, the coastal State possesses
"sovereign rights" over the continental shelf for purposes of ex-
ploration and exploitation. These rights do not depend upon ex-
press proclamation or actual occupation. The rights are exclusive
in the sense that the coastal State need not actually explore or
exploit the shelf in order to require that other States wishing to
(emphasis added).
245. See id. (24th mtg.) 68, 69, para. 21. See note 236 supra.
246. The Indian proposal was generated by an inartfully drafted Bulgarian pro-
vision, U.N. Doc. A/Conf. 13/C.4/LA1/Rev. 1, reprinted in 6 UNCLOS I OR, C.4 An-
nexes 137, U.N. Doc. A/Conf. 13/42 (1958), reading: "The coastal State shall not use
the continental shelf for the purpose of building military bases or installations."
This provision was to apply only to coastal State use of its own shelf.
247. The Bulgarian proposal was withdrawn in favor of the Indian proposal,
U.N. Doc. A/Conf. 13/C.4/L.57, reprinted in 6 UNCLOS I OR, C.4 Annexes 141, U.N.
Doec. A/Conf. 13/42 (1958), which stated: "The continental shelf adjacent to any
coastal State shall not be used by the coastal State or any State for the purpose of
building military bases or installations."
248. The vote was 31 to 18, with 16 abstentions. 6 UNCLOS I OR, CA (30th
mtg.) 88, 91, para. 45, U.N. Doc. A/Conf. 13/42 (1958).
249. Id. (28th mtg.) 81, 83, para. 28.
250. Neither Article 2(2) of the Convention on the Continental Shelf, note 3
supra (which prohibits foreign State exploration of the shelf without coastal
State consent), nor Article 5(8), id. (which requires coastal State consent before
undertaking any shelf research), changes this proposition because anti-submarine
mines do not research or explore the shelf. Though fixed acoustic detection de-
vices may do both, they limit their surveillance to the water immediately above the
seafloor.
do so secure its consent before proceeding. Nothing in the provi-
sions of the Convention or in its negotiating history evinces an in-
tention to proscribe all foreign State military utilizations of the
shelf. As long as the use does not interfere with the coastal
State's efforts to explore or exploit the shelf, the use is permissi-
ble.
Although it is unlikely that any foreign State would feel so irre-
sistibly constrained to obtain information about the movement of
submarines within the territorial sea of a potential enemy that it
would actually pursue a peacetime ASW effort to deploy fixed
acoustic detection arrays on the bed of that narrow belt, the bene-
fits to be secured from comparable deployment on the continental
shelf may prove too tempting to ignore. Once a submarine has
crossed the outer reaches of the continental margin and pro-
ceeded into the deep sea, it is especially difficult to locate. Conse-
quently, if a State desires to obtain a capability to detect and
eliminate (instantly and effectively) the counterforce component
carried by SSBNs before they escape to the deep sea, from
whence they may actually threaten foreign targets, it is impera-
tive that a substantial portion of that State's ASW program be di-
rected toward the installation on the opponent's shelf of both
large (SAS) and small (Bronco and Barrier) fixed acoustic detec-
tion arrays and anti-submarine mines.
Military use of another State's continental shelf is not prohib-
ited by the 1958 Convention unless it interferes with the explora-
tion or exploitation of that area.251 The coastal State is clearly
entitled to use its own shelf for military purposes. 252 Foreign mili-
tary uses that jeopardize coastal State security fall within the am-
bit of Article 51 of the United Nations Charter. The Convention
does not explicitly proscribe all peacetime programs designed to
251. The Soviet Union has stated that it feels the continental shelf of every
coastal State may be used by another for military purposes. See 23 U.N. GAOR,
C.1 (1605th mtg.) 4-5, U.N. Doc. A/C.1/PV.1605 (1968). As to the position of other
powers, see Purver, Canada and the Control of Arms on the Seabed, 119751 13 CAN.
Y.B. INT'L L. 195, 201 (1976). Several States have stated that although international
law may permit foreign State military use of the shelf, they will not allow such use
of their shelf. See ENDC/PV.410, at 6-7 (Canada); 25 U.N. GAOR, C.1 (1758th mtg.)
4-6, U.N. Doc. A/C.1/PV.1758 (1970) (India); id. (1763d mtg.) 8, U.N, Doc.
A/C.1/PV.1763 (Mexico). In sympathy, see ENDC/PV.423, at 24-28 (Brazil);
ENDC/PV.432, at 12 (Argentina); ENDC/PV.430, at 32 (Ethiopia); id. at 19-20 (It-
aly).
252. See Gehring, Legal Rules Affecting Military Uses of the Seabed, 54 MnL. L.
REv. 168, 189 (1971); Stoever, The "Race"for the Seabed: The Right to Emplace Mili.
tary Installations on the Deep Ocean Floor, 4 INT'L LAw. 560, 561 (1970); Comment,
Military Use of the Ocean Space and the Continental Shelf, 7 COLUM. J. TRANS-
NAT'L L. 279, 287-88 (1968). But see Baxter, The Legal Aspects of Arms Control
Measures Concerning the Missile Carrying Submarines, in SEA-BASED DETERRENT,
supra note 39, at 209, 219.
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deploy fixed acoustic detection arrays and anti-submarine mines
on another State's continental shelf. However, if the deployment
threatens to interfere with the coastal State's exclusive rights to
explore and exploit the continental shelf, then the activity is vio-
lative of the regime enunciated by the Convention.253 In this age
of technological innovation, it is extraordinarily difficult to con-
ceive of any ASW deployment program that would not pose some
degree of interference to coastal State enjoyment of its rights of
exploration and exploitation. As a result, most ASW deployment
programs designed to utilize another State's continental shelf vio-
late international Law of the Sea and are subject to coastal State
proscription.
The most desirable international legal regime governing ocean
space is undoubtedly one that promotes international stability
and State security through the effective prohibition of all destabi-
lizing military uses. The same is equally true of any regime
specifically regulating utilization of the continental shelf.
Nevertheless, as reiterated throughout this study, if the extent of
observance of any proscriptive regime cannot be readily verified,
then security may prove illusory, and the regime may in fact pro-
duce international instability. It is imperative that any ocean
space arms-control regime maintain the balance of power and em-
body readily verifiable proscriptions.
The 1958 Convention meets both of these requisites. By pro-
scribing all foreign State utilizations of the continental shelf that
interfere with exploration and exploitation by the coastal State, it
implicitly prohibits foreign State peacetime installation of ASW
devices. This prohibition prevents any large scale foreign State
ASW deployment effort designed to erode the invulnerability of
the SSBN and to subject it to destruction. Moreover, because any
foreign State program designed to secure such an objective will
necessitate substantial foreign State surface and subsurface activ-
ity, the degree to which the proscription is actually observed will
be readily verifiable. Although violations incident to less ambi-
tious programs may be more difficult to detect, the actual benefit
to the foreign State as a result of such deployment will be slight
253. For authorities that reason to prohibition one way or another, see
generally E. BROWN, ARMs CONTROL IN HYDROSPACE: LEGAL ASPECTS 32 (1971); W.
BURKE, TOWARDS A BETTER USE OF THE OCEAN 98 (1969); Rao, Authority and Con-
trol Over Offshore Areas: In Defence of Common Interests, 11 INDIAN J. INT'L L. 379
(1971); Rao, Legal Regulation of Maritime Military Uses, 13 INDLAN J. INT'L L. 425
(1973).
because of the circumscribed range of both detection devices and
anti-submarine mines.
3. The Exclusive Economic Zone
Though both the ISNT and the ICNT have retained the concept
of the continental shelf, use of most of that portion of the seabed
and subsoil is now generally controlled by the principles gov-
erning the EEZ.254 Nevertheless, both negotiating texts have at-
tempted to clarify substantially the precise parameters of the
shelf because the shelf principles alone apply to that portion of
the seabed and subsoil beyond the EEZ. Essentially, the conti-
nental shelf is defined as including the seabed and subsoil that is
a natural prolongation of the coastal State's land territory to the
outer edge of the continental margin or to a point 200 miles from
the baseline if the margin does not extend to that distance.255
This definition takes full account of the fact that the breadth of
the EEZ itself is 200 miles. Thus, it is conceivable that a coastal
State may possess absolute rights over all economic activities
conducted in its submarine areas to a point 200 miles from the
baseline despite the fact that the outer boundary of its continen-
tal margin may fall far short of that point. If the margin is indeed
located still further seaward, the coastal State possesses control
over that portion in excess of 200 miles from the baseline pursu-
ant to the regime of the continental shelf rather than that of the
EEZ.
a. UNCLOS III
The products of UNCLOS I grant each coastal State complete
control over all economic activities within its EEZ. This control
specifically includes "sovereign rights" for the purposes of explor-
ing25 6 and exploiting, conserving and managing all the natural
recources located on the seabed or in the subsoil thereof. 257 How-
ever, the metamorphosis of an area formerly high seas has not re-
254. However, it should be noted that these principles do not prejudice the
principles governing the coastal State's rights to the shelf. See ICNT, supra note
93, art. 56(3); ISNT, supra note 93, pt. II, art. 45(3).
255. ICNT, supra note 93, art. 76; ISNT, supra note 93, pt. II, art. 62.
256. Though the regime of the EEZ confines the rights of the coastal States to
exploration for natural resources, the few rules specifically articulating the coastal
State's interest in the shelf itself note that the right extends to exploring "it," spe-
cifically meaning the shelf rather than just the resources. See ICNT, supra note
93, art. 77(1); ISNT, supra note 93, pt. II, art. 63(1).
257. The ISNT, supra note 93, pt. II, art. 45(1) (a), states: "In an area beyond
and adjacent to its territorial sea, described as the exclusive economic zone, the
coastal State has: (a) sovereign rights for the purpose of exploring and exploiting,
conserving and managing the natural resources,. . . of the bed and subsoil ....
The ICNT, supra note 93, art. 56(1) (a), is essentially the same.
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sulted in the diminution of traditional freedoms of navigation,
overflight, and the laying of submarine cables and pipelines still
expressly recognized as exercisable by all States.258 But because
the zone is now the economic preserve of the coastal State, for-
eign States are entitled to fish only upon securing coastal State
consent.
Both the ISNT and the ICNT declare that use of the entire EEZ,
including the seabed and subsoil, shall be reserved for "peaceful
purposes." 25 9 Because warships are expressly permitted to tra-
verse the EEZ in the exercise of the freedom of navigation, 260
" peaceful purposes" certainly means nothing more than that the
use must comport with international law and the United Nations
Charter. Neither negotiating text includes incorporative or enu-
merative language purporting expressly to approve any other mil-
itary uses of the EEZ.261 Just as assuredly, neither contains
language proscribing all other military uses of the seabed and
subsoil of the EEZ.
The permissibility of non-aggressive military uses other than
navigation must initially be judged against the "residual clause"
which requires that the importance of the interests of the utilizing
State, the coastal State, and the international community be bal-
anced in light of all the relevant circumstances. 262 Measured by
this test, some foreign State as well as coastal State military uses
of EEZ submarine areas may well be consonant with the draft
texts. Still, otherwise permissible military uses may be severely
restricted by the extent of control granted the coastal State over
drilling activities and installations on the seabed and in the sub-
soil of its EEZ.
Specifically, the ISNT and the ICNT contain provisions explic-
itly stating that within the EEZ the coastal State shall have the
258. ICNT, supra note 93, art. 58(1); ISNT, supra note 93, pt. II, art. 47(1).
259. The ISNT, supra note 93, pt. II, art. 74, is invoked by id. art. 47(2). The
ICNT, supra note 93, art. 88, is invoked by id. art. 58(2).
260. The ISNT, supra note 93, pt. II, art. 81, implicitly recognizes the right of
warship navigation and is invoked by id. art. 47(2). The ICNT, supra note 93, art.
95, also implicitly recognizes the right of warship navigation and is invoked by id.
art. 58(2).
261. The ISNT, supra note 93, pt. II, art. 47(1), lists three specific freedoms. "In-
ter alia," or such similar language, is not used. As a result, military uses are not
expressly permitted. The ICNT, supra note 93, art. 58, also lacks such language.
See the discussion of this matter in reference to the water space of the EEZ, pt.
III(A) (4) supra.
262. ICNT, supra note 93, art. 59; ISNT, supra note 93, pt. II, art. 47(3).
exclusive right to "construct and to authorize and regulate the
construction, operation and use" of all "installations and struc-
tures" that may interfere with the exercise of the rights of the
coastal State in the zone.263 Because the seabed and subsoil of
the EEZ are also part of the continental shelf, the coastal State is
granted the exclusive right to authorize and regulate drilling for
"all purposes. '264
It is readily apparent that both this provision and the "residual
clause" are designed to restrict foreign State activity on the sea-
bed and in the subsoil of the EEZ. The coastal State may utilize
the bed of the EEZ for military purposes if it can demonstrate
that its interest in such utilization is superior to any interest of
the international community. Foreign State military activity on or
beneath the sea floor of the EEZ, however, must not only pass
muster under the "residual clause" but must also avoid contra-
vention of the provisions granting the coastal State exclusive con-
trol over all drilling activities and all installations or structures
that may interfere with the rights of the coastal State in the zone.
The portion of seabed and subsoil beyond the 200-mile breadth
of the EEZ is specifically subject to the regime of the continental
shelf. Essentially, the nature of coastal State control over the
continental shelf proposed by the negotiating texts does not differ
greatly from that articulated in the 1958 Continental Shelf Con-
vention. The coastal State possesses "sovereign rights" for the
purposes of exploring and exploiting the shelf rather than abso-
lute "sovereignty" over the shelf.265 These rights do not depend
upon express proclamation or actual occupation to be effective.26 6
In addition, the rights are exclusive in the sense that the coastal
State need not explore or exploit the area before requiring that
others wishing to do so secure its consent before proceeding.267
The regime proposed by both the ISNT and the ICNT differs
from the earlier Convention in that foreign States must secure
coastal State consent before proceeding to lay pipelines along a
specific route.268 Also, the coastal State is entitled to exercise the
same authority over construction and use of installations or struc-
tures on its continental shelf269 and drilling into the subsoil below
that shelf270 as it exercises over such activities in reference to the
263. ICNT, supra note 93, art. 60(1) (c); ISNT, supra note 93, pt. H, art. 48(1) (c).
264. ICNT, supra note 93, art. 81; ISNT, supra note 93, pt. II, art. 67.
265. ICNT, supra note 93, art. 77(1); ISNT, supra note 93, pt. II, art. 63(1).
266. ICNT, supra note 93, art. 77(3); ISNT, supra note 93, pt. 11, art. 63(3).
267. ICNT, supra note 93, art. 77(2); ISNT, supra note 93, pt. fI, art. 63(2).
268. ICNT, supra note 93, art. 79(3); ISNT, supra note 93, pt. II, art. 65(3).
269. The ISNT, supra note 93, art. 66, applies Article 48 to the shelf; the ICNT,
supra note 93, art. 80, applies Article 60 to the shelf.
270. ICNT, supra note 93, art. 81; ISNT, supra note 93, pt. II, art. 67.
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EEZ. As a result, though military use in general is not pro-
scribed, foreign State military use involving drilling into the shelf
or construction and use of installations and structures that may
interfere with the coastal State's rights in the shelf is subject to
proscription.
b. Assessment
Although coastal State installation of large (SAS) or small
(SOSUS) fixed acoustic detection arrays and anti-submarine
mines on the seabed of its own EEZ or beyond, to the outer
boundary of its continental margin, is justified on the grounds of
superior interest in self-defense and of minimal interference with
foreign State non-military use of these areas, it is clear that any
comparable foreign State deployment scheme is restricted by
both negotiating texts and subject to coastal State proscription.
To the extent that the deployment of such ASW devices necessi-
tates drilling into the sea floor, it is subject to coastal State au-
thorization and regulation. Because the affixation and utilization
of acoustic detection arrays and anti-submarine mines constitutes
construction, operation, and use of installations and structures
that may interfere with the rights of the littoral State in the area,
these are subject to advance authorization and regulation. As a
result, the coastal State is clearly entitled to enact regulations
prohibiting foreign State military installations or structures on
the seabed of its EEZ.
4. The Deep Seabed
In the most general sense, what is commonly referred to as the
deep seabed is that portion of the ocean floor and subsoil beyond
the continental shelf and subjacent to the high seas. Though
never expressly defined at the 1958 Conference, it is clear that the
Conventions produced by that Conference implicitly situate the
deep seabed at this location because every coastal State is enti-
tled to exercise control over that portion of the bed which is a nat-
ural prolongation 271 of its littoral. The ISNT and the ICNT
redesignate the deep seabed as the "Area" and expressly state
that it extends seaward from the outer perimeter of the EEZ or
the continental shelf if the latter is broader than 200 miles.2 72
271. See North Sea Continental Shelf Cases, [19691 I.C.J. 3. See Brown, The
North Sea Continental Shelf Cases, 23 CuRRENT LEGAL PROB. 187 (1970).
272. See ICNT, supra note 93, art. 1; ISNT, supra note 93, pt. I, art. 2(1).
Consequently, despite the fact that the continental shelf of a par-
ticular State may be attenuated, by definition the landward-most
boundary of the Area is located no closer than 200 miles from the
coastline.
a. The 1958 Convention
The waters of the high seas are open to all nations for naviga-
tion, overflight, fishing, laying of submarine cables and pipelines,
and any other uses recognized by the general principles of inter-
national law.273 One of the more traditional, widely accepted
other uses of the high seas recognized by international law is the
right of all States to conduct reasonable military activities. Mili-
tary uses as extensive as naval maneuvers and nuclear weapon
tests have in the past been viewed as consonant with this princi-
ple.274 The objective of this section of the study is to determine
the precise nature of the international legal regime governing the
uses of the deep seabed located immediately below the waters of
the high seas.
The extent to which any nation may employ a portion of the
deep seabed for its exclusive use is predicated upon the character
of the bed itself. However, the authorities are not in agreement
on this issue. One school of thought maintains that the deep sea-
bed is res nullius and therefore subject to sovereign appropria-
tion.275 Any State is entitled to utilize any part of the deep
seabed for its exclusive use, and no other State may attempt to
prohibit it from doing so. Once a particular State has effectively
occupied 276 a portion of the deep seabed, it then possesses suffi-
cient jurisdictional control to exclude all other States from the
area. The other school of thought contends that the deep seabed
is res communis and therefore open to all and subject to appropri-
ation by none.277 The international legal regime governing the
deep seabed is said to be identical to that controlling the superja-
273. See pt. 11(A) (2) supra.
274. Id.
275. 1 P. FAUCHIL.E, TRAITE DE DRorr INTERNATIONAL PuBUc pt. II, 19 (1925); H.
HENKiN, LAW FOR THE SEA'S MNnERAL RESOURCEs 25-29 (1968); 2 H. SMrrH, GREAT
BRITAIN AND THE LAW OF NATIONS 122 (1935); 1 J. WESTLAKE, INTERNATIONAL LAW
187-88 (1904); Hurst, Whose is the Bed of the Sea?, [1923-24] 4 BRiT. Y.B. INT'L L. 34
(1923).
276. See Island of Palmas Case (Netherlands v. United States), Hague Ct. Rep.
2d (Scott) 83, 22 AM. J. INT'L L. 867 (Perm. Ct. Arb. 1928). Effective occupation is
reflected by continuous and peaceful display of the incidents of sovereignty over a
particular area. Specifically, it involves the taking of possession of a particular
area and exercising exclusive authority therein. For the proposition that the deep
seabed can be acquired, see Young, The Legal Regime of the Deep-Sea Floor, 62
Am. J. IN 'L I 641, 645 (1968).
277. C. CoLoMBos, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF THE SEA § 81 (6th rev. ed. 1967);
1 G. GIDEL, LE DRorr INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC DE LA MER 498-501 (1932).
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cent high seas, also viewed as res communis. The high seas and
the seabed are viewed as identical, not sui generis. 278
If the primary concern is military utilization, it really matters
little whether the deep seabed is characterized as res nullius or
res communis. Both positions entitle all States to use the deep
seabed for their exclusive purposes. The major point of departure
between the two positions is that the res nullius characterization
goes beyond the concept of exclusive use and authorizes sover-
eign appropriation of a portion of the deep seabed if the exclu-
sive use is sufficient in duration and extent to constitute effective
occupation. Once a State has satisfied the requests for effective
occupation and appropriated a portion of the deep seabed, it may
then proceed to exercise the incidents of sovereignty: jurisdiction
over foreign nationals within the area and actual exclusion of
such nationals from the area. Consequently, though it can be said
that both characterizations permit exclusive military uses of the
278. The Territorial Sea Convention, supra note 3, art. 2, begins: '"The high seas
being open to all." (emphasis added). "High seas" is defined in Article 1 to in-
clude "all parts of the sea that are not included in the territorial sea or in the in-
ternal waters of a State." (emphasis added). Such broad language may support
the res communis characterization by including the seabed as well as the waters
within "all parts" of the sea. This conclusion seems even more compelling when
one realizes that the delegate from Brazil desired to have the term "high seas"
changed to read "waters of the high seas" (emphasis added) and then proposed to
define "waters of the high seas" to mean "those waters lying between the outer
limits of the territorial sea" (referring to the territorial seas of all States), U.N.
Doc. A/Conf. 13/C.2/L.67, reprinted in 4 UNCLOS I OR, C.2 Annexes 133, U.N. Doc.
A/Conf. 13/40 (1958). Mr. Pedreira (Brazil) had been particularly interested in de-
limiting not only the horizontal zones of ocean space but also the vertical zones.
He felt that his proposal would accomplish this delimitation and would confine the
applicability of the principles to the water surface and column only, leaving the
seabed unaffected. See remarks of Mr. Pedreira, 4 UNCLOS I OR, C.2 (16 mtg.) 40,
42, U.N. Doc. A/Conf. 13/40 (1958). Committee I1 rejected, id. (20th mtg.) 52, 53,
para. 19, an earlier proposal of his designed to emphasize the same distinction be-
tween water and seabed, U.N. Doc. A/Conf. 13/C.2/L.67, reprinted in 4 UNCLOS I
OR, C.2 Annexes 133, U.N. Doc. A/Conf. 13/40 (1958), forcing him to withdraw it.
See 4 UNCLOS I OR, C.2 (21st mtg.) 54, 54, para. 7, U.N. Doc. A/Conf. 13/40 (1958).
The rejection of the one and the Withdrawal of the other proposal may well indi-
cate that what appears to be expansive language in Articles 1 & 2 should be so con-
strued. But see Report of the International Law Commission to the General
Assembly, 11 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 9) 24, art. 27 commentary (2), U.N. Doc.
A/3159 (1956), reprinted in [1956] 2 Y.B. INT'L L. COMI'N 253, 278, U.N. Doc.
A/CN.4/SERA/1956/Add. 1 (1957). It reads:
The Commission has not made specific mention of the freedom to explore
or exploit the subsoil of the high seas. It considered that apart from the
case of the exploitation or exploration of the soil or subsoil of a continen-
tal shelf... such exploitation had not yet assumed sufficient practical im-
portance to justify special regulation.
deep seabed, only the res nullius characterization possesses the
potential for legitimizing sovereign appropriation. Until one State
has effectively occupied a portion of the deep seabed, any attempt
actually to exclude foreign nationals from the area or assert juris-
diction over such nationals found violating exclusionary rules or
regulations lacks international juridical consequence. The inci-
dents of sovereignty remain inchoate until the indicia of effective
occupation have been satisfied.
b. UNCLOS III
The ISNT and the ICNT reflect an attempt to construct an inter-
national legal regime to govern future uses of the seabed and sub-
soil beyond the EEZ or the continental shelf if it extends beyond
that zone.279 Activities designed to explore and/or exploit the
natural resources of the Area are to be subject to the regulation
and supervision of an international body known as the Author-
ity.280 Other activities are to be governed by a few rules of gen-
eral applicability. Because this portion of the study is concerned
with the international legality of military uses of the Area, the pri-
mary focus will be the provisions in the ISNT and the ICNT that
reserve the Area to use exclusively for peaceful purposes 28 1 and
prohibit any State from claiming or exercising sovereignty over,
or appropriating, any part of the Area.282
279. This portion of the seabed is known as the "Area." The ISNT, supra note
93, pt. I, art. 2(1), defines the Area as "the sea-bed and ocean floor and subsoil
thereof beyond the limits of national jurisdiction." The ICNT, supra note 93, art.
1 (1), states: "'Area' means the sea-bed and ocean floor and subsoil thereof beyond
the limits of national jurisdiction."
280. See generally H. KNIGHT, THE LAW OF THE SEA: CASES, DOCUMIENTS AND
READINGS 623-32 (1976); Adede, The System for Exploitation of the "Common Heri-
tage of Mankind" at the Caracas Conference, 69 AM. J. INT'L L. 31 (1975); Goldie,
The Contents of Davy Jones's Locker-A Proposed Regime for the Seabed and
Subsoil, 22 RUTGERS L. REV. 1 (1967).
281. The ISNT, supra note 93, pt. I, art. 8, reads: "1. The Area shall be reserved
exclusively for peaceful purposes. 2. The Area shall be open to use exclusively for
peaceful purposes by all States Parties, whether coastal or land-locked, without
discrimination, in accordance with the provisions of this Convention, and regula-
tions made thereunder." -The ICNT, supra note 93, art. 141, reads: "The Area shall
be open to use exclusively for peaceful purposes by all States, whether coastal or
land-locked, without discrimination and without prejudice to the other provisions
of this Part of the present Convention."
282. The ISNT, supra note 93, pt. I, art. 4, reads:
1. No State shall claim or exercise sovereignty or sovereign rights over
any part of the Area or its resources, nor shall any State or person, natu-
ral or juridical, appropriate any part thereof. No such claim or exercise of
sovereignty or sovereign rights, nor such appropriation shall be recog-
nized.
2. States or persons, natural or juridical, shall claim, acquire or exercise
rights with respect to the minerals in their raw or processed form derived
from the Area only in accordance with the provisions of this Convention.
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Article 8(2) of the ISNT,283 and Article 141 of the ICNT,284 ex-
plicitly state that the Area is "open to use exclusively for peaceful
purposes." Neither draft convention proceeds to explain the pre-
cise standard of use implicit in this reservation, and the travaux
prCparatoires do not make up for this noticeable deficiency.285 If
the provision is construed to prohibit only aggressive uses of the
Area, specifically those activities violative of Article 2(4) of the
United Nations Charter,2 86 then numerous other military activi-
ties may well be consonant with the regime.287 On the other
hand, if the provision proscribes all military uses of the Area,
then any military activity, whether aggressive or not, will un-
doubtedly be in contravention of the provision.288 The non-ag-
gressive connotation of the "peaceful purposes" clause in relation
to the high seas is not controlling because the applicability of that
particular clause does not extend beyond the waters of the high
seas. Moreover, as that specific clause is applied, it is accompa-
nied by a provision implicitly recognizing the right of warships to
traverse the high seas. Thus, the only reconciling construction of
Otherwise, no such claim, acquisition or exercise of rights shall be recog-
nized.
The ICNT, supra note 93, art. 137, is virtually identical.
283. See note 281 supra for the text of ISNT Article 8(2).
284. See note 281 supra for the text of ICNT Article 141.
285. The meaning of "peaceful purposes" received attention, 5 UNCLOS III OR,
PLENARY MEETINGS (68th mtg.) 63 (1976); id. (67th mtg.) 56; id. (66th mtg.) 54. One
commentator, however, has stated that the clause permits the use of listening de-
vices on the deep-sea floor. See M. JANIS, SEA POWER AND THE LAW OF THE SEA 85
(1976).
286. The U.N. CHARTER ch. 1, art. 2, § 4, states: "All members shall refrain in
their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial
integrity or political independence of any state .... "
287. See 5 UNCLOS 1I OR, PLENARY MEETINGS (67th mtg.) 56, 62, para. 81
(1976), where Mr. Learson (United States) stated:
The term "peaceful purposes" did not, of course, preclude military activi-
ties generally. The United States had consistently held that the conduct
of military activities for peaceful purposes was in full accord with the
Charter of the United Nations .... Any specific limitation on military ac-
tivities would require the negotiation of a detailed arms control agree-
ment. The Conference was not charged with such a purpose ......
288. See id. at 56, para. 2, where Mr. Valencia Rodriguez (Ecuador) stated: "It
had already been recognized in many international bodies and agreements that
the use of the ocean space for exclusively peaceful purposes must mean complete
demilitarization and the exclusion from it of all military activities." See also id.
(66th mtg.) 54, 54, paras. 5-12 (comments of Mr. Bakula (Peru)). See also Rao, The
Legal Regime of the Sea-Bed and Ocean Floor, 9 INDIAN J. INT'L L. 1, 17 (1969), con-
tending that the majority of States define "peaceful purposes" to mean non-mili-
tary. On earlier discussions see 23 U.N. GAOR, C.1 (1601st mtg.) 14, U.N. Doc.
A/C.1/PV.1601 (1968) (Trinidad and Tobago);'id. (1596th mtg.) 5-8, U.N. Doc.
A/C.1/PV.1596 (Sweden).
the clause as used in reference to the waters of the high seas is
non-aggressive. Neither draft convention permits comparable mil-
itary use in relation to the Area. Thus, there is no compelling
analogy to be drawn.
Frequently, ambiguities can be removed simply by construing a
troublesome provision in the context of the entire Convention,
seeking to effectuate the general intention of the drafters as evi-
denced in both preceding and subsequent provisions. Yet, in the
case of the "peaceful purposes" clause, the ambiguity seems par-
ticularly inveterate. The ISNT289 as well as the ICNT290 contains
a provision pronouncing the Area and its resources to be the
"common heritage of mankind."291 Even when the "peaceful pur-
poses" clause is construed in conjunction with this provision, one
still cannot state categorically that all military activities are pro-
scribed. This is an evident, logical extrapolation from the previ-
ous examination of both the deep seabed and the waters of the
high seas, areas long acknowledged by many commentators to be
the common heritage of all mankind (res communis)-but areas
where reasonable military uses not accompanied by a claim to or
exercise of sovereignty have been permitted.
Furthermore, both draft proposals also contain a provision stat-
ing that all "[aictivities in the Area shall be carried out for the
benefit of mankind as a whole."292 Though language of similar im-
port in the Outer Space Treaty of 1967293 prompted some scholars
to suggest that any military activity conducted in that realm
would transgress that specific provision because no military activ-
ity could possibly benefit mankind as a whole,294 the same cannot
be said about such language in relation to the Area because both
289. The ISNT, supra note 93, pt. I, art. 3, states: "The Area and its resources
are the common heritage of mankind."
290. The ICNT, supra note 93, art. 136, is identical to Article 3 of the ISNT. See
note 289 supra.
291. For the origin of this concept see 22 U.N. GAOR, C.1 (1515-1516th mtgs.),
U.N. Docs. A/C.1/PV.1515-1516 (1967); G.A. Res. 2340, 22 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 16)
92, U.N. Doc. A/6964 (1967). See generally Arnold, The Common Heritage of Man.
kind as a Legal Concept, 9 IN'L LAw. 153 (1975).
292. The ISNT, supra note 93, pt. I, art. 7, reads: "Activities in the Area shall be
carried out for the benefit of mankind as a whole, irrespective of the geographical
location of States.... and taking into particular consideration the interests and
needs of the developing countries." The ICNT, supra note 93, art. 140, is essen-
tially the same.
293. Article 1 of the Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in
the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, Including the Moon and Other Celestial
Bodies, done Jan. 27, 1967, [1967] 18 U.S.T. 2410, T.I.A.S. No. 6347, 610 U.N.T.S. 205,
states: "The exploration and use of outer space, including the moon and other ce-
lestial bodies, shall be carried out for the benefit and in the interests of all coun-
tries.. .."
294. See Markoff, Disarmament and "Peaceful Purposes" Provision in The 1967
Outer Space Treaty, 4 J. SPACE L. 3 (1976).
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the ISNT295 and the ICNT296 define "activities in the Area" to re-
fer specifically to activities designed to explore and/or exploit the
natural resources located therein. The provision clearly does not
cover all conduct, let alone military conduct. By its express
terms, it is applicable only to activities designed to explore and/or
exploit the natural resources of the Area. Similarly, any conten-
tion that detection devices installed on the sea floor and designed
to conduct surveillance of the ocean "space" 297 come within the
ambit of the "benefit of mankind" provision by virtue of constitut-
ing exploration of a resource is incorrect. Not only is it highly un-
likely that mere observation constitutes "exploration," but both
draft conventions specifically restrict the application of the provi-
sion to the seabed and subsoil and define "resources" to mean
mineral resources,2 98 not resources as metaphysical as space.
In addition to the "peaceful purposes" clause, both draft con-
295. The ISNT, supra note 93, pt. I, art. 1(ii), states: "'Activities in the Area'
means all activities of exploration of the Area and of the exploitation of its re-
sources, as well as other associated activities in the Area including scientific re-
search."
296. The ICNT, supra note 93, art. 133(a), states: "'Activities in the Area' means
all activities of exploration for, and exploitation of, the resources of the Area." It
appears that a stronger case probably can be made pursuant to the ISNT defini-
tion of "activities in the Area" in favor of bringing surveillance devices within the
purview of the "benefit of mankind" provision. The relevant language covers "all
activities of exploration of the Area." Nothing is said about the exploration having
to be connected with "resource" exploration. Although this has been clarified with
the ICNT, it still seems unlikely a convincing argument can be made under the
ISNT because surveillance is probably not the type of "exploration" contemplated
by the provision and, nevertheless, the surveillance is not of the "Area" (seabed
and subsoil) but rather of the ocean space immediately subjacent thereto.
297. See M. McDouGAL, H. LASsWELL, & I. VLAsIc, LAW AND PUBLIC ORDER IN
SPACE 780 (1963). They designate it a "spatial-extension resource" with the most
distinctive characteristic being its utility as a medium of transportation and com-
munication. After stating that the land, ocean, airspace, and outer space consti-
tute the most noticeable examples, they continue:
The land masses obviously contain various stock and flow resources, as do
the oceans and air space and outer space. The particular reference we
make is, however, to the spatial or extension quality of the resource which
makes it a highly advantageous medium of transportation and communi-
cation; for present purposes, the material aspects of these resources are
relevant, not for their characteristics as flow or stock resources, but be-
cause they form a surface or extension which can be made use of for
movement.
298. The ISNT, supra note 93, pt. I, art. 1(iii)-(iv), states: "(iii) 'Resources'
means resources in situ. (iv) Mineral resources means any of the following cat-
egorisation: (a) liquid or gaseous substances ... ; (b) useful minerals occurring
on the surface of the sea-bed ... ; (c) solid minerals in the ocean floor ... ; (d)
ore-bearing silt and brine." The ICNT, supra note 93, art. 133(b), states:
"'Resources' means mineral resources in situ."
ventions contain another provision that may well affect military
uses of the Area. Article 4(1) of the ISNT, and Article 137(1) of
the ICNT, provide: "No State shall claim or exercise sovereignty
or sovereign rights over any part of the Area or its resources, nor
shall any State or person, natural or juridical, appropriate any
part thereof. No such claim or exercise of sovereignty or sover-
eign rights, nor such appropriation shall be recognized." 299
Clearly, no State may claim or exercise sovereignty over any
portion of the Area. Though mere exclusive use does not contra-
vene the prohibition, because, as noted in relation to the 1958
High Seas Convention, all uses of ocean space necessarily operate
to exclude simultaneous use of the same area by any other
State,300 there is little doubt that both the exercise of exclusive
jurisdiction over foreign nationals located within the parameters
of the Area and the assertion of any occlusive authority are
strictly forbidden. The prohibition against any claim or exercise
of sovereignty does not ipso facto prevent military utilization of
,the Area. After all, most military activities constitute mere' exclu-
sive use and involve neither a claim of sovereignty nor an exer-
cise sufficient to give rise to any implication of a claim of
sovereignty. The quoted provision also contains a proscription of
State appropriation of any portion of the seabed and subsoil
thereof beyond the limits of national jurisdiction, a proscription
that may well affect certain military uses of the Area. It seems
axiomatic that the inclusion of appropriation among the list of
prohibited State activities clearly indicates an intention to go be-
yond a simple denunciation of claims to or exercises of sover-
eignty. If this were not so, there would have been no need to
include a term perceived as a mere recitation of previously pro-
scribed conduct.
Though neither the negotiating texts nor the travaux pre-
paratoires contain any definitive statements as to the type of con-
duct constituting an appropriation, 301 it apparently consists of
299. ICNT, supra note 93, art. 137(1); ISNT, supra note 93, pt. I, art. 4(1) (em-
phasis added).
300. See pt. MH(A) (2) supra.
301. Before the First Session of UNCLOS III, many seabed issues were debated
by the United Nations Committee on the Peaceful Uses of the Sea-Bed and the
Ocean Floor Beyond the Limits of National Jurisdiction. In 1973, Subcommittee I
forwarded a draft convention to UNCLOS I which contained several alternative
provisions, 28 U.N. GAOR, 2 Supp. (No. 21) 54, U.N. Doc. A/9021 (1973). Alternative
draft Article 4 read.
(A)
Neither the Area nor (its resources nor) any part thereof shall be sub-
ject to appropriation by any means whatsoever, by States or persons natu-
ral or juridical, and no State shall claim or exercise sovereignty or
sovereign rights over the Area or (its resources or) any part thereof, nor,
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something less than an explicit or implicit claim of sovereignty.
Consequently, the mere fact that a certain military use is not
sufficient to contravene the proscription of any claim to or exer-
cise of sovereignty over any portion of the Area does not mean
that it is authorized by international law. If the use amounts to
an appropriation, then, despite the fact that it may comport with
all other principles enunciated in the draft conventions, it is pro-
hibited.
Standing alone, or construed in conjunction with the "common
heritage" or "benefit of mankind" provisions, the '"peaceful pur-
poses" clause lacks sufficient normative clarity to proscribe all
military activities within the Area.302 Neither the draft conven-
except as hereinafter otherwise specified in these articles, shall any State
or any person natural or juridical claim, acquire or exercise any rights
over the resources of the Area or of any part thereof. Subject to the fore-
going, no such claims or exercise of such rights shall be recognized.
OR (B)
1. No State shall claim or exercise sovereignty or sovereign rights over
any part of the sea-bed or the subsoil thereof. States Parties to this
Treaty shall not recognize any such claim or exercise of sovereignty or
sovereign rights.
2. Similarly, the sea-bed and the subsoil thereof shall not be subject to
appropriation by any means, by States or persons, natural or juridical.
The precise meaning of "appropriation" was never clarified. Moreover, it appeared
in neither the 1971 report, 26 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 21), U.N. Doc. A/8421 (1971),
nor the 1972 report, 27 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 21), U.N. Doc. A/8721 (1972). How-
ever, in 1971 Canada submitted a paper to the Committee, International sea-bed
regime and machinery working paper, U.N. Doc. A/AC.138/59, cited in 26 U.N.
GAOR, Supp. (No. 21) 205, U.N. Doc. A/8421 (1971), which contained an Article
prohibiting "appropriation." In explanation it said:
Bearing in mind international experience with various uses of the high
seas ... it would also be advisable to give a clearer indication in the
treaty as to what might constitute a form of appropriation falling short of a
claim or exercise of sovereignty or sovereign rights (a question which is
closely related both to the scope of activities to be governed by the regime
and to the reservation of the sea-bed for exclusively peaceful purposes).
To this end "appropriation" might be defined to mean any exclusive use or
denial of the right of access not provided for in the treaty.
Id. at 206. (emphasis added). Though denial of the right of access is surely appro-
priation, it will be demonstrated below that to proclaim mere exclusive use an ap-
propriation is unwise.
302. Mr. Bavand (Iran), recapitulated the various interpretations voiced at UN-
CLOS I1, 5 UNCLOS III OR, PLENARY MEETINGS (68th mtg.) 63, 65 (1976):
Three trends of thought seemed to emerge .... Many States had taken
the view that "peaceful purposes" meant the prohibition of all military
activities, including activities by military personnel, on the sea-bed.
Other States interpreted the principle as prohibiting all military activities
for offensive purposes, but not, for instance, the use of military means of
communication or the use of military personnel for scientific purposes. A
third group of States maintained that the test of whether an activity was
tions nor the working documents indicate any consensus as to the
meaning of the clause. Moreover, the "common heritage" provi-
sion merely operates to prohibit assertions of sovereignty over
the Area, while the "benefit of mankind" provision governs only
activities designed to explore and/or exploit the mineral re-
sources of the seabed and subsoil.
Any explicit claim to sovereignty over a portion of the Area is
proscribed. Claims implicit in any assertion that a portion of the
Area is closed to foreign nationals, or in the exercise of exclusive
jurisdiction over such nationals found within a portion of the
Area, are similarly proscribed. Because neither draft convention
expressly prohibits every possible exclusive use of the Area, it ap-
pears that many military uses continue unaffected unless it can
indubitably be shown that "peaceful purposes" proscribes all ac-
tivities of a military nature. Even if this proscription cannot be
demonstrated, those exclusive military activities exhibiting some
indication of permanency are prohibited by the proscription of
appropriation.
c. Assessment
Most authorities are still in disagreement as to whether the in-
ternational legal regime established by the 1958 Conference
designates the deep seabed res communis or res nullius. None-
theless, it is clear that both characterizations permit military utili-
zation,303 with the former differing only in that it proscribes
efforts to subject the Area to State sovereignty. In general terms,
UNCLOS III leaves the regime of military utilization intact. How-
ever, in addition to characterizing explicitly the Area as res
communis and thereby proscribing all claims to or assertions of
sovereignty, any use exhibiting an indication of permanency is
prohibited by the proscription of "appropriation" of any portion of
the ocean floor beyond the limits of national jurisdiction. The
only permissible exclusive military uses are those of a temporary
nature.
The vastness of the deep seabed, its distance from the littoral,
and its physical composition relative to the superjacent high seas
all conjoin to increase the likelihood that in the future it will be-
come one of the primary areas for substantial ASW deployment
peaceful was whether it was consistent with the Charter of the United Na-
tions and other obligations of international law.
(emphasis added).
303. See Legal Regime of Inner Space, supra note 132, at 188; Rao, Legal Regu-
lation of Maritime Military Uses, 13 INDIAN J. INT'L L. 425, 453 (1973). But see
Stoever, The "Race"for the Seabed: The Right to Emplace Military Installations on
the Deep Ocean Floor, 4 INT'L LAw. 560, 563-64 (1970).
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programs (and for that matter, military uses in general). The
United States has already embarked on programs designed to ac-
tualize this prognostication. In the area of anti-submarine mines,
the "Captor" (MK-46) is designed to take advantage not only of
reduced coastal State sensitivity to military utilization of areas of
the ocean floor distant from the littoral but also of the fact that
the seabed, as opposed to the water column, admits to the affixa-
tion of mines which one can rest assured will remain in place to
threaten enemy submarines in perpetuity. Also, since the early
1970's military engineers have been seriously considering the de-
ployment of a network of massive fixed acoustic detection instru-
ments known as the "Suspended Array System" (SAS).
Reportedly, one such device stationed in each ocean would "in-
sonify" the earth's entire water column. The potential military
advantages incident to either program are not difficult to concep-
tualize.
The present international legal regime governing military utili-
zation of the deep seabed does not effectively proscribe undertak-
ings as ambitious as Captor and SAS. Assuming that deployment
of these ASW devices is unaccompanied by any closing of the
area to use by foreign nationals, or by assertions of jurisdiction
over such nationals found in the immediate vicinity, the exclusive
use appears quite consistent with notions of reasonableness. His-
torically, this standard has given great deference to military uses
of ocean space unless they created inordinate interference with
inclusive uses. The fact that both Captor and SAS are to be
deployed far below the navigable surface removes almost any
possibility that either will result in the least interference with in-
clusive uses of ocean space. Most likely, the only interference
will be with exclusive military uses by other States.
A regime that permits deep seabed emplacement of ASW de-
vices comparable to SAS or Captor is definitely undesirable.
Such a fixed acoustic detection network would result in the trans-
parency of the earth's entire water column. States could keep
constant track of the precise location of every SSBN. The resul-
tant loss of invulnerablility would subject the SSBNs of potential
opponents to destruction. As a consequence, the last assured
counterforce component that may well have served in the past to
deter the launching of any preemptive nuclear attack will itself
become subject to elimination. A strategic asymmetry of this sort
would jeopardize international stability and State security by
threatening to disrupt the balance of power.304 Any nation that
possesses the capacity to attrite sufficiently all three components
of the strategic triad may not feel the least averse to launching a
nuclear strike if the international situation dictates.
The regime embodied in the proposals of UNCLOS III effec-
tively proscribes the installation of such ASW devices and
thereby preserves the invulnerability of the counterforce deter-
rent carried by the SSBN. Both the ISNT and the ICNT go be-
yond the mere proscription of claims to or assertions of
sovereignty and prohibit all States from appropriating any portion
of the Area. Specifically, although exclusive temporary use is per-
mitted,305 any exclusive use that exhibits an indication of perma-
nency, such as installation to the seabed, is prohibited. A
proscriptive regime of this character guarantees international sta-
bility and State security through maintenance of the balance of
power.
As mentioned in relation to the waters of the high seas and to
those of the EEZ, proscriptive regimes frequently prove illusory
and sometimes actually destabilizing. It would be fatuous to es-
tablish a regime prohibiting certain conduct if in fact the degree
of compliance could not be readily verified. The perfidious would
violate the agreement with impunity, oftentimes subjecting adher-
ents to military disadvantage. This is clearly not the case with
the proscription of State appropriation of any portion of the Area.
Although admittedly the waters of the high seas are vast and sus-
ceptible to inconspicuous deployment of water column ASW de-
vices, any effort to install successfully a network of fixed acoustic
detection arrays or anti-submarine mines to the seabed will nec-
essarily require a large-scale task force stationed on the navigable
surface working for a considerable period of time. To verify the
extent of State compliance with the proscription would be quite
easy.
For precisely the reason stated in the preceding paragraph, it
would be unwise to construe the "peaceful purposes" clause con-
tained in each draft convention to mean an absolute proscription
of all military uses of the Area. How, for instance, could one pos-
sibly verify whether some temporary military activity is taking
place on the ocean floor, thousands of feet below the opaque
water surface? Military uses designed to be permanent in nature
inevitably result in significant surface activity; the same cannot
be said of temporary uses. Therefore, any proscription of tempo-
rary military uses of the seabed beyond the limits of national ju-
304. See W. BuRKE, TowARDS A BETTER USE OF THE OCEANS 88-89 (1969).
305. Id. at 88.
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risdiction will create a false sense of security. States with no
moral compunction to abide by the proscription will undoubtedly
violate it, while adherents will be placed at a military disadvan-
tage.
IV. CONCLUSION
Certain military uses of ocean space jeopardize international
stability and the widely shared value of State security. For in-
stance, though it is quite clear that peacetime ASW programs
designed for purposes of self-defense present little threat to the
continuation of international tranquility, the same cannot be said
of programs designed to deploy conjunctively massive fixed
acoustic detection arrays, hunter-killer submarines, and electroni-
cally guided long-range anti-submarine weapons. Assured invul-
nerability of the counterforce component carried by the SSBN
serves to deter nuclear conflict and cavalier foreign policy. In-
sonification of ocean space accompanied by weapons that
threaten the survivability of nuclear submarines launching Polar-
is/Poseidon missiles may well erode the constraints preventing
thermonuclear conflagration.
If any international legal regime designed to control military
uses of ocean space, particularly peacetime ASW, is to be effec-
tive, the extent to which the State-Parties observe the provisions
must submit to ready verification, and the regime itself must in
fact preserve the balance of power. Although it is unlikely many
States would adhere to an arms-control convention that actually
threatened to disrupt rather than maintain the balance of power,
scrutiny of the annals of history could surely unearth several in-
stances in which just such a thing has happened. But it should be
kept in mind that the balance of power may also be jeopardized
by a regime that does not specifically embody destabilizing obli-
gations, but rather obligations to which the extent of State-Party
observance cannot be easily verified. The perceived advantage in-
cident to perfidy may prove too tempting to resist.
This study has sought to focus attention, not only on the spe-
cific legal rules regulating the use of ocean space for ASW activi-
ties, but also on the desirability of the particular regimes in
reference to the desiderata of maintenance of the balance of
power and verifiability. Measured against these requisites, the
1958 Conventions and the products of UNCLOS III establish
desirable proscriptive regimes from the coastline to the outer
boundary of the territorial sea and equally desirable permissive
regimes over all waters beyond the territorial sea. Throughout
the remainder of ocean space, exclusive of the continental shelf, it
appears that only the ISNT and the ICNT create comparably de-
sirable regimes.
The 1958 Conventions permit all States to deploy ASW devices
within the waters of the high seas. Both negotiating texts issuing
from UNCLOS III permit deployment within the waters of the
EEZ in addition to those of the high seas. This permission ap-
pears preferable because it would be particularly difficult to verify
adequately compliance with a proscriptive regime and because
successful deployment will infrequently prove beneficial. Any
foreign use threatening coastal State security will fall within the
ambit of Article 51 of the United Nations Charter. With respect to
the seabed immediately subjacent to the waters of the EEZ and
the deep sea, however, only the products of UNCLOS I prohibit
foreign State deployment. The 1958 Convention deals with such
deployment on the basis of Article 51.
Pursuant to the 1958 Conventions, the seabed beyond the conti-
nental shelf is clearly subject to foreign State military utilization.
When one considers that that area is susceptible to emplacement
of massive fixed acoustic detection devices, it is readily apparent
that a proscriptive regime, such as that proposed by the products
of UNCLOS Ill, is highly desirable. Because the installation of
such devices will necessitate large-scale, prolonged foreign State
naval activity on both the surface and the seabed below, it will be
particularly easy to verify the extent of State-Party observance.
